GOD
AN ENQUIRY AND A SOLUTION

BY

PAUL CARUS

CHRISTIANITY OF TO-DAY SERIES

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GOD

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF MAN'S HIGHEST IDEAL AND A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCIENCE

BY

PAUL CARUS

"NEARER, MY GOD TO THEE,
NEARER ALWAY!"

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PART I

A NEW CONCEPTION OF GOD

PART I.

A NEW CONCEPTION OF GOD.

THE PROBLEM.

The conception of God is the most important idea of philosophy, science, and religion, and our attitude toward it is of vital importance for our emotional, intellectual, and moral life. It is a thought which, more than any other, covers the unity of existence in its entirety, and its formulation touches upon a great number of other problems. Indeed, it is likely to present itself at any moment in one form or another. Thus it is a matter of course that the conception of God has been approached in various ways and can be treated in the most diverse manners.

We may with mystics abandon any attempt at comprehending the problem and indulge in purely intuitional contemplations, which naturally will assume the form of visions and ecstasies. We may with moralists point out the close relation between God and duty and preach the sermon of the categorical imperative; or we may with the scientist seek the ultimate *raison d'être* of existence and trace the eternal, the everlasting, the permanent, in the tran-

siency of natural phenomena. We might combine the three methods and start from the needs of these three aspects of human nature, the head, the heart, and the hand, and proceed on these three avenues of our life to their center, in the hope of harmonizing the results of our methods and reconciling apparent contradictions.

Yet we may take still another road which is very promising. The God-idea is of historical growth; in the form in which it exists in the minds of the present generation it is the product of a long evolution; it represents aspirations definite in kind and tending in a definite direction. These aspirations are by no means all consistent; to a great extent they are conflicting and even directly contradictory. Many of them are conservative and reactionary; others progressive and radical. A great part of them partake of the nature of instincts. They are, in their ultimate constructions, submerged in the realm of subconscious and unconscious soul-life. In other words, they are based upon arguments which do not all appear on the surface of conscious life but are partly buried in the traditions of the past, and have originated under the influence of the experiences of our ancestors from time immemorial, still embody-

ing the notions of primeval man, which, however, have been added to and have also been corrected by considerations of a more matured period.

All these methods are constructive. They are methods of handling the material that is given and, however critical we may be in details, assume (or, at least, may assume) the legitimacy of the God-idea itself as a matter of course. But we might attack the subject in quite another fashion, a fashion which at first sight appears to invalidate the whole issue, but which may, after all, prove most fruitful by assuming an attitude of doubt and subjecting the God-idea to a critical analysis.

What if the atheist be right after all? Would not the whole question as to the nature of God become irrelevant? Would not the visions of the mystic have to be regarded as aberrations of the human mind? Would not the God-idea in science and philosophy be out of place, and had not ethics better dispense with it as an unfounded hypothesis, while in history it should be treated under the heading of superstitions?

These questions we venture to answer with a decided No. Even from the standpoint of the athiest, the God-idea remains the most important thought in the history of the world.

It is neither irrelevant nor an aberration, but contains the most important, the deepest and most comprehensive, philosophically the most explanatory, and practically the most applicable truth of all truths,—a truth which is expressed in a most telling popular way, setting forth its main features in striking human analogies and with a directness that shows at once the practical and personal interrelation of the unity of the whole to all of its parts, of the universal to all particulars, of God to every one of us.

AGNOSTICISM.

There is still another attitude left, which is the agnostic position, holding that we cannot know whether God exists or not. Agnosticism, which may briefly be characterized as a bankruptcy of thought, is not only the weakest but also the most injurious philosophy. It is the philosophy of indolence which, on account of its own insolvency, declares that the most vital questions of man's life, the questions of the soul, the soul's relation to the body and the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, the creation, and the ultimate purpose of being, are beyond the reach of reason. The agnostic argument consists in glittering phrases such as "the finite cannot comprehend the infinite,"

which are unmeaning, if analyzed, but, as a rule, strongly appeal to the half-educated man who is satisfied with mere words.

"The finite cannot comprehend the infinite" is such a common-place expression and is so thoughtlessly repeated by both reverent and irreverent agnostics, that I may be pardoned for a short digression in pointing out its weakness. What does the phrase mean? Are the terms "finite" and "infinite" used in their strict scientific, that is to say, their mathematical sense? Apparently not. For in mathematical language the "infinite" as such is not less definite and clear than the "finite." It is a process unlimited, while the finite is limited. A mathematical line is infinite. The decimal fraction 0.333, etc., if it were actually extended to equal one-third would be an infinite series; the tangent of 90° is infinite, etc., etc. All these infinitudes are no more incomprehensible than the finite numbers 1, 2, 3, or any other magnitude.

Are the terms "finite" and "infinite" in our phrase used in the mechanical sense? Apparently not. An infinite chain, an infinite screw are mechanical contrivances which serve the same purpose over and over again. There is no beginning and no end,—but only an uninter-

rupted round of revolutions. A circle, a ring, a wheel, capable of unlimited functions by returning again and again to the starting-point, are not more incomprehensible than things definitely limited in their work, having characteristic starting-points, progressive developments, and final consummations. There is as little sense in the saying "The finite cannot comprehend the infinite" as in the words "The rational cannot comprehend the irrational," or "The wise can never comprehend the unwise." If, however, the words "finite" and "infinite" have a special sense, the inventor of the argument should first define the terms before he expects us to accept his conclusion as valid.

The infinite is a process that can never be finished because as soon as we stop it ceases to be infinite. Therefore we can think it, but never contemplate it in a concrete instance. And why not? Because the infinite is not a concrete thing. It is a function. The infinite means possibility of unlimited progress. All potentialities are infinite; the use of every atom is infinite, the chance of every human soul is infinite. Everything in space and time is limited, but time and space which are not things are infinite. There is nothing marvelous in the fact that there are unlimited functions. We

are mystified only if we regard the infinite as a concrete thing and then discover that the idea is contradictory.

There are two kinds of agnosticism: the pious agnosticism of him who would not allow the light of science to shine upon the problem of religion; and the infidel agnosticism of the scoffer who argues that since knowledge on matters of religion is unobtainable we ought to leave religion alone. Both views are equally reactionary; yet at the same time both are equally acceptable to the indolent who love stagnation because they dislike to do any thinking for themselves.

While even the atheist's denial will be helpful, the agnostic position is neither theoretically valid nor practicable, for it leaves all opinions, be they scientific, superstitious, or mere guesswork, on the same level of equal incommensurability. And this verdict holds good for agnosticism in all forms, for Mr. Spencer's popular agnosticism adapted to the demands of the average reader, and even for Kant's idealism which is both deeper and more dignified. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant demonstrates the fallacies of the God-idea and the impossibility of offering any positive proof in its favor; yet in his *Critique of Practical*

Reason he postulates the existence of God. But if God is to be of any account at all, his existence must not belong to things hypothetical. A God whose existence has to be postulated is worse than no God at all, and even atheism is preferable to that undefined theology which rests its ultimate argument upon our utter ignorance of things supersensible.

THE FACTS OF EXPERIENCE.

If we wish to be clear on this subject, which has been surrounded with the clouds of dust raised by the quarrels of schools and factions, we must trace God in the facts of our experience. If he is not there, he is nowhere; if he is only beyond the clouds or in the realms of metaphysics, his existence is of no account and we might as well do without him.

The monotheistic God-idea is very old. Centuries before the prophets of Israel purified the Yahveh cult of Palestine, there were philosophers in Egypt and priests in Mesopotamia who proclaimed the supremacy of the one God. An ancient brick found at Ur, whose date has been ascertained to be 2500 B. C., contained the following litany for temple service:

"In Heaven who is supreme?—Thou alone art supreme.
On earth who is supreme?—Thou alone art supreme.
Thy word is proclaimed in Heaven,
And the angels bow down their faces."

And a hymn of about the same date reads:

"Long-suffering Father, full of forgiveness,
Whose hand upholdeth the lives of mankind,
Lord, thy deity is as wide as the Heavens
And it fills the sea with awe."

In the history of the nations, Israel has become the prophet of this monotheism. We can still trace in the Old Testament the process of purification. The tribal deity of Yahveh, worshiped under the symbol of a bull in the national sacred cities of Bethel and Dan, gradually changed into the universal God of justice and truth, until in the early Christian era he was conceived as the triune Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,—which in philosophical language means God is *Grund, Ursache,* and *Zweck* of existence. He is (1) the *raison d'être,* or law of being[1], (2) the evolution of life in its onward

[1] I purposely avoid the trite and at the same time erroneous phrase, *causa sui.* For a criticism of this strange mistake see the author's *Primer of Philosophy,* pp. 145-147 and *Fundamental Problems,* p. 90.

aspiration, and (3) the ideal and its final consummation, the aim and purpose of existence.

Now, in all religious ideas we must distinguish between the symbol and its significance, the myth and its meaning, the allegory and its lesson. Accordingly, we must analyze the God-idea and distinguish between those features which can be retained as literally true and those which are allegorical. Literally true are those features alone which can be traced in the facts of experience and established on good evidence as unequivocal actualities.

In the mythology of monotheism God is called the Father, the Lord, the Creator, the Judge. What can these terms mean? Have we to understand that God is a man as we are, a parent who procreates children that grow up and develop in his own image? Shall we regard Him as a king after the fashion of earthly rulers, surrounded by angels and archangels, as our sovereigns are by ministers of state and secretaries? Shall we believe in the judgment-day as pictured by Michael Angelo and other Christian artists? The atheist rejects the belief in God on account of the crudities of the myth if literally accepted. And I do not hesitate to say in plain words that the atheist is

right if it is necessary to regard these crudities as the essential features of the God-idea.

The child-like theist says: "The world is governed by a good Father." The atheist says: "The world is governed by law." Both are wrong. There is no governing at all; the term governing is a pure allegory which in its literal significance does not apply to the processes of nature. The truth is that there are uniformities of nature which can be classified in universal formulas describing all possible happenings of a special type. Thus the law of gravitation does not govern the motion of falling bodies and of the coursing planets, meteors, and suns. The law, so-called, is a descriptive formula which states in the tersest way possible the mode of action which things of a definite quality will take under certain conditions. That which makes the stone fall is the stone's gravity, which is an attribute of its mass, and the action of the stone's gravity depends upon the stone's position in the universe,—mainly upon the gravity (i. e., the mass) of the earth. There is no God and no law which dictates the course of action, but the things act on account of the inherent qualities which constitute them. The world is not a world of slaves, but a free play of uniformities. There is not a metaphysical

or theological power that forces things, either animate or inanimate, to pursue a certain course, but all things act in a definite and determinable way by virtue of their own nature. A thief steals when the occasion arises, and an honest man pursues the straight path of righteousness, as the cat will jump at the mouse and the oxygen will combine with the carbon. None of the events of the world happen at the dictates of either a God or a law, but because things are such as to act thus. Things consist of motor impulses, shaped by previous conditions, and, according to present conditions, taking a definite course.

Things purely physical are dominated by their physical properties: fire burns, the chemical elements combine according to their chemical affinities, the stone falls to the ground in a velocity described by Newton's law, etc. But rational beings are guided and prompted to action by their impulses, motor ideas, and considerations of probable consequences. The higher a creature ranges the less prone it will be to rush into action and the more important will be the process of deliberation, and thoughtful persons will gradually establish principles which are ultimately derived from experience. For man learns to mind. He has to respect the

powers that curtail his wishes and he adjusts himself to conditions. Thus he recognizes an authority of some kind to which he has to submit and this authority of man's conduct whatever it may be I call his God.

In this preliminary definition I will not here discuss what God is and what the idea of God ought to be. I will only call attention to this most significant feature of the idea of God as the authority of conduct, and will grant that in this sense every thoughtful man who is not a slave of his impulses and passions but regulates his conduct in one way or another, has a god of some kind.

Is this not atheism? May be it is. All depends upon the definition of the word. We must not be afraid of words; and if we find that atheism is right, let us frankly confess that we are atheists. Thank God that the days are past when atheists were burned at the stake, and let us be assured that, on the one hand, the best theist is more of an atheist than he may grant you; while, on the other hand, what is more important in a discussion of the God-problem, the most rabid atheist is more of a theist than he himself is aware. Let us see how.

FROM THE ATHEIST'S POINT OF VIEW.

We shall start on the much abused road of the atheist and grant all that can be granted him.

A scientific world-conception needs no God. Laplace answered Napoleon, when asked why there was no mention of God in his *Celestial Mechanics*, "I have no need of that hypothesis," and every man of science may give the same answer, in the same sense.

Further, there is no need of the God-idea in ethics, to teach morality. The God-idea is a convenient assistance to the teacher, but a moralist of a solid philosophical education is not in need of God. Kant, for instance, opens his work on *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason,* as follows:

"Morality, in so far as it is based upon the conception of man as a free being who binds himself through his reason by absolute laws, is in need neither of a being superior to himself to recognize his duty, nor of any special motive other than the law itself that is to be observed."[2]

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[2]Translated from the preface to the edition of the year 1793. Leipsic: Modes and Baumann, Vol. VI., p. 161.

Nor can it be said that our heart is in need of God. Christian mystics constantly have the word God upon their tongues, but closely considered, the God of Jacob Böhme, of Johannes Tauler, of Angelus Silesius, and other theosophical philosophers is not very different from the Buddhist Nirvâna, and we might as well express the very same sentiments in an atheistic terminology.

We may grant even more. The craving for prayer which appears to be ingrained in the human heart seems to demand the existence of a God; but what did the Son of Man, who, in the New Testament records, is said to have been conscious of his Sonship of God, say when his disciples requested him, "Lord teach us to pray!" He taught them a prayer which may be characterized as a prayer to wean us from the habit of praying. The Lord's Prayer is a prayer only in its form; in its substance it is a vow to abandon prayer in the literal sense of the word.

If a friend of yours prays you to do him a favor, he attempts to induce you to comply with his wish. The Lord's Prayer does nothing of the kind. On the contrary, it attunes the heart to comply with God's ordinances, whatever they may be, and to submit to his will.

"Thy will be done" is not a prayer in the proper signification of the word.

There is but one petition in the Lord's Prayer which appears to be a genuine prayer, and we have reason to believe that it suffered by being translated into Greek, viz.: "Give us this day our daily bread." The oldest versions vary greatly, and a reconstruction which has been attempted in the original Aramaic is at best hypothetical. Judging from other passages which express the views of Jesus of Nazareth on the same topic, the significance of the fourth prayer will be clear, if viewed in the light of the sentence, "Take no heed of the morrow." Accordingly we are inclined to interpret it in the sense: "Let us be satisfied with our daily bread," and thus the fourth prayer would, like the other prayers, be a mere variation of the general theme expressed by Christ in Gethsemane: "Not what I will, but what thou wilt."

Here we have a remarkable coincidence between theism and atheism. Buddhism, commonly regarded as an atheistic religion, rejects prayer as an irreligious practice and replaces prayers by vows. Analyze the Lord's Prayer, and it consists of self-exhortations, of vows,

which serve the educational purpose of a high-minded self-discipline.

THE LESSON OF UNIFORMITIES.

Having made all these concessions to atheism, we shall now build our God-conception upon the very foundations which atheism leaves us. We shall thereby construct a conception of God which rests on an irreversible foundation, on the rock of ages. It will prove tenable not only before the most critical tribunal of science, but even the atheist will be unable to refute or reject it.

There are uniformities of a definite type in nature, which render it possible to describe natural phenomena, and even predict the course of events to come. These uniformities are the conditions of science. On the one hand they make the phenomena of the world classifiable and thereby comprehensible; and on the other hand they make possible the development of an organ of comprehension called "reason." Reason is simply the faculty of tracing samenesses by designating the same type of phenomena by the same name. By comprehending samenesses we can anticipate the future and by anticipating the future we learn to seek the useful and to avoid evil. Thus, uniformities naturally pro-

duce purposive action. The apprehension of future results leads to adaptation, and adaptation pursued with conscious intention is the condition of ethics.

The uniformities of nature in their totality constitute a grand harmony which is commonly called the cosmic order; and this cosmic order comprises the chemical combination of atoms, no less than the motions of stars, and is the principle which permeates the realm of man's life, including his highest intellectual and moral aspirations.

What is the *raison d'être* of these uniformities? Have they, such as they are, been ordained by the Creator, or are they accidental similarities? Here lies the whole God-problem in a nutshell, and this is the answer that science gives: "They are neither ordained, nor are they accidental: they are intrinsically necessary."

We can best explain the peculiar meaning of the term "necessary" by a reference to mathematics and logic.

The philosophical term "necessity" must not be confounded with "compulsion." Philosophical necessity, in the sense in which we use the term, does not imply the curtailment of liberty, but denotes simply that certain things (including the future course of events) are defi-

nitely determined according to conditions; they can be described; their nature, their behavior, their fate, can be foretold in descriptive formulas. If a wrathful man is not checked by the fear of punishment, he will, if unimpeded, maltreat or even slay his adversary. He commits the crime of his own free will according to the character of the motor ideas of which his soul consists; he acts as he wants to act, without any external compulsion and yet with necessity. It is that inner necessity which is determined by himself, by his own character. In the same way the needle of a compass points toward the north by virtue of its magnetic nature. According to the physicist's interpretation of the process, the needle, when left at liberty to adjust its position, will adapt itself to the magnetic lines of force that pass through it.

MATHEMATICS.

Mathematics teaches us to comprehend the nature of necessity, in the philosophical sense of the term. "Necessary" is not that which suffers violence or is forced by some external pressure, but that which is definitely determinable. $1+1=2$ is a statement which carries with it an intrinsic necessity. The same is true of $2+2=1+3$ and of all arithmetical and geomet-

rical theorems. Thus the sum of the angles of a triangle in Euclidean or plane space is always equal to two right angles; the tangent of $45°=1$; the square of the hypotenuse in any rectangular triangle of Euclidean space is equal to the sum of the squares of the sides, etc. There is no compulsion whatever here, but there is necessity,—that which in common parlance we call "a matter of course."

Mathematics, logic, and all other formal sciences are purely ideal constructions. An action is done (which in the domain of the science of pure form means it is thought of as done) and the results will always be the same if the process of construction be the same, and thus an ideal—i. e., a purely mental—world of samenesses, of uniformities, is established, which when applied to the realities of the material world serves to classify its phenomena, to describe them, and to predict their future course. The formal sciences have been invented to describe that which is necessary and to arrange all necessities into a methodical and comprehensive system which assists us in seeing at a glance that, given some function under definite conditions, certain results will take place as a matter of course. Here lies the explanation of the cosmic order with all that it implies, sci-

ence, reason and rationality, foresight and purpose, ideals and ethics.

Now, mathematics and all the other formal sciences are descriptions, they are a system of formulas, and the question arises, Are these formulas pure inventions, or is there any reality that corresponds to them?

There are philosophers who claim that the formal sciences do not formulate truths but are a *lusus intellectus,* a mere play of the mind. Even Kant took the word "ideal" in the sense of "subjective" which practically changed all ideal conceptions into imaginary magnitudes. On this little mistake, viz.: the identification of "ideal" and "subjective," which was inadvertently made by the great Königsberg thinker, hinges the philosophy of his critical idealism and the bold assumption of the ideality, that is to say the illusory nature, of space, time, and the categories. No wonder that Kant's system lacked system and opened a loophole for agnosticism which has appeared in the shape of a doctrine of the unknowableness of things-in-themselves. Thus he arrived at a conclusion in which his radicalism offered a safe refuge to the reactionary obscurantism of his time, and Kant himself made the proposition that he "must abolish knowledge to make room for be-

lief," which stands in an irreconcilable contradiction to his original aspiration for certainty of knowledge by avoiding both dogmatism and skepticism, i. e., Wolf's dogmatism with its unfounded assumptions, and Hume's skepticism, which is a denial of strict science. Kant meant to avoid "skepticism, which changes labor into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy," yet his doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself commits the same error. Kant aspired after certainty and arrived at nescience.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PURELY FORMAL.

Let us briefly characterize the nature of the term "ideal," in the sense in which Kant ought to have used it when speaking of Space and Time as being ideal, as belonging to the realm of ideas!

An idea is a mental picture in the thinking subject, representing some objective reality. The objective reality need not be a concrete thing, but may be a general quality or a universal relation; it may be a combination of things not yet realized, and it may be a mode of conceiving mere relations under a common aspect. In all events it must be representative, it must point beyond or outside itself, it must be a sym-

bol of something. The nature of ideas is their significance, that is to say, ideas are not purely subjective; they are subjective pictures of objective presences of some kind. Thus that which in this sense is ideal (things belonging to the realm of ideas) is not *eo ipso* identical with the purely subjective; it is not mere thought and therefore unreal or illusory, but on the contrary its most characteristic feature is representativeness, as signifying some objective reality.

Now we ask, What is the nature of the realities represented in the purely formal sciences? They are real presences in the world, John Stuart Mill and the whole Empiricist School notwithstanding. We may call them the purely formal laws of nature if we bear in mind that they are not laws, not coercive factors, but intrinsically necessary uniformities. Nor are they many various uniformities; they form one great system. They are one throughout and every special formula is but one aspect under special conditions of the same fundamental idea which may be comprised under the name of "universal consistency." They form in their totality an organic whole, a body of necessities which are all equally self-evident and even in their greatest complexity a matter of course.

These uniformities are not mere abstrac-

tions; they are effective determinants in the real world of material things. They are the formative factors of the world. While all things are transient, they are eternal; while all existences are subject to change, they are the same forever and aye. They are uncreated and uncreatable. They are the measure of truth and standard of right and wrong. When we become acquainted with them, we have glimpses into the realms of the eternal. But consider! Geometry, arithmetic, and logic are only partial glimpses into the glorious harmony of the divine constitution of existence. There is also, as it were, a mathematics of ethics, and a geometry of religious aspirations, the practical importance of which is more easily felt than understood.

From the eternal moulds of these formative presences of existence all things proceed, and in them the forms of all things are preserved in a universal and superreal existence which knoweth not of origin or dissolution, nor of birth nor death, nor of the anxieties of life and the fear of annihilation.

The plural form of the realities which correspond to the ideas of the purely formal sciences, is justified only because we become gradually acquainted with them in the uniformities

of experience. Thus they at first appear to the growing intellect as a plurality of factors. But the truth soon dawns on a thinking mind that they form one grand system. We spoke of them purposely in the plural, for the sake of not anticipating the main implication of the God-idea, which consists in the organic unity of the world-order as one consistent whole of uniformities, which may, not inappropriately, be spoken of as a personality, not human but divine, not bodily but spiritual and ideal, not individual, i. e., in a special place and having states of temporal succession, but eternal and omnipresent. It is obvious that the unity of all formative factors is their most essential feature, for every single aspect is complete only when viewed as an aspect of this whole organism.

When we try to realize the importance of these presences as a unity we shall soon find that they possess a direct and personal relation to the life of every one of us, which (if we remain conscious of the allegory) may very well be compared to a father, a lord, or a judge. Besides it partakes of all those qualities which have, since time immemorial, been regarded as the characteristic features of the Deity.

ALLHOOD.

In the unity of these presences we have the Allhood of existence, which is the formative principle of the world, constituting the cosmic order. This Allhood is omnipresent and eternal. It comprises everything in its loving embrace; man has originated in its image, and reason is but the reflection of its intrinsic consistency. It is the prototype of logic, of rational speech, of language, or, as the Fourth Gospel has it, "The Logos that was in the beginning," and thus it is the prototype of all truth. It is the world-reason, or the Tao as it is called by the Taoists, of which Lao-Tze the venerable founder of Taoism says:

"It quickens all things and cherishes them;
It quickens but owns not;
It acts but claims not;
It brings up but rules not."

By Allhood I do not here understand the totality of corporeal things but those uniform and omnipresent factors which determine the formation of things everywhere. It is not identical with the sum of all corporeal existences but it pervades them all as their norm, or, as naturalists would say, as their law.

This Allhood is not an imaginary assumption, but it is the most real factor of life. It

is not only real; it is superreal in the literal sense of the word; that is to say,—it is not only a presence in the concrete things of this actual world in which we live, but it applies generally and would be no less present in any possible world that might originate somewhere, somehow, as if by magic. Nay, it holds good for purely fictitious worlds which, after the fashion of fairy tales, endeavor to establish other laws and arrangements that would supersede the laws of nature with which we are familiar. Even the dreams of magic do not abolish causation; they only attempt to alter its concatenations, and its miracles are viewed as necessary results from the supposition on which they are based. So little can we discard necessity itself, even when we fly into the realms of fancy.

The attempt has been made to explain the world-order as a creation of God, but here the traditional conception of theism breaks down. For this omnipresence that permeates all existence is beginningless and intrinsically necessary. If this formative omnipresence be not God, if it is assumed to be different from God, then it is undoubtedly God's superior. God would have to comply with the world-order and its laws in order to construct the world cor-

rectly; he would have to utilize its norms of logic and consistency, in order to be wise; he would have to adopt its eternal principles of truth and right, in order to be moral. In other words, it would be the ultimate authority of God himself. It would be the deity to which even the creator was subject.

A duality of a Divine Omnipresence and a God-being is obviously absurd. For a God-being that is subject to the eternal norm of rationality, of truth and righteousness, is not God in the sense in which we should use the term to-day. Such a God would be a being, a creature, an individual existence; it would be *a* god, but not God; it might be a Jupiter or a Brahma, or a world-soul. It would be much greater than any human being, but would still remain a creature such as we are; not the Allhood of existence, but a world-architect, a demiurge; it would be a particular and individual entity, not the deity.

We need not enter into all the difficulties into which the assumption of a distinction between God and the omnipresent world-order would lead us. At any rate, a God-conception which individualizes God and conceives of Him as a

concrete being is mere paganism, whether or not it assumes the name of Christianity.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

While we are conscious of the symbolic nature of the various terms of the God-idea, such as father, lord, judge, we must not look upon them, when considering their significance, as untruths. The main difficulty of a purified God-idea probably consists in understanding that truths, as well as all ideas that represent purely formal and unmaterial relations, denote after all undeniable presences, possessed of real effectiveness in this world of actualities.

Let us see whether by purifying the traditional God-conception, we have lost anything of its religious significance.

All the attributes which have ever rightly been predicated of God are here combined in the Divinity that shapes the ends of the cosmos as a whole as well as in all its details. We expect of God immutability, omnipresence, eternality, universality, omnipotence, omniscience, justice, omnibeneficence, an all-embracing love, long-suffering, and mercy. Shall we find all this in a philosophical God-conception?

Every one can readily see that the God of philosophy is immutable, eternal, universal, and

omnipresent, for God is defined as the abiding in the transient, as the law of uniformities in the variety of natural phenomena. Although it may be difficult to realize vividly in one's mind God's omnipresence, from which no one can hide even his most secret thoughts, the idea itself is clear enough. But a few words are needed with regard to omniscience, omnipotence, omnibeneficence, long-suffering, and love.

It is understood that the omnipresence of the formative factors of the world is not possessed of a knowledge like that of man. It is a higher kind of knowledge; it is omniscience, not science. Science is discursive, walking as it were on crutches and proceeding step by step. Omniscience is argument and conclusion in one. It can dispense with investigation because it possesses the result before it searches for it. It is the automatic workings of the truth which appears in the unfailing correctness of so-called natural laws.

When speaking of God's omniscience we are too apt to think of his thoughts as being like ours, transient and discursive, but they are eternal and omnipresent, and in this respect infinitely different from human thoughts. And this is good doctrine too which orthodox belief

will not refuse to accept, as we read in Isaiah lv. 8-9:

"For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."

The old prophet is right. Whenever we are confronted with a truth that is found to be eternal and intrinsically necessary, be it a norm of reason or a law of nature, we are in the presence of a thought of God. Science formulates these laws, and every progress of science affords us a deeper insight into the character of God.

Further, God's omnipotence is not a force that can be measured in footpounds. His strength is not power of muscle nor the might of armies. God's omnipotence is the irresistibility of His omnipresent decree. It is the irrefragability of what appears to the scientist as the silent workings of natural law; it is the inevitable efficacy of God's dispensation, which on account of its apparent passivity, its long-suffering and patience, gives to the superficial observer the impression of non-existence. But experience teaches that its quiet ways are unfailing—a truth which was found out by the

Greeks, with whom the saying became proverbial:[1]

ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά.

Friedrich von Logau embodied this idea in a *Sinngedicht* which Longfellow translated as follows:

"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small.
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."

The human conception of God's power has resulted in the belief in miracles, after the fashion of magicians. But God is not a magician-deity, a miracle-monger. God's omnipotence does not consist in overleaping the laws of nature. It does not show itself in irregularities or exceptions. God's omnipotence consists in the immutability of his will as the formative factor of nature. Whether God's laws are obeyed or disobeyed, the law will hold good. There is no possibility of changing him or escaping the fulfilment of his will. The good man, whose actions are in agreement with God, realizes the blessings of God's will; the bad man, who infringes upon his decisions changes

[1] In this form, which is most commonly quoted, it is found in *Adversus Mathematicos*, by Sextus Empiricus; but the same proverb occurs with a slight variation in Oracula Sibyll, 8, 14. See Büchmann's *Geflügelte Worte*, p. 231.

his blessings into curses; but God remains the same in either case, and the possibilities of his nature in their various applications are inexhaustible. If miracle is a name of that which ought to impress us with awe, then there is but one miracle in innumerable applications. But how paltry are the miracles which the superstitions of the past have attributed to God in comparison with the miracles of the inventions of to-day which have become possible by a better understanding of God's thoughts, the laws of existence!

Finally, as to God's omnibeneficence, it is natural that primitive people did not see the goodness of God. They were too dependent still on the forces of nature to see the deeper aspects of the divine law that works for progress in the intellectual world and not less in the moral world. The soul of the savages contains too little of God's true nature to know Him correctly; their faculty of perception is still too dull, and therefore they see Him only in the thunder-storm and hear Him not in the still, small voice of moral ideals. But for that reason God is in every one of us, cherishing all in loving embrace. The still, small voice is speaking, addressing every one of us personally, but we must learn to listen.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION PURIFIED.

And what do we gain by a purification of the God-idea?

First of all, the idea of God has thus become not only scientifically tenable but an intrinsic part of all science and philosophy. The word "God" is recognized as a name comprising all that which is the bread of our spiritual life. This God-conception reconciles Religion and Philosophy and affords a basis for a truly scientific theology.

Secondly, it transfigures tradition; it fulfils its aspirations without destroying its ideals. It explains the purport of the symbols of religious truths and teaches us to distinguish between the essential and accidental. This God-conception reconciles Religion and History and explains the errors of the past as necessary phases in a normal development, which, according to the law of evolution, is increasingly tending truthward.

Thirdly, it will liberate us from the bondage of the letter. We shall thereby learn to distinguish between symbol and truth, ritual and its significance, mythology and religion, dogma and doctrine, that is to say, the meaning of the dogma and its lesson. The pious need no longer fear Bible criticism and the destruction of their

cherished idols; for they will understand that the fundamental truths of religion are based upon the recognition of that which is eternal. This God-conception digs down to the bottom rock of the conditions of a religious world-conception and affords a foundation which can never be shaken in the progress of science and civilization.

These are great advantages, which will be appreciated by all those who have ever grappled seriously with the problem of the existence and nature of God.

Before we proceed, it seems advisable to forestall misinterpretations which will arise in those to whom the present view is yet novel.

This purer God-conception loses nothing of the definiteness and personality of the old God-conception. A surrender of the letter does not imply a surrender of the spirit that God is our Father, our Lord, our Judge, our Comforter, our Saviour, the prototype of the incarnated Christ-ideal, the Way, the Truth, and the Light.

This God-conception is not the old pantheism which identifies God and the All. God is not the sum-total of all things; He is in all things, but He is also beyond and above all things. God is the Allhood of existence. He is the norm of actual existence and the condi-

tion of any possible existence. He is *in* nature and yet different from nature. He is *in* reality but different from all real things. He is the supernatural in nature and the superreal in real things. He is the formative factor of things material, himself unmaterial.

This God-conception does not teach the impersonality, but the superpersonality of God. God is the condition of all personality. God's nature is not an indefinite omneity, for He is possessed of a very definite character constituting the significance of existence as a whole and laying down the purpose of all existence, as well as imparting a definite direction to all life aspirations which finds expression in the evolution of solar systems, of nations, of individuals.

Further, God is not indifferent to us. He has a personal and private relation to all His creatures, being nearer to every one of them than the beat of their hearts and the neural vibrations of their brains. He is in them and yet different from them and infinitely high above them. He is their life, their home whence they start, and the goal whither they return.

God is not like us, but we are like Him. He is the light of our life, He is the mariner's compass which guides us, and the anchor of

hope on which we rely. Unless we feel his presence, we shall find no peace in the restlessness of the world. Unless we sanctify our lives by the purport which his existence imparts to all life, we can find no comfort in our afflictions. Unless we recognize that our soul is an actualization of His eternal thoughts, we shall not learn to fight the right way in the struggle for existence. Unless we listen to the still, small voice that teaches us our duties, we shall not obtain that blissful assurance which the sonship of God alone can afford.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF MATERIALISM.

Science is frequently regarded as materialistic, while in fact it is no more materialistic than religion.

The difficulty consists in the meaning of the word "materialism." The term is frequently used in its popular acceptance to denote a view which would refuse to believe in ghosts and ghost-existences of any kind. Accordingly scientists, men like Helmholz, Kirchhoff, Huxley, Hertz, etc., who endeavor to explain all phenomena of motion from the laws of mechanics, would be gross materialists, and of course, in that sense, our greatest philosophers, the teachers of all schools, even the idealists Spinoza,

Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, etc., etc., would have to be counted among the materialists.

Materialism in its exact significance is different from the usual conception. According to the terminology current among philosophers, it is a world-conception which attempts to explain all phenomena from matter and motion. But there are a number of people who are so materialistic in their conceptions that they materialize even things immaterial, and with these ultra-materialists materialism is frequently a name of opprobrium. Whenever they speak of materialism they mean the very opposite of the exact meaning of the word. These people, spiritualists and their ilk, regard the soul as a kind of substance, and God as a concrete, substantial being, or gaseous personality. Any one who would not look upon God as a particular individual, and upon spirit as a kind of attenuated matter is called a materialist in their terminology.

What is true of the term "materialism" is true also of the term "atheism." Most outspoken atheists are outspoken materialists, but there are also theistic materialists who would regard as an atheist any one whose God is not a corporeal being, or at least an individual Cre-

ator with human sentiments and human volitions.

The difficulty at the bottom of all these problems, in my opinion, consists in the inability of a certain class of people to think of things immaterial as real and effective presences in the world without materializing them, without conceiving them after the fashion of substantial things or beings.

Man is naturally a materialist. He naturally overestimates the importance of his sense-activity and is apt to think that matter and energy are the only realities that exist. But matter and energy are only two features of reality, both being abstractions of certain general qualities of existence, which correspond in our own existence to sensations and volitions. Matter is the sense-perceived, energy is resistance or exertion to overcome resistance. But enery and matter are by no means the only realities. In addition to matter and energy there is another class of important features met with in experience which we may call by the general term "form." A clock does not consist of metal, be it gold or iron or steel or wood, but it consists first of all of a definite form and the form is exactly the thing which constitutes the clock.

A little thought will soon teach us that form is by far a more important abstraction than either matter or motion. For under the general term of "form" fall all those most important qualities which condition the mentality, the rationality, and the ideal aspirations of man's soul.

There are a great number of people who undervalue the importance of form. Because form, in and by itself, is not something material, they imagine it does not exist and is of no consequence. But form not only exists, it is not only a factor in the actual world, but it is the most important factor of all.

A materialistic friend of mine, insisting on the all-importance of matter, declared that form was of no significance because things could not exist without matter, and if matter were taken away the whole thing would be gone. Therefore he argued that matter was the essential thing that constituted the reality of things. He said that form is a quality of matter, matter is reality itself; therefore matter possesses form, not form matter. But he forgot that matter is as much an abstraction as form. There is no matter which would be nothing but matter, and all matter has both definite shape and definite structure; for under the term

"form" we comprise also the internal make-up of things.

MATTER AND FORM.

Form is that which constitutes the thing in its particular individuality, and the laws of form constitute that something in the world which shapes the course of events and conditions natural phenomena. Form conditions the *such*ness of things, matter the *this*ness.

We are in the habit of regarding the material as first existing and as afterwards assuming shape. The artist takes a marble block and cuts the statue out of it, as, according to the first chapter of Genesis, God took a piece of clay and formed man. But would it not be more correct to say (as Aristotle does, for example) that a certain form was actualized by being imposed upon some kind of material? The artist has the image of the statue in his mind and this image, which since Plato's time is commonly called by the Greek word idea (from εἶδος, image) is a more or less clearly defined conception of some special form.

In the same way, or rather with more intrinsic necessity, the idea of man, *i. e.*, the possible type of manhood, existed before man originated in the process of evolution. The

mental organization of a rational being is a special application of the universal laws of form, and thus the nature of man as a rational being, is predetermined in the world's constitution since eternity.

The forms of things are relations which are determined by the intrinsic laws of forms, and "ideas," in the sense in which Plato uses the term, are as significant as the laws of mathematics and logic. This seems clear enough, but my materialistic friend used to say that if you took away all matter and energy nothing whatever would be left, to which statement I must demur. If you could annihilate matter and energy there would be left, as an intrinsic reality from which neither existence nor non-existence could escape, the eternal laws of form which by philosophers have been formulated in what is commonly termed the purely formal sciences, viz., logic, arithmetic, geometry, algebra, pure mechanics, and pure natural science.[1] Even if no material object existed 1+1 would always make 2, the rules of logic would hold good, the square of the hypotenuse would still be equal to the sum of the squares of the other

[1] *Reine Naturwissenschaft* is Kant's term, which would mainly comprise the cognition of causation and of the law of the conservation of matter and energy.

two sides of a rectangular triangle. In brief, the laws of pure reason would be the same, for they are intrinsically necessary and hold good whether we apply them or not, whether they are realized in the actual world or not, whether they are utilized by rational beings or trespassed against by fools.

One of the greatest thinkers of mankind, John Stuart Mill, actually went so far as to deny the existence of these eternal truths which constitute the ultimate authority of logical and mathematical thought. He actually said that mathematical lines, squares, and circles did not exist, and that mathematical theorems, far from being necessary truths, were actual untruths. No wonder that he came to the conclusion that we could not know but that on another planet twice two might perhaps make five. His conception of mathematics was so unmathematical that he regarded the mathematical line, which is without extension, not as a purely ideal construction, but as a picture of real lines. Ideal was to him tantamount to imaginary; and that materiality is excluded in the conception of mathematical lines appeared to him a sure sign of imperfection which would change mathematics from a science into an illusion of the mind. Strange! If John Stuart Mill were

right, then this purely imaginary conception, an illusion of the mind, a misstatement of genuine reality, would be the key to our comprehension of the whole world. Is that plausible?

John Stuart Mill's misconception of the erroneousness of mathematics is based on the materialistic assumption that material things alone exist. The truth is that the immaterial laws of form are the most essential reality (or, better, super-reality) in the world. They shape the form of things, the immaterial conditions through which things are such as they are, and these laws are as omnipresent and eternal as God himself. Is not the conclusion justified that they are part and parcel of God?

The term "law of nature" is not a good term, but it is commonly used now, and we use it because we believe it is easily understood. But we must insist that the laws of nature are not laws in the sense of acts of legislation. The laws of nature have not been decreed by kings or parliaments; nor do natural events take place in obedience to natural laws. Natural laws are formulas which describe uniformities. Our naturalists formulate the regularities which are observed in nature, and reduce them to exact statements. The uniformities of nature are not haphazard coincidences but intrinsi-

cally necessary conditions, indicating a sameness in variety and reflecting a grand systematic order that is ultimately based on the same principles as the harmonious relations met with in mathematics, logic, and algebra. They are, as it were, God's thoughts, and God's thoughts are not as human thoughts, transient. God's thoughts are eternal, and they appear to the scientist as the immutable laws of nature.

There is no prophet that preaches the super-personal God more plainly than mathematics, which reflects the symmetry of the divine norm immanent in all things, in the immeasurable immensity of the cosmos not less than in the mysterious depths of the human mind.

If the laws of mathematics and the laws of nature as their applications to material actuality are part and parcel of God, then God certainly is not an individual being, not a concrete ego-consciousness, not a person in the common acceptance of the term, but a true omnipresence and a true universality. Then, he is not a thisness at all, nor any particular suchness either, but that immaterial principle which conditions all suchness of things. In a word, he cannot be a man, nor an entity, nor any creature however great or powerful, but the

superreal condition of the whole world-order, of the laws of nature and of ethical norms which are indispensable factors in the evolution of mankind.

TRUE DIVINITY.

Our conception of God takes the characteristic qualities of God seriously and defines him as superpersonal, not as an individual ego-being, and the following criticism of this view was made by the Hon. Charles H. Chase, Ithaca, Mich., Judge of the Probate Court of Gratiot County:[1]

"First, I cannot see any distinction between your idea of God and atheism. The atheist admits the laws of nature; indeed, he refers all phenomena to these laws. They are to him unconscious, unchangeable, incapable of volition, impersonal. In fact, he attributes to the laws of matter and the cosmos the very necessary attributes which you deify. I can see no difference except in this, that the atheist says, 'There is no God, the world is governed by law;' while you say, 'The world is governed by law, and this law is God.'"

My kind critic says that he finds no difference between my idea of God and atheism, but his statement is based on the assumption that in order to exist God must be an individual and concrete being. He must not be God but *a*

[1]For Judge Chase's criticism in full see *The Monist*, VIII., 420-422.

God, an ego-consciousness that thinks and acts like a human being. The atheist, Judge Chase says, admits the laws of nature, too; and I grant that there may be some atheists who do; others do not. For instance Mr. Mill certainly did not admit the reality of law as such, and on this ground he did not admit that anything purely formal had any existence except as an imperfect picture of material things. To him one of the simplest arithmetical laws appeared untenable if applied universally to nature, for he denied the right of assuming the existence of anything universal and omnipresent. Thus it appears that there are atheists who actually deny the reality of purely formal relations.

Judge Chase would not deny that God is superpersonal, but he claims that "the superpersonal includes the personal, as the supervegetal ought to include the vegetal." To some extent this is true, but to some extent only; for a supervegetal being like man, need not possess all vegetal characteristics. I do not deny that in a certain sense God is personal.

If personal means that which is possessed of a definite character, God is certainly personal, for God is not an indefinite generality, but is as definite as are all mathematical, logical, and moral truths. But the word person is

commonly used in the sense of individual, of a concrete being possessed with a thisness, as contrasted to otherness. If there is anything that God is not, he is certainly not an individual creature that is here and not there, and is endowed with a sense of thisness such as we possess in our ego-consciousness. At the same time the superpersonal in this sense can no more be regarded as personal than an animal can be regarded as a plant because it is supervegetal. Plants have many functions which animals in spite of their supervegetal nature cannot perform. It is not true that the higher includes all phases and features of the lower. Let us hope at least that man as the superbrute, a creature which is higher than the brute, has dropped some of the most characteristic features of brute-existence.

Judge Chase claims that God, if he be such as I have proposed, would be quite incapable of volition. Perhaps he is. It all depends on what we mean by "volition." The eternal laws are not a transient volition such as are human volitions, but they are an eternal determinedness. If "will" means the transient decision of an individual creature implying a choice between alternatives which this same creature may afterwards regret, God certainly

has no will. But if "will" means that there is a determinedness of action, the laws of nature are certainly a will. God's will is not a transient act. It is an unwavering will, an eternal and omnipresent condition; it is the consistency of the intrinsically necessary laws which determine the character of the whole cosmos.

The materialist may recognize uniformities but he does not see their significance; at any rate, he does not recognize the laws of nature in their moral importance.

Such a scientist as Professor Huxley (who was not even a materialist) went so far as to declare that the cosmic order was immoral. Accordingly, it appears to be of greatest importance whether or not we recognize the laws of nature in their divinity and moral importance. The law of love, of mutual assistance, the longing of the individual to live in and with and for the whole, are not unnatural conditions. They are deeply rooted in the order of nature, and I would say that the moral laws of nature are the most important features of God's existence. We are apt to overlook the actuality of these most delicate and subtle realities in the world, but almost all the human races have found them out by experience and formulated the moral laws of society in their ethical codes

to a greater or less degree of perfection. At any rate the common agreement of the basic laws of morality indicate that they are based on the nature of things and that they constitute an intrinsic part of the world-order.

We should not be afraid of being classed either as atheists or as theists. There are people who look upon every one who uses the terms "soul" and "God" as either a hypocrite or a fool, and *vice versa* some pious people are satisfied with the mere belief without understanding what the words may mean. All depends on the proper meaning, not on the words themselves. There can be no question about it that there are atheists who without knowing it are believers in God. On the other hand, there are Christian theists who without knowing it are mere pagans, and who, far from believing in a genuine God, worship a deified creature, an idol, an unreal image of their own making.

Judge Chase says that the God that I believe in is unconscious, he cannot feel. And certainly when we speak of nature's laws as parts of God, we do not mean by it that they are living beings, either in parts or in their totality, such as the pagan poets of old used to describe. In a certain sense God is unfeeling, indeed. He is the eternal sternness of the world-

order, the blessing of goodness and, at the same time, the curse of sin. But God is not merely pure law, he is also applied law, and he manifests himself in this world of living, sentient beings. He is not only the condition of all existence, or, metaphorically speaking, the father of all, but he is also the realization of everything that is in agreement with the eternal law. God is not only the father but also the son, and this is the essential significance of Christianity. God is not only the Logos as the eternal world-order, but also the Logos that has become flesh. He appears as Christ in this world of human beings. It is God himself who suffers and seeks the right path, the path of salvation. It is God himself who comes as the divine teacher to set an example to those who have not as yet found the truth. Thus the sternness of God is counterbalanced by the love and goodness of the actualized God, who in Christianity is called Christ.

For general investigation, such as we are pursuing at present, it is quite indifferent whether we call the God-man Christ or Buddha or any other name of religious dignity. The significance is the same, and we may be sure that if there are rational beings on other planets they will develop a similar religion in which

they follow the lead of a divine teacher who reveals to them the laws of eternal righteousness, universal love and goodwill towards all.

It is true that many scientists, even astute thinkers and men of great name and fame, have a conception of science which overlooks the importance of the spiritual and moral interconnection of things. In Mr. Spencer's opinion evolution is nothing but the integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion; he defines it as a progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. We have on other occasions called attention to this erroneous and actually false conception of evolution.[2] Evolution is not a law that can be explained from matter and energy alone. It is not a process which can be described in purely material terms with the omission of soul and spirit.

Evolution tends to the formation of the human mind, and human evolution, commonly called progress, depends upon the increase of a clearer and more comprehensive recognition of truth. We may call it God's self-realization, a term which will be better understood after a further perusal of this book. Certainly, there is a deep spiritual significance in evolution, and

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[2] See, for instance, in *Homilies of Science*, the chapter on pp. 36-47, "The Test of Progress."

the religious conception of evolution which would conceive of it as the manifestation of God according to the design of universal and eternal law would certainly be truer than any agnostic or materialistic statement in terms of matter and motion.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

The most important application of every philosophy lies in the domain of psychology. It is natural that there the differences between my critic and myself become more flagrant.

Judge Chase says:

"If thought be but a mode of motion, consciousness mere oxidation; if the whole combination of man break down utterly at death; if our consciousness be extinguished at death, then, indeed, is death an 'eternal sleep,' and man is no better off than the beast of the field."

In these sentiments I concur. But like my critic I deny that "thought is but a mode of motion, and consciousness mere oxidation." I believe though that our consciousness is extinguished in death, just as much as it is reduced to a subconscious state in sleep; and in this sense the Apostle speaks of the dead as those that sleep.

I will not, however, deny that the difference

between my critic's view and mine own is deep-seated. Judge Chase further says:

"If the vortex theory of atoms be accepted, as it is quite extensively among scientists, and it is certainly not unphilosophic, then there is a common substratum of all matter, and the various elements are but different vortices of this universal fluid. May not the ether be that universal fluid? Or the ether itself may be a discrete mass of vortices and account for gravitation and all other apparent actions at a distance, involving so apparent an impossibility as shown by Newton. The ether is so organized that it eludes all our efforts to bring it within the range of the senses. Is it more improbable that spirit, the active selective principle of all life, should be so organized as to elude our powers of cognition? To express the ideas in another form: Gross matter may be represented by the letter x, and the ether by dx, or differential x. The relation between these is such that if to x we add or subtract from it dx multiplied by any finite multiplier, there can be no appreciable change in x. Again, if we represent spirit by d_2x, then the relation between dx and d_2x is such that to add to or subtract d_2x, multiplied by any finite multiplier, from dx, the latter cannot be changed to any appreciable extent. These relations of abstract mathematics may represent in a crude way the distinctions between matter, ether and spirit."

Judge Chase is unconsciously a materialist, for to him the soul consists of an ethereal substance. Representing gross matter by the letter x, and ether by dx, he believes that we may represent spirit by d_2x. And as ether is imponderable so the substance of the soul would naturally elude detection by our senses. The main mistake of this as well as of all kindred the-

ories of the soul consists in seeking the nature of the soul in some attenuated substance. Ether is matter in the general sense of the term as much as are the chemical elements, for indeed no objection can be made to the theory which is actually held by many prominent physicists, that matter is but a condensation of ether. If the soul is substantial it might as well consist of iron as of ether; in our conception, however, the soul is not substantial but formal, and here as well as everywhere the formal is the most important part of reality.

Judge Chase does not seem to be consistent. He defines soul as the active selective principle of life; but is selection something that can be explained from such a substance as ether, and is it possible to think of a principle as a thing that is substantial? I grant that there is a selective principle active in man. The characteristic feature of soul, as I would say, is that which gives direction to the motions of a sentient organism. But this quality is not a substance of any kind; nor is it an energy; nor is it anything inexplicable. Direction is a matter of form, and so is that which conditions the choice made among several possible directions.

What is soul? Soul is a system of motor ideas, *i. e.,* of meaning-endowed symbols de-

noting intentions, sentiments and thoughts which rise in response to sensations depicting the objects and conditions of the surrounding world.

In a certain way soul is comparable to the thoughts contained in a book, only that they are living thoughts. The ideas of which the soul consists are sentient forms of nervous functions which may prompt us to utter certain word-combinations, while the ideas in books consist in the forms of printed letters.

It would lead us too far now to explain the origin of man's soul. Nor is that necessary, as we have done so explicitly in other places; but we must insist on this, that man's soul is as little the cerebral substance of his brain, as the thoughts of a book are either printer's ink or paper. Man's soul as well as the thoughts of books consist of the significance of certain forms. Both are actualized through the materials upon which they have been impressed; but they are not these materials and they can be transferred upon other materials. Books are reprinted, pictures are photographed for reproduction, and the soul of every man impresses itself upon others, adding its mite to the progress of the race.

The significance of sense-impressions and of

words originates through the perception of a relation between the mental picture and a certain object; it is not anything material; it is not substance nor is it force or energy. We grant that thinking takes place in the brain, and the physiological process on which the function depends is, chemically considered, oxidation. But for that reason thought and oxidation are no more identical than the turning of the crank of a musical box can be regarded as music.

The materialistic proposition that the world can be explained from matter and motion alone is simply a superstition, although it has been seriously pronounced by philosophers who are sometimes regarded as deep thinkers. When this hypothesis is found to fail, the result is naturally what we have characterized as a philosophical bankruptcy which is glorified as the highest achievement of modern thought and is paraded under the name of agnosticism.

If matter and motion contained the conditions of all things, we might wonder with Shakespeare's clown at the musical genius hidden in sheep's guts and might try to deduce the beauties of a melody from the friction of a bow on the strings. A concert, the actualization of music, is not possible without instru-

ments, but music itself is not constituted by or explainable through the material qualities of the instruments. Music is the actualization of mathematical proportions which are directly perceived without being calculated or at all understood in their arithmetical values. In the same way, the significance of sense-impressions and word-symbols is something relational, *i. e.*, formal; and its most important feature is its faculty of imparting direction.

If a cat sees a dog approach, it will nimbly climb the nearest tree. The cat knows the dog, the tree, and its own facility in climbing; and the cat's action is determined by the significance of the sense-impressions, which originated under past experiences. The total amount of these memory-structures which enable the cat to interpret present impressions and utilize them for adjusting itself towards the surrounding world is the cat's soul. That the cat jumps toward the tree and not in any other direction is a quality which is not measurable in the scales of the chemist or by the methods of the physicist. It is not a material thing nor is it a force. It is purely a matter of form. That which determines the directions of the cat's mo-

tion is the significance of the mental pictures in the cat's mind.

Now Judge Chase may object, that man's soul is not the system of his ideas, but the substance in which the system of ideas is impressed. And here his theory may be introduced, that ideas are not impressed into gross matter but into the more intangible matter called ether; to which I reply that it is quite indifferent whether the ideas of man's soul are registered in gross or in ethereal substance. It seems to me that if the soul must needs consist of a substance, it does not gain in dignity by the thinness of its substratum; at least I for my part would prefer to have a soul of solid steel than of some nondescript gas or ether. But a critical investigation will have to reject the idea of the materiality of the soul altogether and insist on the truth that the main thing of a man is the nature of his ideas, *i. e.*, the form of his sentiments and the character of his impulses, not the substance on which they are impressed.

NO THINKING SUBSTANCE.

The term substance has been introduced in order to denote a material that might be different from matter,—a spiritual matter,—and in

this sense the word has been interpreted to mean that which underlies certain phenomena, that which is standing under them or supporting them. If substance be used in the sense of forms that in material changes remain constant, we have no objection to the use of the word as something immaterial. In that case, the form of the rainbow would have to be called a substance, while the raindrop would be the material which is perpetually replaced by new material. But I cannot help thinking that this use of the word "substance" is misleading.

Little, of course, is gained by replacing the notion of a sense-perceptible matter by a more subtle metaphysical matter; for both are mere materials, both denote a mere thisness, and neither can be regarded as implying suchness, character or worth, for all suchness is a matter of form. If we compare two substances, *e. g.*, gold and lead, we shall find that their difference is reducible to a difference of form as Mendeljeff's law actually assumes with regard to all chemical elements.

Supposing there to be a particular thinking substance, as there are different chemical substances, we should have to assume that its peculiarities would finally find their explanation in its structural qualities; its character would

after all be a matter of form. There is no way of escaping the idea of form as that factor which gives character to things. Suppose there were a special soul-substance, what would it signify? The character of a man and his moral worth would after all depend upon form. We must shape our lives, we must build up our fate, we must train our mental and moral make-up, we must discipline our conscience, we must mould our personality. All progress, even moral accomplishments, every deed of any kind, is an act of forming.

The material of which a thing consists is only of secondary importance. The Bible is the Bible whether it is written on parchment, on silk, or on paper. The significance of the words remains the same either way. That which we call the Bible has nothing to do with the material on which the words are printed.

Now, for argument's sake, we might grant that the presence of ether in the brain is necessary in order to render the cerebral substance capable of performing its proper functions. What of it? Would it bring us any nearer to a comprehension of the soul? It would simply be one step farther in the physiology of the brain, not of the soul. This is the reason why all theories have always failed which attempt

to explain the soul either as a force, like electricity or magnetism; or as a substance such as ether, phosphorus, oxygen, etc. They try to explain something that is purely formal by either matter or motion.

If we properly understand the origin of man's soul and the continuance of it beyond the grave, we learn to understand man's relations to other living creatures. Man's mind is formed in the mould of God's eternal thoughts and all the creatures coming from the same form are brothers; to the extent that they are like one another they are like different editions of the same book. The fatherhood of God teaches us the brotherhood of man. A consideration of the importance of suchness helps us to comprehend the relative irrelevance of thisness and implies the lesson which in India has been expressed in the words *Tat twam asi, i. e.,* "that art thou." Other rational beings are, not less than myself, incarnations of the hyperphysical; they too, with more or less success, seek for deeper truths and long for a higher and nobler life. "Have we not one father, and are we not all brothers?"

When we understand whence we come we learn also whither we shall fare. We come from the souls of the past and our soul will continue

in the souls of the future. There is the same identity between the souls of the past and the future as there is between the soul-life of my own yesterday and of my own to-morrow. There is a continuity of form and there is a preservation and transference of the various particular forms which constitute our suchness, our character, our personality. Former souls are not strangers to me. They are soul of my soul and parts of the same spirit-life which at the present day pulses in my brain. Nor shall I remain a stranger to the souls to come. There, within the souls of the future generations, not somewhere in the sky, is the Kingdom of God of which Christ spoke. Heaven is not local, not material, but spiritual. In the soul-life of mankind are the mansions in which there is room immeasurable for all of us. There we shall be preserved with all our peculiar idiosyncrasies in our personal identity.

TELEPATHY AND KINDRED THEORIES.

We will consider another remark of Judge Chase:

"I am inclined to think there has now been sufficient evidence adduced by the London Society for Psychial Research, and from other sources, to show that the mind can act independently of the body, independently of distance, can transfer itself in space instantaneously, as in telepathy and clairvoyance, and that, if these things be

true, there is no reason why the mind or soul cannot maintain after death its identity, its consciousness, its power of volition, and all other purely psychical powers. I am inclined to the opinion that our so-called science is quite onesided, objectively so, and that a great field for investigation lies in spiritualism, hypnotism, clairvoyance, mind-healing, faith-healing, etc."

My friendly critic expects new insight from the revelations of clairvoyants, spiritualism, hypnotism, mind-healing, and theosophy. He hopes that they will somehow throw some unexpected light upon the problems of the soul. And no doubt we shall know more in the centuries to come than we knew in the Middle Ages. But the hopes which Judge Chase cherishes will probably prove illusory, for the abnormal phenomena of hypnotism have so far demonstrated nothing, except what we might have known, or rather what we ought to have known, from a careful observation of normal phenomena.

But such is man. Being accustomed to the most wonderful phenomena of nature he no longer notices their grandeur, but regards it as a matter of course. He no longer observes what he is accustomed to and it appears to him as a mere nonentity. When confronted with the same thing in some ugly and distorted form he is overawed with astonishment and brought to his knees in wonder. The mere fact of man's

consciousness which mirrors the world in the shape of a living picture painted in the warm glow of feelings, and in addition the automatic method that classifies natural phenomena in a system of rational comprehension, elicits no admiration of the cosmic order. We have dreams and see in our dreams the faces of our dead brothers and sisters as if they were still alive; they prove themselves living presences to us as parts of ourselves, and we can touch them in our dream as if they had real bodies. We can speak with them and receive their answers. People say "Such are dreams," and that is with many the end of their appreciation; but when we see consciousness distorted in dreamlike conditions, in a so-called hypnotic or clairvoyant state, we imagine we have seen something grand and are on the track of discovering valuable truths. When a philosopher by the determination of his will exercises self-control over physical ailments, as Kant did when he mastered his attacks of asthma; or when a general such as Frederick the Great, by his genius makes apparent impossibilities possible, conquering foes who, counting all the armies that were in the field against him, were ten times his superiors in numbers; or when a small nation like the Greeks, with a few thou-

sand soldiers, triumphs over the millions of Xerxes's hosts, we are apt to make little of it because we can understand the laws according to which these events became possible. But when a faith-cure healer practices the same things under our very eyes on a small scale, and sometimes very blunderingly, we begin to believe in miracles, and are liable to be thrown off our balance.

Telepathy is a truth which is commonly practised in life. But the telepathy of our daily experience is different from the telepathy which the believers in psychical research try to establish. Every telegram is an act of telepathy. Indeed every sensation is telepathic. It is a sensing of that which is far off. It is the act of experiencing the presence of something outside of us; and many things which our senses take note of, are at an enormous distance. The stars which we see are infinitely far, and yet we perceive their reality and know of their existence! Nor is man's mind limited to the present. His memories reach back into the past, and with the assistance of reason he can reconstruct the farthest event and read the origin of his own life and of the planet on which he lives. In addition he can anticipate the future. If this is not telepathy, pray what is

it? I know that those who profess to believe in telepathy, as a rule, try to establish the existence of a telepathy which works without means of transmission, but such telepathy is both absurd and unnecessary, and the conception of it is an erratic idea.

THE IMMORTAL IN MAN.

Judge Chase claims that according to our theory "man is no better off than the beast of the field." And in one sense that is true. Man's body will be dissolved into its particles just as much as the body of beasts, and this, I believe, is commonly recognized by all people alike, by both religious and irreligious. We read, for instance, in Ecclesiastes iii. 19-21, the author of which book is counted by all Christian Churches as directly inspired by the Holy Ghost:

> "That which befalleth the sons of man befalleth the beasts. Even one thing befalleth them. As one dieth so dieth the other. Yea, they have all one breath, so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast. For all is vanity. All go unto one place, all are of dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?"

The physical part of man is in exactly the same predicament as the physical part of any beast. Man's body consists of matter; it is

dust and to dust it must return. There is nothing of man's material elements that could escape disintegration in death. And supposing that in addition to the gross matter of which man's body consists there existed some ether in his brain, it is more than probable that those more rarefied substances would undergo disintegration as much as any other. If man's immortality depended upon the preservation of a substance, there would be no hope for him beyond the grave. The ether-soul which according to the belief of past ages quits the body at the moment of death and flits about from place to place, would be as subject to a final dissolution as any material combination.

But man's soul is not material; it is formal; it consists of ideas, of thoughts, of aspirations. And because man's soul is formal it can continue, even though the body may become a prey to death. Man's soul continues through his works; being a certain form of life-activity, man continues in his personal identity wherever this peculiar form of life-activity is preserved.

The existence of death, from which no living creature can escape, appears terrible and oppressive, but as soon as we know that the soul of man is immaterial, and that, therefore,

it is not touched by death, we have good reason to feel comforted. And he who understands the situation will lose all fear of death and rise into that higher plane of ideal life which characterizes or ought to characterize every man of religious aspirations. In this sense the preacher continues (*Ibid.*, 22):

"I perceive that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his own works, for that is his portion."

Judge Chase objects to this conception of immortality as being merely a statement of the principle of conservation of energy, but that is not so. It is a statement of the principle of the conservation of form. It is true that energy is preserved and matter is preserved, but both matter and energy change their forms; electricity is changed into motion, into heat, into potential energy, etc., etc. And similarly the chemical elements undergo various combinations in which they act differently according to circumstances. Some forces become latent, others become apparent. In new combinations, some properties seem to disappear while others rise unexpectedly into prominence as if created out of nothing.

The conservation of soul is radically different from the conservation of matter and en-

ergy. No material part of an organism is preserved in its organized structure. The organism, materially considered, is a constant flux. It is comparable to an eddy in a stream where the conditions remain to a certain degree constant, so as to produce the same form of a whirl. The whirl consists of water, but the whirl is not water. You can analyze all the particles of water and the chemist will never discover what the nature of a whirl is. A chemist will search all the raindrops in vain if he searches for an explanation of the rainbow. It is true that water is needed to make whirls and rainbows, but the water only furnishes the material for their makeup, and it is quite indifferent which drops pass through the place where they originate.

The same is true of man. It is upon the whole quite indifferent at which bakery we buy our bread, or whether the wheat grew in Russia or Dakota. The question of where our cereals grow may be of commercial interest as considerations of political economy, but it has nothing to do with the soul. Man's soul is neither the amount of material particles which at the time are contained in his body, nor does it consist of the footpounds of energy which are stored up in the body's tissues. Man's soul

is constituted by the form in which both matter and energy appear united in his body, and form implies the significance of ideas and the tendencies of aspirations.

ORIGIN AND DESTINY OF THE SOUL.

Now the question arises, Whence does man's soul come? Does it originate out of nothing at the day of his birth or at the moment of conception? Is there any possibility of interpreting its origin as due to a transference of substance of some kind? Suppose the soul were some definite ethereal soul-substance radically different from matter and from substance of any other kind. How could we explain the increase of soul on earth? A few milleniums ago whole continents were without population. They were inhabited only by brutes of the lowest order, and now the whole earth is peopled with rational beings. Is there a soul-substance which by being fed increases? Does the law of conservation of matter not hold good for soul-substance? All these hypotheses are *prima facie* absurd.

There is only one theory which explains the unlimited increase of souls, and that is the recognition that soul is form. Form can be increased. Indeed, form can be created out of

nothing, and considering that the whole creation of this world is a formation, the old dogma of the creation of any new world-system out of nothing through the intervention of the divine Logos is philosophically justified.

Man's soul is in a certain sense a creation out of nothing, but its production is by no means a mystic phenomenon for that reason. The soul of the baby originates by reproduction. As every tree reproduces its own kind in its seed, so does mankind. The kind, the type, the form, is potentially contained in the seed. The formative element of the seed is the essential part. The material element is unessential; and as a certain mass of matter is indispensable for formation of any kind it is reduced to a minimum.

Judge Chase declares that man's immortality would be comparable to the action of a pebble that is dropped into the sea, the effects of which are as much preserved as is man's soul. And Judge Chase is right to the extent that the immortality of man's soul is as certain as the conservation of the action of the pebble upon the sea. In relation to the whole universe it is perhaps also infinitesimally small, but he is greatly mistaken when he thinks that the infinitesimal influence of a

life is lost in the further evolution of mankind. The very reverse is true. The importance of man's soul increases with the progress of mankind, if his soul but be of the right kind.

Think only of the inventor of the wheel or the inventor of the needle. Their souls still live and have been added to by later inventions. Is it not a great comfort to know that our souls do not only continue beyond the grave but that they are even capable of a higher evolution, of a spiritual increase and of better formulation with greater exactness and precision! Far from being lost at a distant age, the soul of man gains in influence, and, if it is a power for good, will become a source of ever increasing blessings.

In this conception the immortality of Cæsar lies not only in the fact that we read about Cæsar in our school books, but mainly that the deeds of Cæsar remain a factor in the future evolution of mankind; it is not the knowing about Cæsar nor the preservation of his name, but it is the persistence of his accomplishments, or the reproduction of the very deed-forms of himself.

It is apparent that not all the deeds of Cæsar are equally immortal. Some of them will retain a greater, and others a smaller, in-

fluence. Some may be almost entirely obliterated, but there are features of his which by the selection of the fittest will survive for the benefit of mankind; but that is exactly the immortality of his soul, and this immortality is not limited to the people of whom we read in books, to the men of fame, but is as powerful in those whose names remain unknown; in the mother who brings up her children with love and care, in the father who toils for his family, in the honest laborer who plods in the sweat of his brow to make a living. There is an immortality for everybody and for everything. It is not for everybody and for everything alike. It is different for the action of the pebble on the sea and for the hero who dies to save his country. It is purely physical in the former case, it is moral and ideal in the latter case.

The difficulty of preserving the soul of everybody consists in the rarity of original souls of importance. Most original minds are simply aberrations and the men who have discovered a new truth or set a noble example are few indeed. But every Tom, Dick, and Harry, who are at best mediocre reproductions of average souls, mere copies of John and Bill, without any originality of their own making

added thereto, also want to be assured that their puny little egos will be preserved. For this kind of people the idea of a substance-soul is naturally the best comfort, for not having any particular suchness, they cling to the thisness of their existence, and will be sorely disappointed when they find that the preservation of any thisness is not conformable to the laws of existence; man's aspirations characterize his suchness; they are ideal, not material; they belong to the realm of thoughts, not to the realm of concrete objects.

I know there are people who believe that ideal means unreal, but that is a mistake. They are materialists who believe that whatever is formal must be non-existent because it cannot be touched by the hands or noted by any one of the other senses. Things ideal, *i. e.*, presences that consist of thought-relations, are spiritual, not material, but for that reason they are as real as any stone and as actual as any one of the forces of nature. The formal, and especially the spiritual, is truly, as the Greek calls it, the causative in the world, αἰτιώδης.

It is difficult for mankind generally and especially for the primitive peoples of an unscientific age, to conceive of the paramount importance of the purely formal. Crude think-

ers are apt to materialize or even personify that which is immaterial. And thus we have the strange phenomenon that spirit is characterized as breath, as air. It is always supposed to consist of the thinnest material conceivable, and so the notion of an ether-soul recommends itself to the materialists of the present generation. But the spiritual is no substance whatever. The spiritual is formal, and the formal is not a nonentity but is the most important factor in the world.

The formal is not only a feature of the actual world, but the formal relations form an abstract world of their own. There is a supernatural world of form which has been called by Philo "the realm of the Logoi," by Plato "the world of ideas," by Kant "the purely formal or transcendental."

FORM SUPERMATERIAL.

If there is any truth in the conception of the absolute (which we do not grant without serious limitations), we must regard the norms of purely formal relations as absolute. *They* are intrinsically necessary. Logical and mathematical theorems are not fictitious nor even inventions, they are discoveries; they are true if considered for themselves and without refer-

ence to material things such as exist in nature. In this sense they are hyperphysical and form a supernatural realm; not as if they were remote from nature, but by being applicable to any possible nature. If new universes of a different kind were created, the eternal verities of formal relations would hold good for them as they do for our actual world.

The supernatural or hyperphysical world consists of all those eternal verities which would remain true even if the world did not exist. Pure mechanics is a kind of hyperphysics which explains the laws of physical motions. *In abstracto* and according to an *a priori* system, the laws of pure mechanics hold good for any kind of practical mechanics. The purely formal world is that system of laws which are absolutely true, but at the same time shape the real world and condition all its transformations. Therefore, the purely formal sciences are the key to the natural sciences. They are not real, they are super-real, and the truths which they reveal are not results of sense-experience but products of pure reason.

One most important feature of all the formal truths is this, that they stand in a decided contrast to the material world of sense-experience. They do not consist of a heap of

single facts but they form one grand system. The more we understand the nature of the formal sciences the better we learn that all of them are one and the same truth in its various applications. The simplest of them are most obvious, and the most complicated of them are nothing but the very simplest applied to complicated conditions. And not the least important aspect of the purely formal sciences is their moral importance. Not only is there a morality, nay a holiness, about the multiplication table, but morality is nothing but the rigidity of the formal laws applied to practical life, especially to the relations between man and his fellows.

If we consider the purely formal, the immaterial or hyperphysical as a whole, we understand its moral application better, and in this sense it has been allegorically represented as the father of all life, as the creator, as the Lord of the universe, as God.

In the course of the evolution of the human race the formal factors of the world which obviously determine man's destiny have been conceived first as mysterious powers described in myths, then as divine personages, and finally as God; and the reverence which men cherish

for the cosmic order that is the ultimate authority of conduct is called religion.

Religion is not an aberration nor do its truths stand in any conflict with science. Religion is an instinctive formulation of those truths which mankind needs for practical life. The savage gropes after these truths without comprehending them. He feels that there is a spiritual factor in the world and he attempts to find it, but his conceptions of the spirit life are not only crude but also false. His God is formed after the pattern of his own savage mind.

The religious genius of a primitive civilization takes shape in prophets who, poet-like and intuitively, understand the deeper significance of spiritual life, but even the prophets of the early ages use allegorical terms. They still materialize God; they still speak of the soul as though it were a substance. But how can they do otherwise? In the first place, they know no better, for they see the truth as through a glass darkly and not face to face, and secondly, if they could have expressed themselves with the exactness of modern science, they would not have been understood by their contemporaries.

The prophets of Israel tried to abolish bloody sacrifices, a relic of savagery, and taught mankind the blessings of love. A savage chief

may still think that he has disposed of an adversary when he has killed him, but experience will soon teach him that the dead may be more powerful than the living. A man who is killed is bodily dead, but not spiritually. The example of his life, the experience of his soul, the influence of his personality, remain after his death, and will naturally produce the belief in immortality. Nor is this instinctive belief an error. It is an undeniable truth formulated in allegories which, however, if taken literally, lead to superstitious notions.

RELIGIOUS GROWTH.

Religion comes in response to a need and so the difference of religious convictions is to a great extent due to a difference of need.

Every man has the religion which he deserves. A sensuous man has a sensuous religion, a spiritual man a spiritual religion. Be sure that if you meet a man who believes in a hell that is actually burning with brimstone in which the souls are roasted as ore is roasted in the kiln, he needs that kind of sensual conception in order to keep in check the savage impulses of his nature. If spiritualists believe that souls hover about them in the air in invisible winged forms, be sure that their lack

of true spirituality needs a belief in the corporeality of souls; otherwise they would believe that souls have no existence and that the spiritual immortality which a scientific conception teaches, is mere verbiage. There are people who need a religion of rituals, and it is good for them, for it educates them until they learn the truth that is expressed in rituals.

Our view does not imply that the lower religious phases should be left alone and undisturbed, that mankind should remain untaught, or that progress should be checked; we merely insist that the lower stages are necessary stages of transition, and we cannot expect to lift the savage at once to the height of a scientific conception. It would not to do to send to a university a boy who has not yet mastered his spelling. We must continue to teach mankind and point out the way which leads higher without losing patience with those who are slow in comprehension. We must fearlessly investigate and explain the mysteries of the spirit, but at the same time we must not expect to reap a harvest when we have scarcely sown the fields.

It is natural that those who still cling to the symbols as if symbols themselves were the truth, will be unable to comprehend the truth stated without employing symbols, and in the

same way those who still believe in a material God and a material soul will regard every view which teaches an immaterial God, as atheism, and an immaterial soul, as a denial of the existence of the soul. Form and the purely formal are not nothing, and the philosophy which recognizes the paramount importance of form is not nihilism. On the contrary it opens a vista to a scientific comprehension of God and the world, and will render perfectly clear what formerly appeared unintelligible and mystical.

THE GOD OF SCIENCE.

If the term "God" must literally, and not allegorically, mean such a personality as our various catechisms define it to be, and if we should not be allowed to seek for a deeper and truer significance of this most potent symbol of religious thought, science would most assuredly have to confess not only that there is no evidence in favor of the existence of God, but even that the problems of life are more easily explained without resorting to the theistic hypothesis. But why should we regard the definition of a word as unalterable in the face of the fact that all our fundamental notions, such terms as life, matter, force, have undergone similar changes? Life is still as real as ever, although our physiologists have discarded

the materialistic view of life as a vital substance; fire still burns, although our physicists have ceased to believe in the existence of a phlogiston, or fire-stuff with its mysterious qualities. Electricity has become more useful than ever since we have abandoned the error of an electric fluid and conceive it as a mere form of motion. So the soul will remain as grand and noble as ever, although the old psychology which assumes the existence of a peculiar soul-substance will give way to a purer and more scientific conception of the soul. And finally the idea of God which in its common acceptance is gross and pagan, will lose nothing by being freed of the materialistic accretions which are at present the most serious objections of scientifically trained minds to the religion that is still preached in many of our churches.

One thing is sure: that the God of science is not a negation of the old God-belief, but its completion and perfection. It comes as the fulfilment of a prophecy. I would not deny that the way to a comprehension of this higher God-conception leads through atheism, but where has any one found any truth worthy of the name who had not first to pass to it through doubt and had to gain it by the exertion of a close search and painstaking inquiry? Let us

no longer hold atheism, I mean honest atheism and honest doubt, in abhorrence, for they are the indispensable stepping-stones to a clear and scientific comprehension of the truth. Let negations have their way; the sooner the truth of a negation is seen the quicker will its one-sidedness become apparent and lead to the new formulation of a higher and more exact positivism.

In his personal development the author of this book has successively passed through all the stages of belief, and can therefore appreciate the arguments proffered from all sides. He knows from his own experience and still cherishes the sacred Godward longings of a childlike mind, and at the same time he is conscious of the truth that lies in the negations of atheism. But having regained a positive attitude through formulating in affirmative terms the truth of the negations to which his conscientious doubts led him, he can now better understand the religious aspirations of his childhood and has ceased to look upon the imperfections of creeds as absolute errors.

Life is evolution, and we, the children of the age in which the doctrine of evolution has for the first time been recognized in its sweeping importance, should not hesitate to under-

stand the necessity of a progress from the mythological through the metaphysical to the positive and purely scientific. Why should we accept this law in science and philosophy and refuse to recognize it in religion? And if the mythology of science contained the germs of glorious discoveries and inventions, should not the mythology of religion, too, be the prophecy of a purely scientific religion?

Let us have the confidence that evolution leads higher. The criticism of science will break down only the unessential, but the deeper insight which science affords will open our eyes to new truths and will show us the old truths in a new and a clearer light.

The God of a scientific world-conception is in one sense the old God still, and our God-ward aspiration still pursues the same aim, which is *sursum*. God is different only in so far as our conception of Him is purified,—for, "When I was a child I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man I put away childish things." In the place of childish hopes and notions I now have matured thoughts and manly aspirations. God is not a God of stagnation. He is a God of evolution, whose motto is: "Behold, I make all things new!"

PART II

THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

PART II.

THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

Religion and Science are as disparate and as diametrically opposed to one another as are sentiment and knowledge, or poetry with its indeterminable flights of fancy, and mathematical argument; and this fact seems sufficient to draw a line of demarcation between the two, which would keep our religious and scientific notions quite distinct and not permit either one to interfere with the other. Religion is of the heart; it is the warm devotion to the noblest cause imaginable; it is a zeal and enthusiasm for, and a faith in, an ideal that lies in spheres transcendent, while science is the ruthless unblinking investigation of facts, consisting of mental functions that may well be compared to the operations of a calculating machine, with which sentiment must not interfere, and of which the results are the more reliable the less the personal equation of subjective preferences enters into them.

This contrast between religion and science is not exaggerated, and so it seems to justify

the old dualism that some statement may be true in religion or theology which is utterly untrue in science. Indeed artistic imagination has rules of its own and the causation of poetic dreams is different from the causation of scientific facts. The former in the domain of the latter would be lies; the latter in the domain of the former, prosaic and meaningless trivialities.

We recognize this contrast and believe fully in the right of both religion and science to exist in their own name with institutions that are relatively independent and not subject to one another, but correlated in harmonious alliance. Yet we do not believe in a duality of truth or a separation of the spheres of life as if there were two worlds, a realm of religion which lies in a Beyond and a domain of science which is the reality of matter in motion that surrounds us here. We believe that the fields of both are the same and that in spite of their disparity the two are inseparably linked together as husband and wife ought to be in well-ordained wedlock.

When we encourage the science of religion (an investigation of the facts of religion), and come, on the other hand, to the conclusion that there is religion in science which may be for-

mulated as a religion of science, we are perfectly aware of the difficulty of the undertaking. We do not slur over the contrast that actually and obviously exists, but on the contrary, we appreciate its significance and point out a *modus vivendi* as to how the contrast may be preserved without injury to either party, for a contrast is not a contradiction and involves conflicts only when it is wrongly interpreted and its nature misunderstood.

RELIGION.

Religion has been variously defined as belief in a deity, as devotion to the supernatural, as worship, and also as obedience to the behests of God, etc., but it is obvious that the definitions of the catechisms are one-sided; they suit the case for home use well enough but keep only in view one feature of religion. Religion is broader than its usual definitions: it affects the whole man, his heart, his head and his hand, and there are religions which imply definite beliefs, especially the belief in God, while others do not. Buddhism, for instance, can be taught and practiced so far as its original tenets are concerned, without even the mention of the word God or a belief in him, and yet it is as decidedly not a mere philosophy but a

religion, as either Christianity, or the Mosaic faith, or Islam, or Brahmanism, or Mazdaism.

That which characterizes religion is the predominance of sentiment. There is no religion without sentiment, but as there is no sentiment in itself, so religious sentiment has always a definite content and is characterized by a principle of conduct imparting a definite direction to the minds of its devotees. The content is the notion upon which religious sentiment is built up, and the principle of conduct, the moral ideal in which it finds expression. In other words: while sentiment is the core and center of religion, the sentiment feeds upon the materials furnished by the intellect and manifests itself in practical life as will.

The substance of religion is always a world-conception yet it is a world-conception practically applied. It is a world-conception that dominates the soul. Therefore religion is everywhere the sentiment of adapting oneself to the ruling power of one's surroundings. If we believe our world-conception to be true *i. e.,* if we have faith in it, it is inevitable that it serves us as a guide in life. Hence there are three elements in religion: its root is of the head, consisting of the notions concerning the significance of life; in its essential nature

it is sentiment,—*Gefühl ist alles*,—and indeed in the average man, who is untrained in self-analysis, the religious sentiment is a mysterious mass of yearnings, hopes, fears, visions of bliss and ecstatic upliftings which defy the explanation of scientific enquiry; but its most significant feature, after all, is the impulse it gives to action. Religion is always practical. It has a moral application, and the immoral customs of savage or barbarous, and semi-civilized religions only prove that religion and morality are inseparable. A superstitious religion leads to immoral practices, and a pure religion will unfailingly tend to elevate and purify conduct.

There are three distinct elements in religion: (1) doctrine, (2) piety, and (3) conduct. All three are indispensable, but now the one, now the other is emphasized. The doctrine may be blind faith, or a philosophically purified belief, or a clear scientific comprehension. A doctrine that on account of its nature strongly affects our sentiment and then becomes a principle of conduct, is called a conviction; and all those convictions which affect our notion of the purpose of life in general constitute our religion.

An essential feature of a religious conviction is the recognition of its rule or principle

or maxim as obligatory, for that which is acknowledged to be right or good or commendable, should be carried into effect, on penalty of punishment or of evil results. In other words, a religious conviction implies a duty to be performed, or a command to be obeyed.

The authority upon which the duty depends (*i. e.,* that which renders it obligatory) need not be a personal being; it may simply be the universality of natural law which, when recognized, teaches us that all causes have their effects, and that evil deeds beget evil consequences. But whatever the nature of the authority, its conception as something superior exercises an educational influence; it holds up an ideal to be attained, and thus stimulates man to reach beyond and to grow above his present stature. Since the average man, even of today, is little trained in philosophical thought, it is but natural that he will personify the authority of conduct and think of the divine (the supreme norm of existence) in human terms, shaping God in man's own image. But whatever the authority of conduct may be, we call it God and would say that a belief in God (viz., the recognition of an authority of conduct) is an essential feature of religion.

Having broadened the conception of God so

as to include all possible views, we may now, without fear of being misunderstood, fall back upon the definition of religion in terms of Christian theology and say: "Religion is the faith in, the love of, and the obedience to, God." But whatever point of view we may take, a man's religion is his world-conception, the aspect of which is always threefold: (1) idea, (2) devotion, (3) deeds. The idea is the product of the intellect, the devotion is sentiment, and the deed is the expression of the will.

PANPATHY.

If we ask what is the nature of religion we shall receive as many different answers as there are religious conceptions. We shall here propose three definitions, which represent three stages in the most recent development of our religious life.

The first definition of religion is the maturest product of orthodox theology which is summed up in the statement, "Religion is love of God and obedience to His will."

On this definition Cardinal Newman and Dr. Martineau, who are antagonistic in many essential points, would yet unhesitatingly agree. The former says:[1]

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[1]Gram. of Assent, p. 378.

"By religion I mean the knowledge of God, of His will, and of our duties towards Him."

The latter uses other words, but means practically the same thing. He declares:[2]

"By religion I understand the belief and worship of Supreme Mind and Will, directing the Universe and holding moral relations with human life."

These definitions, of course, are one-sided, as they take the existence of God, of a Supreme Mind, for granted, and exclude at once all Buddhists who, according to orthodox Christian notions, must be regarded as atheists. Shall we say Buddhism is no religion, or are our theologians too narrow-minded to consider that there are other religious people besides themselves?

Schleiermacher, one of the most philosophical theologians of the nineteenth century may serve as an exponent of the second definition. He says: "Religion is the sentiment of absolute dependence." (*Gefühl unbedingter Abhängigkeit.*) He omits "belief in God," and substitutes for it a feeling of subordination; and certainly he is right in so far as the most characteristic element of religion is its emotional nature. Science is of the head, religion is of the heart. This Schleiermacher empha-

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[2]Study of Religion I, 15.

sizes by his definition, but he forgets that there are men who show their religious enthusiasm not in subordination but in a manly independence and love of freedom. He who breaks the chains of tyranny in holy wrath is often more religious than he who submits.

If religion is, as Schleiermacher says, the feeling of absolute dependence, we might as well regard religion as the enemy of mankind that must be overcome. Religion implies the recognition of some authoritative power, but religion must not for that reason manifest itself in a sentiment of dependence.

These considerations lead us to a third definition of religion, broader than any other one, which seems to me to cover the ground; and if the coinage of a new word be permitted for a new term, I would propose the word *panpathy,* or All-feeling; for it is the emotion which rises in the soul in response to the influence of the whole universe in its entirety, and changes with the world-conception a man has.

The whole of the universe influences every particle of the material world, and determines the nature of its conduct. The molar motion of every one of the celestial bodies is conditioned by the attraction of all other celestial

bodies, according to their masses and distances, and there is no molecule, no atom, that is bare of the unavoidable omnipresence of the All. And what is true of the material universe is in a higher degree and in a nobler sense, true of the spiritual universe, as it reveals itself in the soul of man. Man is what he thinks; man's soul is the conception which he has of the world and of life. The contemplation of the whole of the world is accompanied by a sentiment which Clifford calls "cosmic emotion." A man's world-conception may be more or less intense, more or less clear, more or less true; but it is his guide in life, and on it, under all circumstances, directly or indirectly, his moral conduct will depend. The conviction of the truth of our world-conception is the directive power of man's moral conduct, and is his religion. Dull souls will show a lack of conviction, great souls are strong by having a conviction that is stable and well-grounded; and the main duty of a man is to form a conviction that will serve him as a mariner's compass in the course of life.

There is in the secret depths of the heart a peculiar emotional feeling of sympathy which sometimes comes to the front in spite of ourselves. There is a natural egotism in everyone,

but the greatest egotist and most unscrupulous rascal cannot entirely suppress that yearning for love which binds him with invisible threads to the souls of other beings. We cannot stand isolation, but feel the gentle attraction of sympathy, and out of it grow the friendship of those who are like us, the love of our companions, the compassion with the suffering, and the aspiration for righteousness.

The roots of this sentiment are very deep; indeed they seem to go to the bottom of our very existence, intellectual, psychical, and physical, for it appears that the sentiment itself is nothing but the law of gravitation in its moral interpretation and application. Suppose atoms to be sentient beings, what can be the nature of atomic feeling, but the influence of the whole surrounding world? The masses of all the other atoms in the universe affect one individual atom, and thus the All resides in, and as it were, ensouls each part of the All. Panpathy is an intrinsic feature of any kind of existence.

Wherever Panpathy stirs in a heart, there is religion; but wherever it is absent, there religion is not even though we have all its external symptoms such as ceremonies, belief, church discipline, lip-service, and the decorum of a respectable morality.

What is Panpathy?

Panpathy is that emotion in any particular being which represents its most intimate attachment to the All of existence. Panpathy is that in us which prompts us to sacrifice ourselves for a great purpose and inspires us to accomplish noble deeds; it is that which begets in man the enthusiasm for justice and right, and rouses a burning indignation at wrongs of all kinds. Panpathy is the wrath in the bosom of the oppressed; it is the fear of vengeance paling the cheek of the tyrant. It speaks in the voice of the guilty conscience, and is our comfort in affliction. It is the confidence of those who are wronged in the hope of the final victory of their good cause. Where we meet love of truth, there is Panpathy. Where a strong will pursues aims that are destined to serve ideals, it is Panpathy that consecrates the effort. Panpathy is that which makes the sentiment and endeavor of man transcend his own self to reach out for that of which he is a part and in the communion with which in some way or other he will alone find peace. Panpathy, in a word, is the quickening presence of the All in the heart of a sentient creature, manifesting itself as the *sursum* of all aspirations. It is the root of all

action not dictated by self; it is the origin of religion, the essence of morality, and the gist of life.

AFFECTING THE ENTIRE MAN.

Religion like consciousness is rooted in the elementary conditions of existence, but it blossoms out into full fragrance only in man; in man however it assumes dominance, for religion does not remain limited to sentiment, it takes possession of the whole man and there is nothing that determines more the character of his personality.

According to the antiquated notions of prescientific psychology, intellect, sentiment, and will, were three distinct powers or faculties of man, but modern psychology, having discarded the assumption of faculties, looks upon them as phases and features only in man's psychic disposition.

The change may be best explained in the instance of memory.

We no longer believe in memory as an organ of the mind but regard it as a general disposition of mental functions. Every sense-impression that is perceived is a psychic act; it is conscious for a moment and then disappears from the field of consciousness. But it

is not entirely obliterated; it only sinks below the limit of that mental state which is clearly felt. It ceases to be conscious and becomes subconscious. Being present in the mind in an unconscious condition but as a definite trace, it can be revived by a proper stimulus; and we generalize this feature of mental proceedings as "memory." To conceive of memory, which is a general function, as if it were a definite faculty having its own center in a special bump of the brain, is an antiquated conception; and similarly all the faculties as distinct provinces of the mind have been done away with.

There is no definite place in the brain where sentiment has its seat, nor another where the intellect operates, nor a third where the will reigns; but all, sentiment, intellect, and will, are three phases in one and the same process; they have their seats (if we may use the word) all over the organ of the mental functions and are abstract terms that designate the several significant features of the whole process.

There may be regions in the brain where either the sensation or the motor impulse is the significant feature of cerebral activity, as we have reason to assume of the several sensory and motor centers; but even these centers are stations only on a longer road, and the nature

of their activity is determined by their co-operation with other brain-structures. At any rate they are not isolated organs of sentiment, of thought, and of will, but interacting parts of one indivisible process; and in all actions of man these three aspects of his soul-life are indispensable, and every one of them plays an important part.

Religion is a product of experience, and thus it is decidedly a child of the intellect. Objects of inorganic nature, celestial bodies as well as the atoms of chemical reagents, are endowed with energy, but if we call their motions (by an indulgence in poetic language) actions of a will, it is a blind will only; they act, and their actions agree with the natural laws, yet they have no religion. Further, the brute creation is possessed of sensation, and we know that many animals are capable of most tender feelings, yet they have no religion. Man alone possesses religion, because his intellect has attained the height of rationality. Man's conceptions beget religion, and man's religion can be modified by a modification of his conceptions.

Suppose a primitive man witnessing a thunderstorm is suddenly surprised by a tremendous flash of lightning which breaks down a

tall tree in his immediate vicinity and is accompanied by the awful roar of a thunderclap. Think of the animistic notions he has concerning the powers of nature, his helplessness in facing them, his fear of being slain, his gratitude for having escaped, etc., etc.! What a storm of passionate feelings excites his soul! His notions concerning the power of the being that causes the thunderstorm is intensified, and he is willing to submit to its behests whatever the command may be.

Or again, think of the same man seeing in a dream his deceased father, his slain enemy, a murdered friend, or some other dead person: he believes in the reality of the vision and wakes up with the idea that he has conversed with the ghost of the departed. How powerfully will he be stirred, and how quickly will he obey the commands of the spirits!

The intensity of the sentiment gives power to the will, and the sentiment in its turn is the reaction of man's soul upon a definite kind of experience.

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF SENTIMENT.

Sentiment seems to us a purely subjective factor, and so will appears arbitrary. The whims of both are quite enigmatic and fre-

quently defy a rational explanation by pure self-introspection, even on honest self-observation. The prominent part which they play in psychology and ethics has been recognized since time immemorial, and all moralists, all public orators, all educators, are agreed on this: that to gain success a reformer must work through the sentiment on the will. Our sentiments are, properly understood, we ourselves, and those sentiments that preside over and dominate our impulse ideas which in their totality are comprised under the name of "will," are the dynamic power of our mental life. The will is king.

We can easily understand how the will, being personified in the prescientific period of psychology, becomes "the thing-in-itself," and in Schopenhauer's system it is conceived as the mysterious metaphysical entity which comes to the rescue when science ceases and the dreams of metaphysics begin. The superiority of the will, as the motor power in man, being recognized, Nietzsche goes so far as to banish reason, and logic, and the entire intellect, including objectivity of truth, declaring the will in its full arbitrariness to be the autocrat of everything. The intellect is the handmaid of the will and ought to be nothing better; for truth

is truth only (so Nietzsche says) if it pleases the will to be so. And these doctrines are echoed in America by a man of most conservative tendencies, Professor William James of Harvard, who has worked out a special theory of "the will to believe," cherishing the opinion that the will is justified in forming its belief according to its "organic needs," and not in compliance with arguments or scientific investigations.[1]

It is not our intention here to criticise either Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, or James; we adduce their views only to prove the importance and the necessity of a ventilation of the significance of the will. We take exception to their views. The will is not a metaphysical entity, it is not an isolated faculty, or a monarch in the commonwealth of the soul: the will is an abstract term denoting the condition of a

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[1] I may be mistaken in my conception of James, for he must not always be taken literally. He is more of a prophet than a philosopher and in his desire to emphasize a statement may easily go to extremes. Though there are many statements of his which I cannot endorse, I find him always interesting and, in addition, personally sympathetic. He is decidedly a noteworthy personality, and I refer to him on account of the significance which I attach to him. Should I misrepresent him, he is cordially invited to correct my statements. For a discussion of his philosophy see the author's article on "Pragmatism" in *The Monist* of July, 1908.

conscious motor-idea, *i. e.*, image, or notion, or idea, or plan, in the mind of man, impelling him to action.

Will implies three factors: (1) the idea, or plan, or conception; (2) consciousness or feeling, viz., a state of awareness which may be intense or weak, passionate and fitful or quiet and steady, joyous and jubilant, or painful; full of excitement or indifferent; and (3) the realization, or at least inchoate realization, in deeds. The latter is that which characterizes the state as will in contrast to feeling, and has led to the definition of will as "a state passing into act."

Accordingly there is no will which would be will, pure and simple. Every will is possessed of a content of some kind, and the content of the will is an idea, which is a product of the intellect. The idea, *i. e.*, the intellectual factor, in a state of volition is not an indifferent or unessential part of it, but a most important feature, for it imparts direction to the will, and if you change the idea you change thereby the will. Hence the possibility of education so emphatically denied by Schopenhauer.

THE PERSONAL EQUATION.

Now, we grant that in all practical questions in life there is a subjective element that belongs and must belong to what may be called the personal equation. The facts that lie before us in a given case are not sufficient to form an opinion or to determine the course that a special person should take. The attitude of the person toward the facts is an important part of the whole combination, and this "personal equation" cannot be the same for all people. It must and will be different with different personalities.

The truth is that no two persons facing the same situation, even when understanding the situation to be the same, will assume the same attitude. Thus, a recognition of the nature of the soul as a compound produces a different impression upon different individualities. Buddha expresses it in his doctrine of the three characteristics of life, that all compounds are transitory, that their existence implies misery, and that there is no thing-in-itself, no stable ego-entity (*atman*); and he derives from it his moral teaching of unselfishness, or non-assertion, of a surrender of all clinging to worldly pleasures and a universal loving-kindness toward all beings. How different is the

attitude of Omar Khayyam! Life is fleeting, there is no permanency, and our personality too is a cluster of effects without any stable entity behind it. But his conclusion is not that therefore man must renounce the impermanent and seek that which is permanent, by surrendering his egotism which is based upon the illusion of self, but on the contrary, he advises clinging to the fleeting moment, sipping the cup of joy to the dregs, and leaving all other thoughts to dreamers. To him, life has no sense except enjoyment. I note here the contrast only which consists in the attitude, but must not be sought in the facts in the face of which the attitude is taken. I ought to add that there is a serious moral background in the position of the poet of wine and love, which is worked out by Goethe in such poems as *"Vanitas Vanitatum Vanitas."*[1] In fact, Goethe's attitude is one that in a certain sense combines the opposites of Buddha and Omar Khayyam.

In brief, we grant that there is a personal equation in the moral principle of every man, and the objective statement of facts is not the sole thing in the determination of man's atti-

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[1] For further details and a collection of Goethe's poems in this line of thought see the author's *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics*, pp. 118-121 and 98-115.

tude toward his surroundings. This personal equation is due to the character of man. But we must insist, first, that the attitude toward facts is not "a belief," as Professor James would have it. In a scientifically trained man the will determines the attitude towards facts, but not his conception of the facts themselves. The will may further determine the mode of expression, but not the substance of the statement. And, secondly, it is obvious that the will itself is a product of experience; it has developed from blind impulses and has been modified, trained, and educated in the school of life. Accordingly, its character, its worth, its place in the scale of evolution, depend upon the growth of intelligence, which proves that reason and rational considerations play no unimportant part in both the formation and in the decisions of the will.

THE WILL.

Far from being a metaphysical entity, which is such by an arbitrary act, a *sic volo sic jubeo* (as Schopenhauer teaches), the will is a phenomenon of nature, a product of definite conditions and explicable in its origin and growth. Schopenhauer commonly characterizes the will as "blind," meaning thereby that it lacks ra-

tionality and spurns the acute visions of intellectual comprehension. And it is quite true that the will appears arbitrary in its nature. The several personalities, and generally speaking all living beings, know what they will, but, as a rule, they do not know why they will it. In other words, they are conscious of what they are and what they desire; but they are not conscious of the conditions that have moulded their nature. They are especially ignorant of their prenatal history, which built up their physiological system, the frame of the skeleton, the muscles, the intestines, the several organs of sensation, and also the inherited traits of character. Only the present is illumined by consciousness, not the past.

The lion lives on a flesh diet because he has become carnivorous in the long history of his race. He does not know why; he only feels his appetite for flesh; he hunts animals as he saw his parents do; he catches his prey and devours it. For him (if he could reason about it) there is no "why?" save his royal pleasure. He likes flesh diet, it agrees with him, he feels contented when he gets it,—in short he wills it. It is his "organic need" (to use the phrase of Professor James). Logic, or ratiocination, or scientific evidence, has noth-

ing to do with it. To the lion the slimmest pretext of an argument would be sufficient to justify his belief in flesh diet. On the other hand, no amount of the most skillful explanation of its absolute necessity will be sufficient to induce a sheep not to condemn the lion's mode of living as an utterly immoral principle.

The example of the lion's belief in flesh diet exhibits in an exaggerated way the enormous significance of the part which the personal equation plays in the formation of convictions; and on that very account it is more instructive than an instance taken from the field of arithmetic or formal logic. No one questions the statement of a mathematician that $2\times2=4$, or that $(a+b)^2=a^2+2ab+b^2$, or if all *A*'s are *B*, that every single *A* is *B*. But purely formal statements, so long as they are considered abstractly, are theoretical. As soon as they are applied to practical life, the quarrel of dissenting opinions begins. On the very threshold of experience, the question arises whether $2\times2=4$ is true at all. There is a large contingent of able-minded, headstrong, stout-willed knights of thought who would declare that purely formal statements are not true. They are merely correct; that is to say, they are legitimate inferences only from assumed propo-

sitions. The statement proves true in thousands of instances in the domain of our experience, but it may not hold good on Mars, where (for all we know) 2×2 may $= 5$. And geometric theorems, far from being true, are positively false, for geometrical lines and points and surfaces are purely imaginary and positively unreal.

Such is the theory of John Stuart Mill as presented in his *Logic,* and if he is right, science loses its solid bottom and ceases to be reliable; but the loss of science (viz., exactness of argument and objectivity of statement) is the gain of the erratic escapades of subjectivity, of superstition and of all flights of fancy in the domain of unfounded belief.

If science (viz., objective knowledge) ceases, subjective opinion as fashioned by an arbitrary will exercises undisputed control. Thus the door is opened to either agnosticism or obscurantism.

Those who seek religion in the domain of the impenetrable night of nescience, who define religion as belief in the unknowable or incomprehensible, or even the impossible and incredible, whose motto is *credo quia absurdum,* would say here, "the loss of science is the gain of religion." We demur. The loss of science

can never be a gain to religion, but only to superstition. It is exactly the point we intend to make that this conception of religion (as being based upon unfounded belief, as being a mere matter of subjective idiosyncracy and comparable to the lion's belief in flesh diet) is as false as is the method of laying its foundation upon scepticism.

The denial of the objectivity of truth which seems to be a disease that naturally develops in the period of transition from childhood to manhood, a kind of mental measles, leads in science to agnosticism, in religion to obscurantism. The agnostic argues that there is no truth, and thus everyone's religious conviction becomes a matter of purely subjective attitude. The infidel scorns religion, saying, since truth is not forthcoming, let us acquiesce in nescience; and the pious rejoices at the idea that nothing can be either proved or disproved, for now he is free to believe anything that he pleases. In both cases indolence triumphs. There is no need of troubling oneself with doubts, or investigating the problems of life. Since science is not reliable, the personal equation of our own organic needs will solve for us all the problems of life. The will is king, intelligence is his hired servant. The will to be-

lieve alone can fabricate for us a religion that will suit us. Never mind what science has to say. Will is trump!

The question of the will in both spheres, science and religion, has a far-reaching moral application. If our organic needs are the court of last appeal, we have only to know what we want and make a religion to suit us. If a satisfaction of our constitutional demands be the last aim that we can obtain, we need not trouble about theory, or an objective comprehension of things. It would be sufficient to let our instincts do the thinking for us. This is practical, or if you prefer the term, pragmatic, and it is a convenient and easy way of dealing with a grave problem, but the world will move on and leave the pragmatist behind. Our intellectual life will be arrested, for the correction of the will through better insight, through growth and higher development, is thus made irrelevant.

INTELLECT FORMING THE WILL.

Neither a truly religious nor a truly scientific man can find satisfaction in the assumption of an arbitrary will that uses the intellect as a handmaid only to do its bidding. On the contrary: the will is (not directly but indi-

rectly) the product of the intellect. And if the will were not amenable to intellectual guidance, whence should we take the courage to labor for progress, whence the hope that our life's work is not in vain? If the will were truly the ultimate *raison d'être* of our religious convictions and the authority of last appeal, there would be no sense in letting the light of science shine upon religion. Religion would be relegated to the dark region of the inscrutable, and there all superstitions, whether high or low, whether absurd or relatively true, whether inspiring by their moral significance or debasing by bigotry and error, would rank on the same level and be entitled to equal claims,—for the criterion of judging them would have been removed and purely subjective, arbitrary needs would be deemed sufficient for their justification.

The will can be affected by instruction, it can be guided by education, it can be modified by experience. And though the influence of an improved insight is slow, it is unfailing.

Let us but consider the origin of the will, and we shall appreciate the paramount influence which intelligence exercises upon its formation.

Schopenhauer claims (and within certain

limits he is right) that the will is unchangeable; that educators can improve the intellect of a man but cannot affect his character. A cat will have a hankering after birds, even though constant fear of punishment may restrain her from attacking the canary in his cage. *Mutatis mutandis,* a thief will remain a thief, a liar a liar, a rascal a rascal, even though fear of punishment may force him to reform, the character will remain as before, for no living being can change its nature, it can only adapt itself to circumstances and acquire the habit of suppressing certain impulses in consideration of their inevitable evil results. This is true enough, but we must not forget that the acquisition of new habit is actually a change of character, and the habit of suppressing evil impulses may convert a dangerous criminal into a useful member of society. We grant that the growth of new habits is a slow process, and that old habits are more inveterate than later accretions. Nevertheless, no one can doubt that education and experience in developing certain desirable habits are neither impossible nor unheard of experiences.

The fact remains that new types of beings are being moulded under our very eyes. Human races (like the negroes in the United States,

the Japanese under the influence of Western civilization, European immigrants to America) are modified. The process is slow, very slow, but not slow enough to be questioned. And it is experience under definitely given conditions that produces the change. Experience means intelligence, and it implies the objectivity of facts to which the subjectivity of sentiment becomes adapted. The product which is a change of character appears upon introspection as arbitrary as before; it is will, and the new type of creature acts according to its new habits because it wills to be such as it now is, and not because it argues on lines of logical deductions.

It is the logic of the influence of objective facts, not the subjective logic of pondering over problems, that moulds sentient beings. Hence the statement concerning great leaders on the path of progress that they builded better than they knew. Evolution in the animal kingdom and progress in the history of mankind is due to the influence of the reason or logic of the objectivity of facts upon the subjectivity of the will, of character, of sentiment. Thus sentiment, and with it character and will, are slowly but surely modified by reason.

Sentiment, character, and will are for the

present purpose identical, for character is a name of the general tenor of will-impulses, and will is merely the dynamic aspect of sentiment.

EVOLUTION OF SUBJECTIVITY.

The evolution of all life must have started with simple impulses of sentient substance, and these blind impulses are the result of an internal state of irritable matter; they are due to the physical need of hunger. A need is felt as a want, and the want is an incipient will. The want incites irritable substance to activity, and a blind search for food is made. The want is sooner or later satisfied, leaving a trace of the pleasant experience, which is a predisposition for a repetition of the same process. Innumerable actions of the same kind shape the life-substance in adaptation to its surroundings. Constant contact with a surrounding medium produces a follicle or enveloping membrane with an aptitude to contract upon touch; the constantly repeated impact of ether-waves is responded to in places most exposed to them, viz., in front, and the traces of this constantly repeated response develop specks sensitive to light, called ocelli, or primitive eyes. Thus the environment shapes the

several creatures, and their will is nothing but the response to given conditions. The subjectivity of every being is simply the interior state of an awareness of self, analogous to the organism as it manifests itself in the objective world.

And what a bewildering multitude of forms exists in animate creation! There are innumerable bacilli, bacteria, and spores, fungi and microbes. We have protists which cannot as yet be classified either as animals or plants. There are innumerable varieties of lower life, but the number of forms rather decreases with their ascent; fishes, birds, amphibia present stately groups of families, fully known only to specialists. The mammalia are sufficiently limited in number to be generally pretty well known. But when we come to the highest type, the rational animal, we have one genus only, which is man. There are about half a dozen human races, but the black and the white, the yellow and the red races differ from each other less (as regards race characteristics) than the St. Bernard from the dingo. The races of man are not *genera,* but *species*, perhaps not even that, but mere families, called races.

It is true that within the unity of the human genus there is a great variety of individual

differences, almost as great as, or perhaps even greater than, the variety of genera on the lowest scale. Still it is one genus only. This contrast between the higher and lower stages of evolution is characteristic, because it points out the power of the oneness of the aim, or goal, or ideal. This ideal of animal life is not imposed upon it as an external purpose in the old sense of the doctrine of design, but inheres in nature as an intrinsic teleology, a direction which evolution takes because it is determined by law, *i. e.*, the immanent world-order of uniformities which naturally lead all creatures to develop toward rationality.

We do not deny that on other planets other kinds of rational beings may exist; they may be winged, their organs of locomotion may be different, and they may have additional sense-organs, but they will have the same reason, and (leaving out the decimal system as accidental) the same arithmetic, the same mathematics, the same logic. There is one law only in the word which in its purely formal relations is the condition of all uniformities in the world, and corresponding to this one law there is one reason only and there can be only one ideal of rationality for rational beings. This

ideal, being founded upon the objective fact of uniformity in the world-order, is an objective factor; it is the factor that moulds the intellect of living creatures, and, by moulding the intellect, fashions the will.

Will (properly speaking) is never blind, as Schopenhauer says; will develops from blind impulses, but it becomes will only by the light of intelligence which is nothing but subjectivity regulated by a recognition of the objective world-order, viz., the eternal law of being in which existence is moulded.

The idiosyncrasy of the will is unquestionably the most powerful factor in belief, religious as well as ethical. All creatures that can speak are apt to fashion their rules of conduct according to their character, the preservation of which is to them an organic need. And yet, however stable a character may be, it is not absolutely stable. There is back of it the influence of experience which is little recognized and much misinterpreted, working constantly in one and the same direction toward a recognition of the factors that shape us. The result is first a rational being with the eggshell of superstition still clinging to him and then the completion of the rational ideal in the man of scientific insight.

SCIENTIFIC INSIGHT.

We say purposely "man of scientific insight," not "scientist"; for science is the method only, the instrument by which we realize the aims of mankind, the ideal of existence toward which evolution tends. The scientist is the hod-carrier who furnishes the materials for a scientific conception of existence. It is not probable in the advance of civilization that all men will become scientists, but it is quite within the scope of probability that in a future condition of society all people will be possessed of scientific insight, and as soon as that stage is attained, we shall all understand that above the organic need of a will to believe, there is an objective norm which shapes and moulds in the furnace of evolution the organic needs of beings, and those creatures whose organic needs are not amenable to the quiet promptings of the lessons of life will be sifted out and discarded.

Organic needs remain the court of last appeal to the prescientific man, who, however, need not for that reason be irrational. The prescientific man finds rest and peace in the thought that a certain belief is satisfactory to him, because it suits his idiosyncrasy. The man of scientific insight goes farther; he seeks his

foundation in the eternal conditions that have shaped his will and thus he is enabled to grow beyond his present size. All creatures have this chance, and it is a positive fact that all creatures do grow by experience in the school of life. For it is this growth which makes evolution possible. But the man of scientific insight ceases to cling to what he is at a given moment, and thus he acquires the power of conscious growth.

In the prescientific man there is a resistance to growth and this resistance to growth is beneficial as a conservative principle; otherwise growth would not be steady, but erratic. When the stage of scientific insight has been attained, there is less danger of haphazard advances, for then changes will be made only after careful experimentation, and being based upon a clear comprehension of facts they will imply fewer risks. Thus there is less danger of going astray, and this confidence will impart to man a calm trust and a well-directed courage.

THEONOMY.

But what has an exposition of the evolution of will to do with theology?

Very much indeed! If religion in its most significant period of growth is a condition of

belief, and if in this period belief depends upon our organic need, *i. e.*, upon the will to believe, the gradual disappearance of the subjective factor and its replacement by a recognition of the objective norm in which our will is moulded must finally transform the old theology, the pseudo-science of subjective beliefs, into a new theology, viz., theology as a genuine science. The latter is the natural outcome of the aspirations of the former as much as astronomy issues from astrology and chemistry from alchemy. We might call the new theology by a new name to distinguish it from the old theology of bygone ages, but if the transition be a peaceful change the need of a new name will not be felt.

We might call the new theology "theosophy," had not that beautiful name been monopolized by the theosophists whose most prominent representatives seem to be bent on continuing the errors and vagaries of the old theology without actually attaining the higher ground of the truly scientific spirit; they introduce new-fangled extravagances and return at the same time to errors that have been discarded.

Theosophy was the name of theology as a science in ancient Greece, and if we could use

it in its original meaning it would be a good name.

The word "theology" would do, for the ending "logy" means "science," although it has been misused in such words as "mythology" and "astrology." Mythology means a whole system of myths, not their logical comprehension, and astrology the antiquated lore—not to say superstition—of the influence of the stars on human destiny.

In our opinion the best name for the new theology is "theonomy" (in analogy to astronomy), and if the term were accepted it would serve its purpose.

The new theology (or if you please "theonomy") is a new science the roots of which lie partly in philosophy, partly in a scientific treatment of history, partly in ethics, partly in an application of art, and partly also in poetry and *belles lettres,* the religious literature being to a great extent hymns and recitals. The basis of theonomy is an appreciation of the factors that shape our ends, viz., God.

The name God remains quite as appropriate for the new conception of the eternal norm of being as it was for the old. The notion of a divine personality which the term easily conveys is no more objectionable than the occa-

sional personification of nature which now and then occurs even in strictly scientific books. For there is a good reason for anthropomorphism, and if it is but understood as such, there is no need of taking offence at it. Moreover, the eternal norm of being is actually a harmonious totality of laws of nature, a system of truths, a spiritual organism, or a body of immaterial influences which condition all the details of becoming. These creative factors of life are omnipresent and non-material; they are eternal and indelible; they are immutable and perfect beyond the possibility of being improved, forming the unchangeable bed-rock and ultimate *raison d'être* of existence.

But theonomy, the new theology, is not merely philosophy; it is complicated by a consideration of the positive forms of religion as they have developed historically on earth. It is history when tracing the evolution of religion from Egypt and Babylon to Palestine, from Palestine to Rome, from Rome to Germany, England, and America. It is in need of philology and literary criticism when it restores the old sense of the literature of the several faiths. It partakes also of the nature of the descriptive natural sciences. It enters into psychological investigations when inquiring into the source

of religious phenomena, such as the practice of sacrifice, of slaughtering animals, and in savage times even human beings, on the altars of the gods. It trespasses upon the territory of folklore and anthropology when tracing the development of purer views from superstitions, of moral convictions from barbarous customs, of scientifically tenable notions from a belief in magic and other errors. It partakes of the methods of the educator when applied to the practical needs of present morality. It is a grand and noble science, and the scope of its development is of infinite potentialities.

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION.

Those who speak of the irreligion or non-religion of the future have seen one side only of the religious life of the present age, viz., the decay of certain dogmatic features of the old theology and the palpable untenableness of the old position of dogmatism with its *credo quia absurdum*. They are limited in their field of vision to one aspect only and have not seen the actual growth that is taking place in the minds of theologians holding chairs of theology at the several universities of both hemispheres, and also in the hearts of religious congregations, especially of the Protestant Churches of

the United States. The future of mankind will not be less religious than the past. It will be more religious; that is to say, its religion will be as much purer than the decaying creeds of to-day as monotheism was better than the polytheism which it succeeded.

The present age is a time in which frequent demands are being made for a revision of creeds, and several churches have gone so far as to make a few important changes, and it is remarkable that the delegates of so conservative a denomination as the Presbyterian were practically unanimous.

Obviously modifications in the formulation of our religious tenets have become desirable, because our comprehension has expanded and our field of vision has been enlarged as well as deepened. This change, however, is not a symptom of decay and death, but of growth and life. We find it necessary to discard the old dogmatism. Yet while dogmatism should go, dogmas (or rather doctrines) should stay, and they will stay. That is to say, our attitude toward the traditional confessions of faith, our interpretation of them, our views concerning their letter and the relation of the letter to the spirit, have changed, and the change actu-

ally consists in a better knowledge of their spirit.

It is in this sense that the future will be not less religious but more religious, and our religion will be purer and nobler and truer.

We shall understand the way in which the intellect modifies the will, and we shall see the justice of interpreting the traditional dogmas in the light of science. We need not drop the symbol as a myth, when we begin to understand its significance, nor need we abandon the name and conception of God when we learn that God is not an individual being, but a super-personal omnipresence.

Religion, far from being abolished, is at present in a stage of growth. Its horizon is expanding, but instead of losing anything, we are gaining. Theology changes into theonomy, which is not a surrender of the old orthodoxy, but its fulfilment and completion.[1]

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[1]The change pointed out here does not lead to agnosticism or negativism of any kind, but toward the establishment of a positive science of religion, including the nature of God. While we grow broader, we become more tolerant and sympathetic with other conceptions, but also more definite in comprehending the truth, viz., the orthodox solution of religious problems. For details see the writer's article "The New Orthodoxy" in *The Monist*, Vol. VI., No. 1, and in *The Dawn of a New Era*, p. 21 ff.

THE REVISION OF CREEDS.

The new attitude here taken is neither liberalism, nor the old dogmatism; it is both combined carried to their consistent conclusion. It is an entirely new departure, for it is a rigid radicalism that leads to a new orthodoxy.

It may seem strange, but it is true nevertheless that supposing I myself had been a delegate to the Presbyterian assemblage or committee, I should have voted against a revision of the creed, in spite of my radical position and advanced views. And why? Because I would propose another course which seems to me more recommendable.

To revise creeds seems to imply that their formulation in a past age was a mistake, and I think it was not. A creed is a formulation of faith as understood at the time of its formulation and under definite historical conditions. We can understand the spirit of a creed only after a close study of the history of the time which gave birth to it, and to adapt a creed of the past to the needs of the present must forever remain patchwork. Therefore it would be wrong to tamper with creeds, for they are historical documents and should not be altered

any more than we would change the text of ancient monuments.

The revision of a creed, too, is an historical act, and so the changes adopted indicate a change in the religious attitude of a Church, but it would have been preferable to leave the old confession alone.

In place of a revision I should have proposed that a new statement be made of the spirit in which the present generation views the confessions of faith in the past, and my proposition, which I trust would be acceptable to the most orthodox wing of the Church, would read about as follows:

WHEREAS, divine revelation is the unfoldment of truth;

WHEREAS, God speaks to mankind at sundry times and in divers manners;

WHEREAS, Jesus Christ spoke to us in parables, and the Christian confessions of faith are, as their name implies, symbolical books;

WHEREAS, religion is a living power and life means growth;

WHEREAS, that is the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world; and finally

WHEREAS, centuries of unparalleled growth have added much to our better comprehension of religious truth;

THEREFORE, be it resolved that we, the duly elected representatives of this Church, declare:

That we regard all former Confessions of Faith and other formulations of belief in ages past contained in the symbolical books, as venerable historical documents

which were, from time to time, on certain occasions, and for specific purposes, composed by the legitimate and legally appointed representatives of our Church;

That we justify the spirit in which they were written, but deny that they were ever intended to bar out from us the light that a higher spiritual development and the general advance of civilization and science would bring;

That we bear in mind that the symbolical books are symbols, and that we have learned that a freer scope for their interpretation in the light of the maturest science of our age will do no harm to the essential doctrines of our faith.

This declaration would bestow the necessary liberty of conscience on ministers without involving the change of a single letter in the *credo* and without causing a break in the historical tradition of the Church.

While I am radical in my principles and do not hesitate to apply my radicalism to practical life, the very recognition of evolution as an essential truth in the interpretation of the development of man teaches me to be conservative. Such a radicalism as would tear down religion on account of some antiquated expressions is shallow and will not prove wholesome. It is a spurious radicalism. We must learn to comprehend the old formulations of faith from the standpoint of the old times. We must recognize the sincerity of our fathers and appreciate the work they did. Therefore, let their work stand as theirs. On the other hand we

must not cut off progress or prevent further growth, which would unfailingly happen if we allowed the dead past to cripple the life of the present.

It is true that the authors of creeds, and especially also the framers of the Westminster Confession, fondly imagined that their statement would prove acceptable to all the generations to come; they did not consider the needs of the twentieth century. But that narrowness which characterized them is a trait of their age and we cannot appreciate the moral worth of their zeal unless we bear in mind their limitations.

The Huguenots endured most dreadful persecutions. They were exiled from France, and lost all their worldly possessions of their old homes; but they carried with them confidence in liberty, boldness of enterprise, good schooling and knowledge, sound methods of education, thrifty habits, energy and endurance. It is no accident that they became prosperous wherever they went. History is their justification. We make ourselves worthy of the heirloom of their deeds, not by clinging to their limitations, but by imitating their boldness of spirit and their love of truth—of the truth as they saw it—which made them rise in rebellion

against the tyranny of the letter of the established Church institutions.

When we put our hands to the plow, there is no need of looking back. We should learn to understand the past, and not be overawed by it, but live within the living present; and we of the present have the same right to think, to learn, and to grow, as our ancestors had. We have the same right to reform the Church as they had, and also to formulate our views of religious truth in terms that will suit the needs of the present time. We are their descendants; our faith is the outcome, and in part the product, of their religious development, and if it is not the same in letter, it is the same in spirit. Our faith is their faith; but it is their faith matured by the increased experience of several centuries. There is no need of tampering with their statements and of changing their confessions of faith. If we only recognize our own right to read the old doctrines in the new light, we shall be more just to them and give them a better interpretation which at the same time will be better adapted to the conditions under which we live.

Religious creeds were formulated for the sake of rendering clear the situation in which they were written, but they were never meant

to arrest mental development. The men who wrote the Westminster Confession would not express themselves to-day in the same terms as they did then. In their days they reformed the Church, because they insisted upon their right to think, to learn, and to grow; they would not be prevented to-day from acting on the same principles, and under changed conditions they would express their faith in other terms. Let us follow their example and so prove ourselves to be their faithful successors, their legitimate heirs and true children, not in the letter, but in the spirit.

What is true of the Presbyterian holds good for all Churches. There is no need of revising dogmatic formulas or tampering with any confession of faith. Let all creeds stand as they read and treat them as historical documents; but when you feel that you have outgrown the letter of your religious traditions, remember that creeds are symbols of your faith, not absolute truth, and insist on your right of interpretation.

We need elasticity in our religious life as well as stability. The right of interpretation gives both. It frees us from the bondage of the letter that killeth, yet preserves the spirit. It allows a great scope to liberty on conserva-

tive principles and favors growth without producing a break, thus rendering evolution possible where otherwise a revolution would be necessary.

A CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION.

The change of theology into theonomy is not an innovation, and though the new conception of God as it is here stated, has perhaps never before been formulated in the same way, and with the same definiteness, the author of this book feels that his solution has been prepared by investigators in several fields, that he has only completed their work by systematizing the assured results of scientific and philosophic enquiry and combining their converging lines into a consistent presentation. In one sense we still believe in the same God as did our fathers. We still believe—or rather we know—that there is an authority of conduct which if we are wise we shall acknowledge as our guide in life, and such has been the God of the past. In other respects, however, our conception of God has changed. It has grown more matured, more scientific, more true.

A century ago great disasters, such as hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, etc., gave rise to theological discussions in which the

representatives of all creeds endeavored to show that there was no conflict between God's omnipotence and omniscience on the one hand and his omnibenevolence on the other. The young Goethe was still overwhelmed with the problem of the earthquake of Lisbon, as can be seen in his autobiography, and he found no satisfactory solution of it in the traditional conception of God. In our present age similar disasters such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the earthquake of San Francisco were contemplated in a different spirit, characteristic of a new conception of God.

The outburst of Mount Pelée wiped many thousands of people out of existence in the most horrible manner by suffocating them with obnoxious gases and covering them with a hail of fire. The tragedy on Martinique with a criminal as its sole survivor must have been more horrible than the catastrophe of Pompeii and Herculaneum, and worse than the earthquake of Lisbon! Yet no theological discussions were raised either in the papers or in the pulpit. No questions were asked in public as to the goodness of God. There was no excitement about it of a religious nature, save the sympathy expressed by sending help and

taking care of the unfortunates that were still alive in the ruined island.

The true reason of this change must be sought in the fact that to the thinking part of mankind the problem has been solved. There are some left who do not as yet know of the new conception of God and still cling to their anthropomorphic views, but even they have their misgivings about drawing the same conclusions as did the author of the tale of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and so they kept quiet. Even they know that the laws of nature are irrefragable and that the old notions of providence, being no longer tenable, must be replaced by a new doctrine which holds that providence is immanent in man and that man must work out his own salvation.

There are to-day more avowed atheists than ever, and the theists are divided among themselves. Some believe in a personal God who has theoretically all the power of an autocratic ruler, but in their inmost hearts they concede that he has virtually abdicated in favor of law and so can no longer be held accountable for the various accidents that befall mortals. Others have more or less identified God and law and are thus approaching every one in his

own way a scientifically tenable conception of God.

A few years ago when a storm happened to sweep over the Atlantic threatening to sink an ocean liner on which the Rev. Mr. Moody had passage, a frivolous reporter interviewed the pious preacher, the captain, and many of the passengers as to their belief in the efficacy of the revivalist's prayer on that occasion. Moody refused to answer the question, for even with his child-like faith he saw that however he might represent his views there was little chance of making converts, and the reader could see a sort of grim humor in the report of his few remarks, which were published without invidious comments and with strict impartiality.

It is natural that in the excitement of danger people of Mr. Moody's education and disposition should implore God's mercy, but we no longer blame the captain if he has no confidence in the efficacy of prayer except when made in a spirit of self-exhortation. Whatever the captain believes, we expect him to keep his head clear and to take the right measures to save his ship. Prayer is recommendable if it has that effect upon his mind.

If prayer as an imploration of God's mercy

or an appeal to his clemency were truly a reliable method of commanding the wind and the seas, navigation companies would not fail to engage men that could pray and send them out on dangerous sea voyages. But the old belief in this external and pagan conception of the efficacy of prayer has become a mere student's joke even in the good university of Oberlin, where it was said that when a certain celebrated divine prayed for rain it sprinkled, but that when old Dr. Finney, the pious and militant theological president prayed, it poured.

The Pelée disaster was too terrible for frivolous comments, and so all religious discussions were hushed by the seriousness of the occasion.

Only later did the papers publish a few extravagant utterances, from which I select one which comes from the island of Martinique itself.[1] Père Marcy, the Curé of a church at Morne Rouge, denounced the inhabitants of St. Pierre for Satanism, renewing the old exploded charges of Leo Taxill and the mythical Diana Vaughan, exclaiming with a shudder: "You have no conception of what went on in that wicked city! The Satanists and their black

[1]See the St. Louis *Republic* for Sunday, July 13, 1902.

masses, the terrible people who worshiped the devil and made their horrible offerings to him, were not the only ones whom God punished. . . . Poor souls! They had not even time to repent of their sins."

Such views are mere survivals and are considered curiosa of antiquated bigotry and ignorance.

This change of conduct indicates a radical change in the religious attitude of the world, —a change which from the old standpoint may be characterized as a drifting toward infidelity, but which is simply the progress of a scientific conception of the world. Science has added to our knowledge and is just about to modify our religious faith. We cease to be children and approach the age of maturity. We put away childish things and grow in comprehension.

There are many, perhaps, who are not yet clear as to what the new God conception is, but most of them instinctively feel the change, and their thinking and doing is influenced by it without their knowing it.

There are some theologians who still believe in the old views; they distrust the progress of science and continue to hold back, but their ranks are beginning to grow thin. Others seek refuge in agnosticism. A few take their

cross upon them and tell the straight truth. They may be honest, but they are not wise. So far a certain percentage of them have been tried for heresy, found guilty, and dismissed. Most of the theologians who know the truth and have found the solution, break it to the world gently, confining their efforts to the education of a new generation that will be better prepared for the problems of the present age and will no longer shrink from recognizing the rights of science. These employ methods that promise success, but they have developed a new language and new modes of speech which none but the initiated understand in their full significance. They speak the truth, but they express themselves in terms which do not state but merely involve the result; or whenever results are given direct, their negative side, which discredits the old theology, only is indicated, while the positive aspect is emphasized with great energy.

Among these theologians there are plodding investigators, men of deep conviction, who have had to first overthrow in their own hearts the idol which they worshiped. They know what a hard struggle it is to break away from the old traditional interpretation of religion and the child-like trust in the letter. And, now,

in formulating their new views, they stop to consider the sentiments of their brethren who have not yet reached the same stage, and from sheer charity couch their statements in guarded terms and express themselves in words that will give no offense to those who are still babes and should be fed with milk only.

NO MORE FUROR THEOLOGICUS.

Charity in theological discussions is a new feature which corresponds to politeness in the realm of the other sciences. The old theology, like astrology, is distinguished by a certain vigor of expression, which rarely hesitates to show its firmness of faith in denouncing all other views as heretical.

Swearing in society is regarded as improper, but it was the style in the old theology. And the damnation of the heretics is still the favorite method of settling theological disputes in the most conservative and venerable Churches. Tolstoi has had his experience with it, and Protestants even to-day are officially cursed once a year by Rome, while the Protestant confessions of faith still contain denunciations of the Pope as Antichrist.

There is no need of our denouncing, ridiculing, or vituperating the old method of set-

tling disputes in theology, and we make reference to it without any animosity, simply characterizing it as typical of a certain phase of our religious development. In its time it was as natural to the Church as childish pranks are to children. The churches have outgrown it to a great extent, and will outgrow it more when, on their approach to maturity, following the prediction of St. Paul, they will put away childish things.

The fanaticism of the old Church indicates the fervor of the religious sentiment, and although the consequences are very sad when we consider the fagots of the Inquisition, we need not dwell on the dark side now but may rejoice that the times have changed. We must understand, however, that the approach of science is the abolition of the brutality of enforcing the truth of a proposition. The man who can prove his views by rational arguments never uses threats. Accordingly vigorous terms in upholding a proposition appear in inverse ratio to its being supported by scientific argument. Thus the more mature a science has become, the politer are its representatives in their discussions of mooted subjects. Mathematicians are in the habit of simply pointing out the mistakes of their colleagues. They never revile

one another, for arguments are sufficient, and so they can afford to behave like gentlemen. In the measure that there are no arguments forthcoming, scientists feel constrained to make up for the deficiency by vigorous expressions denouncing as an ignoramus any one who ventures to differ from them. Thus even mathematicians, in trespassing upon the domain of metaphysics in building their metageometrical air-castles, occasionally assume the theological style. Discussions of the natural sciences, when their devotees make raids into the unknown territory of hypothesis and theory, are by no means free from personalities and invectives, still they are moderate when compared with the controversies of philosophers with their denunciations and self-glorifications. Think of the self-sufficiency of the Hegelians in Germany and witness the tirades of Schopenhauer! He had no arguments to offer, so he hurled the thunder of his displeasure at his *confrères* who at that time were in possession of almost all the professorial chairs. In the measure that philosophy becomes a science, its representatives cease to use epithets.

The climax of vigor in the assertion of a position without argument is reached in the domain of religious dogma; and we will not think

the worse of the theological scholars of past ages when we consider that in their dearth of rational argument invectives and interdicts, excommunications and heresy trials, and sometimes even fire and sword, were the only weapons that could be had. If we tolerate Schopenhauer, should we not also have some consideration for the popes who are surrounded by mediæval traditions? Their thunderbolts are blunted, and the days of massacres of St. Bartholomew are past. We need not forget, but we can forgive; for we have learned to appreciate the psychology of fanaticism.

The time has come when theology itself attains to maturity. It is fast becoming a science; and in the measure that it becomes a science theologians cease to excommunicate heretics and introduce a new spirit into their discussions which, though less vigorous, is more polite, more considerate, more charitable.

It may appear that the abolition of vigorous terms in the domain of theology will make it a namby-pamby science without character. But such is not the case. Argument, the new weapon, is as much more formidable than the fagot in destroying errors and in eradicating heresy, as the rifle is superior to the ancient cross-bow, and the cannon to the club of a sav-

age. It is mere euphemism to speak of the old methods of theological discussion as "rigorous," for we are fully aware of the power that scientific argument carries. Though modern scientific discussions are couched in polite language they are incomparably more formidable than the weapons of modern warfare, and will brook no resistance. Science gives every one, every institution, every faith, every man in his station a chance to conform to its revelation, but it will slowly yet surely crush anything that persists in opposing it.

PART III

FURTHER ELUCIDATIONS IN DISCUSSION AND CONTROVERSY

PART III.

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LOOFS VS. HAECKEL.

In speaking of theology as a science, we ought not to pass over in silence an incident which made a great stir in the scientific world, and which, though of a personal nature, is of general interest as characterizing the period of transition—viz., the case of Loofs *versus* Haeckel. The contrast is overdrawn and the literature on the subject distorts the picture of the situation, but it will for this reason serve all the better to point out the true relation between natural science and theology.

Professor Haeckel is a naturalist, not a theologian, not a philosopher, not a historian. But being a man of deep emotions, he is enthusiastic in whatever he does, he is zealous in whatever cause he espouses, and would be called intensely religious were not his religious ideals opposed to old established religious institutions. It is but to be expected of a man of Haeckel's temperament that he should have artistic talents; he paints and has as keen a

sense for beauty as for poetry. In natural science he rises mountain high above the average naturalist, and his peculiar field is an almost prophetic comprehension of the significance of the facts which mark the process of life in its successive phases. It is not an accident that his nomenclature, words like "ontogenetic" and "phylogenetic" and a host of other terms, has been universally accepted by naturalists, but this fact must be regarded as an evidence of Haeckel's genius for finding the characteristic feature that needs determination and for describing it clearly and unmistakably by a single word. Haeckel's greatness is due to his clearness, and his fame is founded on his penetration in tracing the simple laws that govern complicated phenomena.

This sense for the recognition of the simple which Haeckel manifests, is at bottom a moral quality. He who knows Haeckel personally will gladly agree with me that he is without guile and as simple as a child. He makes no pretensions; he does not bluster or make a show; he neither seeks nor makes complications. He is direct in all he does, and in all he thinks, and in all he writes. This directness is peculiarly his when he observes nature; it appears in the style of his books, and it makes

him blunder openly when he is mistaken; but this directness is simply a child's love of truth. Though Haeckel does not call himself a Christian, he is truly possessed of that child-like spirit which Christ declares is indispensable for the attainment of the Kingdom of God.

Professor Haeckel has written a book entitled *The Riddle of the Universe,* which was a great financial success, but it became the butt of all his adversaries,—theologians, Protestants and Roman Catholics, dualists of every stripe, and also philosophers and their ilk. Much of this criticism is perfectly true and may be granted in advance. Many very essential tenets in Haeckel's philosophy are thereby rendered irrelevant or antiquated, but that proves merely (as stated above) that he is not a theologian, not a historian, not a professional philosopher.

Although I am a personal friend of Professor Haeckel, I by no means accept his formulation of the Monistic conception. I had discussions with him in both *The Open Court* and *The Monist,*[1] and insist again on the contrast

[1]See for instance "Monism and Mechanicalism, Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel's Position," in *The Monist,* Vol. II., pp. 438-442; "Professor Haeckel's Monism," *ibid.,* Vol. II., pp. 598-600; "Professor Haeckel's Panpsychism," *ibid.,* Vol. III., pp. 234-242; "Professor Haeckel's Monism and the Ideas of God and Immortality," in *The Open Court,* Vol. V., No. 212, pp. 2957-2958.

between these two views in a few terse extracts. Professor Haeckel made his statements and I my counter-statements, but he has always regarded the differences between us as trivial and purely verbal. Instead of discussing the discrepancies, he simply wrote in a private letter: "We mean the same." Now that may be perfectly true, simply because Haeckel deems it necessary to negate certain theological claims, while I endeavor to point out the religious significance of the facts of life. He sees the latter as well as I, and I agree with his position as regards the former; but he slurs over the latter, and I deem the former antiquated. In the field of science there is nothing more important than the religious significance of scientific truth; and on the other hand, in the realm of Church life nothing is more important than the *résumé* of scientific results that affect the traditional religious belief. Hence it is natural that Professor Haeckel's religious views should have caused quite a stir in the world. He has been attacked not only by theologians, but also by philosophers. At present we are interested in the theological issue of Haeckel's position, and will therefore limit ourselves to a few comments upon the formidable onslaught on Haeckel's book *The*

Riddle of the Universe, made by Friedrich Loofs, Professor of Church History in Halle.

Professor Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* is less scientific than religious, and considering his position in religion and his negative attitude in theology, the book is strong in the criticism of antiquated views but wanting in building up a new theology that would accord with natural science. This weak point has been discovered by many theologians, philosophers, and historians, and the result has been a general attack upon our famous friend, executed with remarkable unanimity as if by general order. Here was a chance to take the scalp of a famous naturalist, and many a puny knight ventured forth to meet the giant and have a fling at him, in the hope of becoming a second David.

Professor Loofs is one of these would-be Davids. He put on the royal armor of science, but it proved too heavy for him, so he preferred the sling of abuse and attacked Haeckel in the vigorous style of ancient theology by calling him names.

We know but little about Professor Loofs's accomplishments. Upon the whole, he seems to be a fairly well-established representative of modern theology, though he is not a star of the first magnitude. He is a scholar and is ap-

parently imbued with the spirit of science. But he does not conceal the irritation he feels when contemplating the recognition which is accorded to the natural sciences, and he chafes at the thought that the public at large as yet know nothing of the latest developments in theology. Even men of fame know nothing of it, and the time seems to have come for a doughty knight of divinity to have a tilt with one of the naturalists and prove the valor of the theologian in the domain of science.

Now, Haeckel claims that the miracle of the immaculate conception is untenable, and venturing in a footnote upon the historical field incidentally makes the mistake of treating an old Jewish insinuation that Jesus was of illegitimate birth, as a historical document of credence. Professor Loofs did not let the opportunity slip. He addressed Haeckel in a private letter first sarcastically but politely, then in a public letter in most insulting terms, with the outspoken hope that Haeckel would sue him for libel. A law suit of that kind would have engaged public attention, and Professor Loofs's name would have appeared in all newspapers. Haeckel, however, did not gratify Loofs's wish but referred him to his authority, Saladin.

Saladin is a *nom de plume* or pseudonym of

W. Stuart Ross, a Scotchman, who began his career as a student of theology but turned unbeliever and is now editor of the *Agnostic Journal* and one of the most noted freethinkers in London. Haeckel, who is quite ingenuous in matters theological, spoke of Saladin as "a prominent English theologian," and so furnished more grist for the mill of Professor Loofs.

Professor Haeckel can scarcely have read Loofs's expositions, for, not being in the habit of writing between the lines, he is still less accustomed to read between the lines, yet this is an art which has attained a high development in modern theology. Probably Haeckel did not even read Professor Loofs's letters, and so, assuming that his critic believes in the supernatural conception, refused to enter into a controversy with him. Here Loofs finds another weak point. He accuses Haeckel of dishonesty, for Loofs insists that Haeckel's negligence is intentional.

In our opinion there is no question but Haeckel's oversight was due to carelessness, and not to dishonest misinterpretation, for what a chance Haeckel missed in not requesting Loofs to state frankly and in unequivocal

terms whether or not he believed in the natural birth of Jesus!

Professor Loofs (another Herostratus) was bent on acquiring notoriety, and so he took opportunity by the forelock and again rushed into print, this time in a pamphlet under the title *Anti-Haeckel,* in which he triumphantly displayed the scalp of the famous naturalist.

The situation is humorous and would afford good material for the cartoonists of *Puck* and *Life;* but we will forbear entering into details and discuss only the most significant points.

The soil on which our David met his giant adversary (viz., ancient Jewish traditions) is slippery ground and all but inaccessible to common mortals. Its topography is known only to very few outside of the circle of learned rabbis of Poland and Germany who have been reared from babyhood on the milk of Talmudic lore. It is a matter of course that Professor Haeckel is not at home here and to take him to task for being ignorant as to the literary significance of a reference to the *Sepher Toledoth* is no more justified than if Haeckel had found a flaw in Professor Loofs's knowledge of some obscure detail of zoology, say on the subject of parthenogenesis which in certain

families of the lower species is not a miracle but an established fact. But unfortunately for his cause, Professor Loofs, in spite of his theological education, failed to prove his point and gave evidence only of his ignorance in this special branch of learning. Dr. Erich Bischoff, an editor of the *Christliche Welt* in which Loofs published his open letter to Haeckel, proves that Loofs's counter-proposition is untenable and that even his statement concerning the synodicon as to the established canonicity of the four gospels at the Council of Nicæa cannot be relied upon. But these issues are incidental and we do not intend to enter into details, though his experience ought to have taught Loofs charity toward others.

One point is of special importance: On close inspection it appears that both parties agree much better than Professor Haeckel is aware of. Professor Loofs appears not to believe in the virgin birth of Jesus any more than Professor Haeckel, but while the latter makes his statement in the most direct way, saying that as a natural philosopher he does not believe in miracles, Professor Loofs is more circumspect and makes no definite statement. The conclusion at which he arrives is written between the lines.

I have no inclination to argue with Professor Loofs, for he might write me a letter similar to that which he wrote to his colleague, Haeckel. I shall simply state a few of his arguments to show the trend of his logic.

Professor Loofs insists that he attacks Haeckel on account of the latter's "vigorous hatred of Christianity and his lack of appreciation of Christian faith and morality"; he speaks of his "arrogant ignorance" (*anmassliche Unwissenheit*), but expressly denies that the historicity of Christ's virgin birth is the issue of the controversy. As to the latter, Loofs points out that "there was an ancient tradition in Jewish-Christian circles according to which Jesus was regarded as the son of Joseph"; . . . and "it is not an arbitrary proposition to represent Math. i. 18 ff. and Luke ii. 1 ff. as belonging to later strata of Biblical tradition. . . ." However, dogmatic arguments in favor of the parthenogenesis cannot stand . . . "There is no reason to understand why a natural birth in the conception should be different from a natural growth," etc., etc.

Dr. Bischoff, who seems to possess the tact to find the proper word at the right time, adds that Mary's psychical virginity is more significant by far than the miracle of a supernatural

conception. But we might suggest to Professor Loofs that the literary arguments of the Church historian, so important to a modern theologian, are supererogatory in the opinion of scientists like Haeckel, while they have no weight with people who accept miracles, and must appear even flimsy to a staunch believer.

The case Loofs *versus* Haeckel is a spectacular side-show, which is as interesting as a burlesque written in travesty of a serious drama. While it discloses foibles in both combatants, it indicates that times have changed. There is now a theology that has become a science, and natural science has become or will very soon become one of her most powerful allies.

We know now that all truth is divine and God reveals himself in natural science as well as in history. The most significant lessons for religious purposes are the facts of man's life; his sorrows and temptations, his bereavements and his final destiny in death. Man's spiritual growth is recorded in the development of the race and has found classical expression in the sacred books of the several religions. The duty devolves upon us to study these documents of religious life, to collate and compare them and thus understand their significance in the re-

ligious evolution of mankind. A literal acceptance of the Bible and of the dogmas in the symbolical books is as pagan as the ancient belief in Greek mythology. A genuine Christianity and a scientific theology (viz., theonomy) becomes possible only through the overthrow of the paganism that still clings to the traditional interpretation of religion. So far the new theology has plodded on in modest obscurity, but the time has come when what scholars whisper into each other's ears will be preached from the housetops. It is an open secret, generally recognized though little talked about, that the new theology exists and is in a quiet way working out a most important reformation in our religious life, and this reformation is mainly concerned with the intellectual side of religion and insists on scientific honesty.

Do not blame the new theology for its reluctance in speaking out boldly and bluntly, for there are many things that, though true, would, under certain conditions, if uttered brusquely, be positively injurious, and indeed, if expressed without propriety, even wrong and false. We cannot recommend Professor Loofs's methods. In his theological articles he uses the language of the new theology, speaking by indirection,

but in his controversy he follows the vigorous methods of the old theology, heaping abuse upon the head of his adversary. While his example ought not to be followed, we appreciate highly the tact of the genuine theologian.

There is no need of either letting truth go ostentatiously naked or of hiding her form in the drapery of hypocrisy. Discretion is her most becoming garment.

If Professor Haeckel had known that his theological adversary absolutely disclaimed defending the supernatural birth of Jesus, nay more, that on close inspection he was even guilty of not believing it himself, and that his notion of miracles was diluted by philosophical considerations, he would have been bewildered, for he takes the supernatural birth of Jesus to be the issue of the controversy. If Haeckel had been aware of the fact that Professor Loofs censured him merely for a lack of judgment as to the historical unreliability of certain references in the Talmud, made in an incidental footnote, he would have exclaimed: *Pourquoi tant de bruit pour une omelette?*

W. E. AYTON WILKINSON.

Mr. W. E. A. Wilkinson, of Burma, a reader of *The Open Court* and one of my friendly

critics in far-away India, objects to my super-personal conception of God as follows:

"Evolution is an infinite process and consciousness is manifest at both ends of it. God is a conscious being whose purpose is to develop out of Himself a number of smaller beings like himself. The process of their development is evolution. The process is somewhat analogous to the birth of a child from its parents. The parent as a whole is a conscious being. The parts of it by themselves are not conscious. There is no consciousness in a man's big toe, as such, but there is consciousness in a perfect child born from the man and containing all the elements that are in him. So also, as you say, there is no consciousness in the planets as such. But there is a consciousness in the whole universe; and there is consciousness in that complete reproduction of the parent called man.

"I maintain that my conception of God as a loving and all-wise father is far more satisfying than yours; that it is warranted by human aspirations, and that it is not inconsistent with any known scientific facts.

"I require something more than *definite character* in this whole universe; I require consciousness. I believe that there is *a* consciousness in the whole universe as such. Otherwise I do not see how it can be manifested in the limited parts of the universe called human individuals. There cannot be any 'conditions of sentiency' without sentiency. It is absurd. Consciousness either is, or is not. *We cannot conceive of any elementary state from which it can be evolved.*"

In reply to Mr. Wilkinson's objections I would grant the possibility of the animation of the universe with an ego-consciousness, such as is assumed in his proposition, and I would for argument's sake also grant that man's soul

is a part of this world-soul, developing from elements of the world-soul into an independent being like unto its parent soul. But if this were so, would not the God, whom science reveals, that superpersonal presence of law, be still superior to this world-soul?

If Mr. Wilkinson's God existed, I should not call him God, but Brahma, or world-soul, or the great spirit of the universe, and he would be as subject to God as I myself or any other person. If you, however, insist on calling such a being with a world-wide consciousness, God, I would insist that there is something higher than God, and I would deem the belief in God a matter of small concern. He would be our elder brother, but not the eternal world-order and the God of science.

God (viz., the God of science) is truly *like* a father, but he is not a father. If we speak of him as a father, it is a mere allegory. Take the allegory in its literal sense, as does Mr. Wilkinson, and you change God into a creature such as we are. A child develops from a part of his parent and grows into a being like them; there is no constitutional difference between parent and child, except that if the parent be faithful in the fulfilment of his duties, the son should become superior to his father in mental

and moral equipment and start life under better conditions and with wider possibilities than did his ancestors.

While I reject the letter of the belief that God is a loving father, I gladly accept the significance of the allegory, and I would go so far as to recommend belief in the letter of the allegory where its meaning cannot as yet be understood. In a certain phase of human development the belief in the letter is natural for the broad masses of the people who are not yet matured in philosophical thought and will not be able to realize the fact that God is much nearer and dearer to us than any human father can be to his child; if they believe that there is a benevolent father in heaven who guides their lives and watches over them with loving care, they have a truer conception of the world than if they say, "There is no God; let us eat and drink and be merry, for to-morrow we shall be no more."

The allegory of a loving father in heaven is true enough in its significance. The order of cosmic laws, which prescribes the paths of the planets and arranges the wonderful combinations of atoms into molecules, is not only sternly just but also most beneficent and dear. It not only begets us; it also cherishes us and

surrounds us with unceasing blessings, infinitely greater not only in amount and proportion but also in kind, than any father or mother could bestow on their children.

If God were an individual being, even though he were conceived to be eternal and infinitely great, he would after all be one of us; he would be the first of all beings, the most powerful of living things, the monarch of creatures, the demiurge or world-builder, the progenitor of life, the father of all others, but he would be in the same predicament as we are. He would be the Son of the eternal world-order, of the God whom I revere.

The father of a family is as much an individual and a mortal as his children are. Therefore God is comparable to a father, but he is not our father. He is infinitely dearer to us than a father. God's relation to his creatures is incomparably more intimate and at the same time more authoritative than the relation of a father to his children.

Nor is God's relation to the world that of a king. We may compare him to a king; but God's majesty is radically different from that of any ruler or monarch of any description. God is not a legislator, not an individual being that issues ukases, he is not a deity who creates

laws, but he is the eternal order of all natural laws itself.

Supposing there were a God-individual who rules the world after the fashion of a king, he might surpass all other beings just as a noble-minded sovereign, a King Arthur, or a Charlemagne, is greater than the beggars in the streets of his capital; but after all he would not be their absolute superior. For he would not be the ultimate standard of truth and morality.

According to the letter of the law in monarchical institutions, the sovereign of a country is above the law; but that is nominal and means simply that he should not be judged in court for any offense he may give; practically he is as much subject to the law as are all his subjects. He is the first citizen of the country but not the measure of justice. The law is practically above him, and, if he be wise, he knows it and will act accordingly.

A God-individual could not condition the cosmic order but would only conform to it. The eternal norms of reason, of rightness, and of righteousness would be as absolutely above him as they are above us. In a word, being a particular being, he would not possess the marks of Godhood, intrinsic necessity, intrinsic

eternality, intrinsic universality, intrinsic omnipresence.

Man naturally fashions his views of God after the pattern of his own personality, because he regards God as the mould from which his manhood has been shaped. But we must learn to understand what is the divine and what the human in man's personality. The divinity of man does not consist in his being an individual; for every crystal, every plant, every brute, is also an individual; the divinity of man consists in that feature which raises individuality into the higher domain of personality, and the distinctive feature of personality is the faculty of rational thought and rational action. In rational beings, feelings develop into self-consciousness, and self-consciousness finds expression in the notion of egoity.

The egoity of man is a very important feature, but it is not that feature which constitutes his divinity. Man's reason is divine, his conscience is divine, his comprehension of the truth is divine, but his ego-consciousness is simply the psychical expression of his selfhood, it is the awareness of his being a distinct individual, and this distinct individual can become divine only when its sentiments are guided by reason, conscience, and truth.

There are a great number of people who are bound to have a God that is like themselves, an individual possessed of an ego consciousness, with sentiments like ours and pursuing plans of his own, which would render his nature a case of exact analogy to our own mental make-up. Mr. Wilkinson* is one of them, and his plea for God as possessing an ego consciousness with an individual organization is very forcible and impressive. But after all, his theory proves untenable and will only reveal the weak points of anthropotheism, *i. e.*, of that view of God which looks upon God as an ego consciousness, having definite feelings, endowed with knowledge, thinking successive thoughts as we do, and finally arriving at a decision to be carried into effect.

The question at present is whether or not God is an individual being, a concrete ego-soul of the world, an *anima mundi*, thinking successive thoughts as we do and arriving at decisions like ours in every respect, except that he is greater, wiser, and infinitely more powerful than a man.

The existence of such a world-soul is not

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*The article to which these comments refer was written in reply to the foregoing remarks on his criticisms of my views. It appeared in the *Monist* in 1899, Vol. IX., 292.

very probable, although I am not prepared to say that it is impossible, but granted that it existed, I should not confer on it the name God. The mere thought of it is sufficient for refutation. This world-soul would be an individual creature subject to evolution, conditioned by the eternal laws of existence and bound to respect the unalterable principles of right and wrong. This world-soul, now taking its existence for granted, for argument's sake, has apparently enough to do in keeping the whole body of the universe in a state of health and cannot trouble itself about the personal welfare of the innumerable smaller beings that people the various members of its organism as bacilli inhabit a human being. The best argument that speaks in favor of this conception of an individual world-soul-god is the discovery of organisms smaller than we ourselves in our own system:

"For little fleas have lesser fleas
Upon their backs to bite 'em,
And lesser fleas still lesser fleas
And so *ad infinitum.*"

But what comfort can the flea derive from the idea that the world which he inhabits is as much an organism as he himself? Both, after all, are creatures, and neither is a God. An All-being would be an enormously big creature,

still it would be a creature subject to error, failure, disappointment, sin, and suffering as much as any minor creature that lives in its bowels.

The difference between a world-soul-god and ourselves would be purely a matter of size. He would be large, very large, while we are small. But hugeness of bulk does not constitute divinity.

I do not wish to repeat myself in this reply to Mr. Wilkinson's criticism, especially as the first chapters of this book deal with the same subject. I would only request the reader to bear in mind, first, that law is a convenient but in certain respects a misleading term, for those eternal uniformities which constitute the cosmic order; secondly, that these uniformities appear in their scientific formulation very dry and abstract, but in reality they are effective realities whose life is not like that of organisms subject to origin and decay, but everlasting and immutable. If they are said to be omnipresent, it means that they are here and everywhere; omnipresence does not mean that they are nowhere. Thirdly, we should mind that those eternal norms of right, of truthfulness, of purity of heart, are not less real than are the laws of gravitation. Fourthly, this om-

nipresence of God should not be interpreted in the sense of the old-fashioned pantheism which identifies God and the world. Although God and world are not separate, they are not one and the same thing; they are different. The Allhood of existence, its omnipresent formative feature is not tantamount to an All-being, *i. e.*, the sum total of all things. Fifthly, God is not a vague generality but is possessed of a definite and well determined character. He exhibits a clearly pronounced suchness which is the ultimate standard of morality, of goodness, of right. In this sense we see a justification of the traditional dogma of the personality of God. God consists of all those features which constitute the personality of man, endowing him with rationality and moral ideas. But while we may speak of the system of divine eternalities as a person, we must insist that the personality of God does not mean individuality, for which reason we prefer to characterize God as superpersonal. His personality is of a higher kind than man's personality; it is an eternal and omnipresent personality, while man's personality is the personality of an individual being limited in time and space. Finally, consider that man is by dint of his reason a more or less perfect incarnation of

the eternal in nature; he has originated in the image of God and is God as reflected in consciousness. Therefore while we may be the lineal descendants of monkeys, frogs, and amœbas, we are still the children of God. The eternal element that permeates all transient phenomena has taken abode in man's soul; and this which is within us constitutes our very soul. Our bodies have originated through the modification of the bodies of lower animals; but this modification has been effected through the omnipresent potencies of the eternal in nature, of the creative and formative Deity, of the Logos that was "in the beginning."

Shall we, being more or less an incarnation of God and an actualization of the eternal, be afraid of death? No, not when we have understood the full significance of this truth. Death dissolves our bodies; death terminates the activity of our earthly career; it does away with sufferings and all the tribulations of life. But the formal part of our being, the mould in which we have been cast, remains undestroyed.

Now, having stated my view of the situation and having pointed out some of the most flagrant mistakes of Mr. Wilkinson's conception of God, I cannot help adding a postscript in which I would urge Mr. Wilkinson to stick to his God conception so long as he is incapable

of perceiving the deeper truth of a more philosophical interpretation of facts. The dogmas of religious tradition are not untrue, but expressed in parables. He who discards the parable as untrue is apt to think that it is meaningless. The babe that cannot as yet digest meat should not become dissatisfied with the milk, else it will starve. And, on the other hand, there is nothing wrong with the milk when the adult is advised to live on a more substantial diet.

MR. AMOS WATERS.

Mr. Amos Waters, an agnostic contributer to *The Literary Guide* of London, England, raises an energetic protest[1] against my "vehemently assailing the agnostic position," and I have the following comments to make in reply to his strictures:

I am loath to reopen the debate on agnosticism, and repeat here only that there are many kinds of agnosticism. On some other occasion I expressed my approval of the agnosticism of modesty, which is a suspension of judgment so long as there are not adequate grounds to be had for forming an opinion. But

[1]Mr. Water's article has been republished in *The Monist* for July 1899, Vol. IX, 624.

the agnosticism of modestly is a personal attitude, not a doctrine. As soon as it is changed into a doctrine it becomes the agnosticism of arrogance. By agnosticism of arrogance I understand the theory that the main problems of life (viz., concerning the existence or non-existence of God and of the soul; as to the immortality of the soul, and the relation of the soul to the body; as to the origin of life, the nature and authority of morals, etc., etc.,) are not within the ken of human comprehension. There is no need of entering now into details, as I have discussed the subject time and again and there is no need of repeating myself.[2]

Mr. Herbert Spencer is the representative agnostic thinker, and when I criticise agnosticism, I mean Mr. Spencer's agnosticism. His agnosticism is not a mere suspense of judgment but a most emphatic declaration that the mystery of life is utterly incomprehensible, that the substance of the soul (whatever that may mean) cannot be known, that energy is inscrutable, etc., etc. He reiterated his principle when censuring Professor Japp for asserting that organized life cannot have risen from inorganic nature and Mr. Spencer de-

[2]See *Homilies of Science*, pp. 213 ff.; *The Open Court* No. 212; *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 154 ff.; and *Primer of Philosophy, passim, Kant and Spencer*, 52 ff.

clares expressly that he rejects the opposite view as well. He rejects both horns of the dilemma, the affirmation as well as the denial, winding up his argument with these words:

"My own belief is that neither interpretation is adequate. A recently issued revised and enlarged edition of the first volume of the *Principles of Biology* contains a chapter on 'The Dynamical Element in Life,' in which I have contended that the theory of a vital principle fails and that the physico-chemical theory also fails; the corollary being that in its ultimate nature is incomprehensible."

This high-handed way of condemning the very attempt at solving a problem on the plea that it is insolvable is the agnosticism which I reject. I know that Mr. Spencer is commonly regarded as the most liberal, progressive, and most scientific philosopher, but I cannot help thinking that he is not. Mr. Amos Waters must not blame me for not joining the liberals in their enthusiastic laudation of agnosticism; for to my mind agnosticism is illiberal, anti-scientific, and reactionary in the highest degree.

How does Mr. Spencer know that the main problem of Biology, the question as to the original of organized life, lies beyond the ken of human knowledge? Judging from the tone

of his expositions he is not informed on the present state of things and has not very closely followed the investigations of biologists. And how does Mr. Spencer prove his proposition? He does so in the old fashioned dogmatic way, by quoting scriptures. There is only this difference between him and the theologian, that the latter quotes from the Bible and Mr. Spencer refers to his own writings.

Mr. Amos Waters, I know understands by agnosticism the agnosticism of modesty, a suspense of judgment as to problems as yet unsolved, and I repeat that I gladly join him on that score, but agnosticism is commonly understood as Mr. Spencer defines it, and whatever admiration we may have for Mr. Spencer personally, for his noble intentions, his studious habits, his industrious collection of interesting materials, his versatility in writing on various subjects, we must not be blind to the truth that his philosophy is wrong in its roots and exercises as baneful an influence as does the religious dogmatism which it attempts to replace. Its main usefulness consists in stimulating thought and in disquieting the complacent assurance of old fogies, who imagine themselves in possession of the whole truth.

Mr. Amos Waters is startled to learn that

the God-conception proposed in *The Monist* is "the Christian conception itself in its matured and purified form." This is nothing to be alarmed at, for it is simply the statement of a historical fact. The Christian God-conception has undergone changes. The God of the Church authorities who instituted the Inquisition is different from the God of the Reformers, and the God of Calvin is no longer the God of the Presbyterians of to-day. My own God-conception has developed from the traditional Protestant God-idea and has been modified under the influence of science, passing through a period of outspoken atheism, until it was transformed into what some sarcastic but friendly critics of mine have called the God-conception of atheism—the doctrine of the superpersonal God, which has been set forth at length in the main portion of this book, and has become a stumbling block to Mr. Amos Waters.

I am fully satisfied that my position on God is sufficiently clear not to be misunderstood as a pandering to that kind of God-belief which I have unhesitatingly and without any agnostic suspense of judgment branded as a superstition. Mr. Amos Waters must bear in mind that I have not requested any one to believe in God, but have simply investigated the ques-

tion of what God must be, if we understand by God that something which moulds the world and shapes the fate of man. I have, however, come to the conclusion, and am becoming more and more convinced, that the superpersonal God, the God of science, the eternal norm of truth and righteousness, is God, indeed; he alone is God. He is what the pagans (including the pagan Christians) have been groping after for ages.

CANON GEO. J. LOW.

It is a great satisfaction to me to find myself in agreement on all main points with a theologian of Canon George J. Low's rank, a man of high standing in his own, the Episcopal Church, who has also been marked out for distinction by a Presbyterian university (Queen's University, of Kingston, Canada), which has conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity. He scarcely takes an exception to any essential proposition of mine and goes so far as to concede in substance the symbolical significance of Church dogmas. He says:

"After all, it is a comfort to think that all who hold 'the Religion of Science' can come to a consensus on the scheme exhibited by Dr. Carus. We all believe in God the Father—we all cry, 'Nearer my God, to Thee!'

We all hold (p. 425) that 'God is not only the Father, but also the Son. . . . God is not only the Logos as the world-order but also the Logos that has become flesh.'

"These are the great truths: these, however, much the 'wise and prudent' may speculate as to the mode, are the truths that have all along been 'revealed unto babes' (3 Matt. xi. 25); in babes' language perhaps, but that was needful. The 'babes,' physical and intellectual, must ever form the vast proportion of mankind; the 'wise and prudent'—the profounder thinkers—must always be the few. Is it not well, then, that we should have a popular and conventional terminology in religion for the 'babes,' even if we adopt an academic terminology to satisfy the 'wise and prudent'? In other words, must we not have, *always* an exoteric as well as an esoteric presentment of religion? Especially as they both mean the same thing; they both bear the same message, whether to the wise and prudent or to the babes: 'God so loved the world that He sent His 'Son.'"

Can the word have such an enormous significance? Is not our language poor and is not our thought richer than the phrases in which it is couched? This is true only at the moment when expanding thought has not yet become clear enough to find its true expression.

Language is not poor. It is true that language employs allegories and imagery; it represents the intangible by tangible similes. But that is natural and necessary. Language transcends the sensory by imparting to it a spiritual significance. That is the method of language and so long as we can use language both for depicting all the realities of life including

its spiritual truths and for communicating our highest and best thoughts to others, it cannot be regarded as poor. In my opinion language is rich. Think of its simple means consisting of a limited number of sounds; yet these sounds can become the vehicle of all the spiritual wealth of mankind. It is true that we sometimes—nay frequently, and always when our souls expand in spiritual growth—feel the dearth of new words to express the new thoughts and ideals budding in our hearts. In such a condition, it is true, we feel the poverty of language—but that is only the poverty of *our* language, not of language. A new expression is needed and, if the same need is felt by others, it will be found. A word will be invented to describe the new thought, and he who has felt its thrill and has become familiar with the connotation of the new term will be stirred by its sound and will rejoice at the power of the word. Words are the most potent realities in life, and the significance of words, if they express truths, is possessed of a pre-existence which has been from the beginning. The significance of language, the meaning of the word —*i. e.*, of truth, which is the soul of the word, —is divine; it is eternal; it is the creative law shaping the world, the logic of facts; the *raison*

d'être in the evolution of worlds. It is in and with God, being God himself. And God becomes incarnate when the right expression is found for a truth.

This is good Christian doctrine and I believe that it is what the author of the Fourth Gospel meant when he said:

"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and God was the word."

The word, viz., the significance of sounds or the truth conveyed in language, although not a material thing, is a reality; it is the most powerful reality in life; it is God incarnate.

The message which the Fourth Gospel proclaims to the world, is that of the incarnation of the word. Of what use is God to us (God in any sense), unless he finds a dwelling-place in our bosom? The order of nature is a Moloch that mercilessly crushes whatever happens to conflict with its forces; but it becomes beneficial and its curses change into blessings, as soon as it is understood. This explains the truth of Christ's word: "No one comes to the Father except through me." It is through the word, through the comprehension of nature's laws, that we learn to appreciate the divinity of the cosmic order.

Here Matthew Arnold's famous formula fails to be satisfactory that, "God is the power

not ourselves that makes for righteousness." The philosophical significance of Christianity consists in the idea that God must be "a power *in* ourselves that makes for righteousness." God's divinity appears only in his incarnation as love, hope, charity, mercy, goodwill,—in a word as moral endeavor. He only who sees the son, sees the father. Inquire into the laws of nature, and it may be that, considering the ruthless cruelty of its arrangements, you will turn away from life with disgust; but feel the thrill of human sympathies and ideal aspirations, and you will find a purpose in existence; you will find a field of duties, you will find life worth living.

Man is essentially (as Noiré said) a speaking animal, and man's rationality is an incarnation of those eternalities of existence which we call the cosmic order. Man is divine, and the morally perfect man, the man who embodies the universality of reason as goodwill toward all, is God incarnate. His is the logos that has become flesh.

Life in itself is mere activity; but spirit is activity guided by reason. Reason, through language becomes incarnate in life, and thus spiritual life is begotten; for what is spirit but the rationality of life. Spirit is not a being endowed with language but language itself is

spirit. Says Christ: "The words which I speak they are life and they are spirit."

Now the contention is frequently made that words or thoughts are realities only when living beings pronounce or think them; while we ought to bear in mind that words—if expressing a truth—are realities which exist for ever and aye. Canon Low says:

"That '1 + 1 = 2 is eternally true, though matter had never existed,' may be demurred to. For when we think or speak of 1 or 2, we must needs ask, one what? or two what? The more appropriate formula would seem to be 0 + 0 = 0 or 0 × (anything whatever) is still = 0."

This is the echo of the old nominalistic school, which regards the word as an empty sound, a mere *flatus vocis,* a convenient mode of expression without any objective significance. We must insist on the significance of the word and on the actual value of abstract truths. If the sentence 0+0=0 be true, the other proposition 2×2=4 is not less true. Canon Low would have the absolute truth of the purely formal sciences restricted to the zero equations 0+0=0, or 0×0=0; but the history as well as the philosophy of mathematics will reveal the remarkable fact that zero is an abstraction of much higher complexity and involving greater difficulties than concrete figures. There are, or at least there have been, mathe-

maticians who hold the theory that while all the figures are real, nought is nothing, chimerical and unreal. Bear in mind that zero finds its counterpart in infinitude, and while neither zero nor infinitude are concrete things, they are symbols of real significance which serve to reveal important truths. Think only of such equations as

$$\frac{1}{\infty}=0; \quad \frac{1}{0}=\infty; \quad \log 1=0;$$

a^0 (viz., any number to the zero power) $=1$.

All equations and propositions are mere instances of rationality itself, which possesses an intrinsic necessity. Even if there were no material existence, if we could annihilate all the Milky Ways with all they contain, the purely formal truths would remain as true as ever. They are not substances, they are not things in themselves, they are not essences of any kind; but they are true and they are intrinsically necessary. Nor are they only true in the numberless concrete instances of facts; but also abstractly; and their application comprises the world of figures as well as the realm of the zero.

It is through the facts of experience alone that we become acquainted with the world of the superreal, of the laws of form, of intrin-

sically necessary relations, of uniformities, of the eternal as underlying the transient phenomena of sense-experience. The supersensible is given in the forms of the sensory world, but it exists independently of any single fact and also of the sum total of all single facts as absolute truth, as intrinsic necessity, as eternal law (or whatever you may call it).

The thoughtful among the theologians of the present day are powerfully touched by the monistic tendencies of the age, and the oneness of science and religion begins to make itself felt. The sentiment finds expression in prose as well as in rhymes, both in the pulpit and in the pews, in sermons and in hymns. The following anonymous lines are a faithful expression of this conception:

" 'God is Love,' and God is beauty;
God is Music, Truth and Light;
God is Hope and God is Duty;
God is Morning, Noon and Night;
God is Joy and God is Sorrow;
God is Pleasure, God is Pain;
God is Yesterday and Morrow;
God is Loss and God is Gain.

"God is Patience, Trust and Trial;
God is Waiting, God is Zest;
God is Promise and Denial
Purity, and Peace, and Rest;
God is Star, and Mount, and Valley;
God is River, Lake and Sea;
God is Field and Crowded Alley;
God, the Lily on the Lea.

"God is Body, God is Spirit;
God is Word and All Who Hear It,
God is Whole and God is Part;
God is Mind and Soul and Heart;
God is all things that he sendeth
To the creatures of His love;
Sun and storm he wisely blendeth
Earth below and sky above."

The New York *Sun* publishes, under the date of May 27, 1898, the following item:[1]

"The Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott, of Brooklyn, preached last Sunday a sermon in which he gave a history of a change which has taken place in his theological views during the last thirty or forty years, intimating that it represents a change which has become extensive in the world of orthodoxy.

"He said that he began by believing in a personal God, Who 'dwelt on a great white throne surrounded by His angels,' Who 'made the world and ruled it as a King over men,' and Who 'sent His Son into the world to bear the penalty' of men's violation of His law, 'and let men go free.' Dr. Abbott believed then in salvation and the resurrection as taught in the Christian theology.

"His feeling and conviction, however, have changed radically. Now God is to him 'in nature and its indwelling force'; the one 'underlying cause.' He recognizes no longer 'a radical distinction between the natural and supernatural; the natural is supernatural, and the supernatural is natural.' Creation is 'a continuous process.' 'Universally and continually creating,' God is 'not ruling over creatures, but in them.' 'Christ is the condition of salvation, because Christ is God coming into human life. Incarnation is no longer an episode standing by itself.' 'Little by little God

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[1]This extract may not be reliable, for it is compiled by one who is greatly dissatisfied with Dr. Abbott's sermon.

made Himself known to men, until at last He came into one incomparable life.'

"Finally Dr. Abbott says that he 'no longer looks forward to a great day of resurrection.' 'We are all in process of resurrection.' 'Death goes from the cradle to the grave, and resurrection goes along with it.' 'Every spring is a new creation.' 'The flowers that bloomed in Eden were not more created by the fiat of Jehovah than those on this pulpit.' 'If your soul leaves the body, the body crumbles and dies; so if God were drawn from the universe it would become dust.'"

As the pews are always more illiberal than the pulpit, the New York *Sun* adds the following comment:

"Dr. Abbott undertook to distinguish this from pantheism, but no such distinction is possible. His creed eliminates wholly the personality of God, and makes of Him only a force in nature. 'There is,' he says, 'only one law and force—God.' That of itself is a very good definition of pantheism. His God is without the element of personality, and his Christ is only this 'one law and force' coming into 'one incomparable life.' He does not speak of affection extending to God as a personal Being, and what he says of the Incarnation takes away from Christ all divine character, making Him human only.

"Such is the pantheistic creed confessed publicly by a Congregational minister of this time."

Judging by the reputation of Dr. Lyman Abbott, we are inclined to believe that the famous successor of Beecher is not more pantheistic than we. There is, of course, a truth in pantheism, but pantheism as an identification of God and the All, is wrong. There is a oneness but no sameness. But it is natural

that one who has never been confronted with the philosophical problem of the existence of God will regard any solution offered by a thoughtful man as pure atheism, or as pantheism.

God is not a being, not a concrete individual, not an ego, thinking successive thoughts, yet He is a systematic whole, an organized entirety, the total of omnipresent eternalities and necessities, bearing the features that condition the rationality of personal beings and giving character to the world-order as well as being the standard of measurement for the moral ideas of all living creatures. God is distinct from the sum total of concrete existences. He is not a pantheistic All-Being, but the truly supernatural Allhood of all existence, including all possible existences.

PERE HYACINTHE LOYSON.

NEUILLY PRES PARIS, 22 July, 1894.

Dr. Paul Carus

MY DEAR SIR:— . . . The parts of your *Primer of Philosophy* which I have had translated for my perusal have struck me very forcibly by reason of the emphasis with which you have expounded the necessity of the great philosophical principles which should be established in the human soul as the basis of all certitude and all religion, and which no revelation coming from without, however excellent it may be, can supplant.

I do not know to what degree you are a Christian.

As for myself, I worship the Word which is incarnate in Jesus Christ. But I do not forget that before having been manifested in a man and in having thus opened up a new epoch in the history of mankind, the Word was eternal and universal.

In their manner of understanding the religion of the incarnate Word, Christians too often miscomprehend the Eternal Word, the uncreated reason which proceeded from the Father before all time and from which proceedeth in time the reason and conscience of men.

Believe me, dear sir, sincerely yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

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20 April, 1895.

MY DEAR SIR:—My slight knowledge of English has hitherto enabled me to grasp but imperfectly your philosophical point of view, but I now comprehend it, thanks to the French translations of your works, *L'Idée de Dieu* and *Conscience du Moi*. I have found in these two works many good and beautiful things worthy of a philosopher and a man. But on one fundamental point I differ radically from you.

Not only as a Christian but as a thinker I believe absolutely in God, living and personal,—though not necessarily anthropomorphic,—and in the like personal immortality of the human ego. I say with Maine de Biran, "Science has two poles: infinite personality, which is God, and finite personality, which is the ego."

I could not live, I should be overwhelmed with intellectual and moral asphyxia, if I were to lose this double and profound conviction.

Truth is not for me an abstract ideal without a living support. It is the direct, unmediated radiation of the divine reason in human reason, and, as the Fourth Gospel excellently has it, "the light of the Word which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

I remain, dear sir, sincerely yours,

H. L.

Letter in Reply.

I am sorry that on the two most important points, the problems of God and the soul, you find yourself in disagreement with my position; but I am always delighted to meet an adversary of your type, a man of warm convictions and unusual intellectual ability, for you are not loath to give your reasons, and I am sure that they are worthy of consideration. If you point out to me my errors I shall be glad to change my views.

You write that you absolutely believe in a personal God and in a personal immortality of the human ego. These two ideas are to you as they were to Maine de Biran, the two poles of science, and you would be struck with intellectual and moral asphyxia if you ever lost this conviction; and as you understand by personal immortality the continuance of a human ego, so by personal God, you understand plainly an individual being, an ego personality, a concrete though spiritual existence. I can feel with you and I can sympathize with you, for I have been in the same predicament as you. But I cannot follow you. Nor can I approve of the fervor with which you emphasize your belief as the sole condition for the welfare of your soul. For

in doing so you endanger the future of those whom you impress with your powerful personality.

When I was young I was taught as you believe. I was taught that there was no God unless God was a personal God, and a personal God means a God who is possessed of an ego; God was characterized as a self, endowed with a consciousness of self. At the same time I was taught that immortality must be the ensured continuance of our personal consciousness in its idiosyncrasy with all individual recollections and relations.

Many struggles would have been spared me if my parents and teachers had not written on the guide-post that leads to a higher and purer religion the words "atheism and nihilism." Thus I was prevented for a long time from attaining a scientifically tenable conception of God and soul. But man cannot help growing, and I had, nevertheless, to march onward, though I could not avoid passing through atheism and nihilism, losing both my God and my soul; for after a most careful examination of these two problems, which, however, at bottom are one and the same problem in two applications, I came, against my own inclination, to the conclusion that there was no God and no

soul. Science has as little room for the huge world-ego of a God-individual as for the puny ego-entity of man, supposed to exist in addition to the psychic elements of which the human soul in the course of a long evolution has been built up. We might as well assume the existence of a metaphysical watch-essence as a distinct entity residing in the watch and representing the unity of its motions. I would gladly have believed in a personal God and in the reality of an ego soul, if I had not plainly recognized the desolate superfluity of these two postulates.

It is possible indeed that the world might have been built by a rational being according to a rational plan. But who, in that case, made the rationality of the Creator? Is not reason, which you will readily recognize as intrinsically necessary, eternal, and universal, superior to any individual God-being? Thus Reason would be an authority above God: it would be the God of God.

Here is the problem in a nutshell:

Take the simplest mathematical theorems, such as $2\times2=4$, or $(a+b)^2=a^2+2ab+b^2$. There are two possibilities for the anthropotheistic theologian: either these theorems have been shaped by God to hold good in the plan

of his creation, or God has cleverly adjusted his creation according to the laws of arithmetic and geometry. If God shaped these laws, they could not be independent of him; but they *are* independent of him, of an individual God, for we cannot help recognizing them to be true whether we believe in the existence of God or not. These rules, as all other rules of mathematics, arithmetic and logic, have not been created; they are intrinsically necessary, unconditionally true, absolute, universal, and eternal. Thus the second possibility remains only. God must have adjusted his creation to the laws of pure Reason, viz., to the eternal conditions of the cosmic order. And if God adjusted his creation to these eternal conditions of the cosmic order they are superior to him, as being a power to which he must conform. Such, indeed, is Plato's conception of God. Plato, when speaking of "the absolutely necessary," calls it " a necessity against which God himself is unable to contend."[1]

In reply to Plato's God-conception, which places necessity above God, we say that a God who is subject to a higher power does not deserve the name of God. Call him a divine spirit,

[1] *Laws*, 818. Cf. *Laws*, 741, and *Protag.*, 345.

an archangel, the demiurge, the world-fashioner, a god perhaps, but not God; for God, as I conceive him, is the highest authority, the ultimate *raison d'être* of existence, and the final standard of truth and righteousness.

On moral grounds the belief in an individual God is not less untenable. An anthropomorphic view of God would inevitably make the Creator responsible for all the untold misery in the world. If we accept traditional Christianity, no compensation is promised to the brute animal world, and for the majority of mankind misery is perpetuated in the sufferings of eternal damnation. And is it not sad that here the human heart that knows nothing of the sternness of scientific proof can take shelter only in agnosticism (the very enemy of any gnosis, scientific as well as religious,) by assuming that we can never comprehend the truth and had better trust in God's mysterious dispensation?

Only after a period of deep despair in which I felt myself forsaken by God and struck with a moral asphyxia such as you prophesy for yourself, did I regain my mental equilibrium.

Now let me tell you that when, after the bankruptcy of my belief in God, I began to calm down, I opened my eyes again and was

astonished that I could still see. I applied my mental abilities, and lo! I could still think. I had not lost my moral aspirations; and though I had utterly surrendered my self, such as it appeared to me in my personality, I had not abandoned my ideals, my appreciation of nobility of character, my admiration for beauty in conduct as well as in art, and above all my love of truth.

God had died to me, and I myself had become as dead. The world was so empty that death appeared rather as a redemption than an annihilation. But while I continued to live, I soon felt that the well-springs of my religious life had not dried up; the realities of life remained as they had been before, and these functions of my soul that, according to the traditional terminology, I had accustomed myself to call a belief in God, continued to operate. I learned through experience that that which in the traditions of Christianity is called God symbolizes actual facts. If God, as science unmistakably teaches, is not an individual being, he is after all a living presence, and if the soul is not an immortal ego, we cannot deny the actuality of the soul's pursuits, such as the treasures of science and art and the grand aims of moral endeavor.

The main argument that refutes the existence of an individual God-entity affords incontrovertible proof of the omnipresence of an intangible God who, being the rationality of reason, the life of the living, and the ultimate norm of moral aspirations, is alone the true God. Therefore I should not say that the laws of mathematics are superior to God, I should say that they are part and parcel of Him, viz., of the superpersonal God. They are the most important features of his nature. God cannot alter them, because he cannot alter himself. But if God were an individual being, a person such a one as we are, a deliberating, thinking ego-consciousness, only infinitely greater, wiser, and better than we, the laws of mathematics and all other formal laws of logic and arithmetic would indeed be superior to him; for mathematical and logical truths are intrinsically necessary and eternal, and a God-individual would have to conform to them in order to be wise and good and great.

The problem of the ego, both in God and in man, commands a wide interest among both professional thinkers and people in the practical walks of life, and justly so, for here lies the root of all difficulties. Man's personality is the most important fact of life. Says Goethe:

"Fürst und Volk and Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehen zu jeder Zeit,
Höchstes Glück der Menschenkinder
Ist doch die Persönlichkeit."

[Prince and people, and those who conquer,
Mankind in totality,
All agree, the bliss they hanker
For is 'personality.']

Personality asserts itself in conscious aspiration, in endeavor, in purposed action. Hence the importance of consciousness and of design. Both together constitute the functions of the soul. There would be no sense in life unless there were personality changing indifferent nature into a field of planned activity. The highest we can think of is that which creates and conditions personality. That is God; and the question is only whether or not God is a personality himself.

Our answer is, that the conditions of human personality are the same eternal laws, or necessary relations, or universal verities, or whatever you may call them, which constitute the entire cosmic order, for man's personality is nothing but a concentrated reflection of the cosmic order, a kind of quintessence of the divinity that is omnipresent in nature. These conditions are not an indifferent anything, but possess a definite character. Nor are they

scattered, isolated facts; they constitute a harmonious unity. Considering their unity, we call them in their religious significance in one word "God." The characteristic feature of personality is rational will, consisting in the realization of purpose; and purpose is design pursued with consciousness.

The cosmic order which reveals itself in the rationality of man, being unalterable and intrinsically necessary, does not only govern this actual world of ours, but, as an investigation of the nature of pure reason teaches, holds good universally for any possible kind of world, and may, therefore, very appropriately be called "supernatural." It is the purely relational, not the material; it is the formal, not the substantial; it comprises not the physical properties of nature, but the hyperphysical order of things which is applicable to any kind of world. It is what St. John calls the Logos that was in the beginning, not as a first-created being, but as part and parcel of God himself. Being the rationality of our thought and the endeavor in our noblest actions, God is nearer to us than any ego-God who is conceived as a distinct individuality can be, for God constitutes the very essence of our being.

We may call this conception of God "nomo-

theism."[2] The order of the universe, the irrefragable law that permeates nature, conditioning the tiny molecular crystallization of metals as well as the grand course of planets, and appearing in its highest manifestations as the rational will of man where it shows itself as moral endeavor, is God Himself. The uncreated and immutable laws of nature are themselves parts and parcels of God; they are features of His being; they are the characteristic aspects of His nature. They are the God whom science teaches. In their oneness we may call them the logic of facts, the world-reason or Logos. Science teaches that the Logos is uncreated; the Logos is the divinity of God.

Now, God (as I understand him to be), if he be God at all, is not conscious design, but, being the condition of organized unity of any kind, of law and cosmic order, he is also the condition of design, of man's rationality, of purposive action. As such God is also the condition of consciousness, for consciousness is organized sentiency; it is the irritability that prevails among the lower forms of nature, raised to the high level of self-apprehension. Having originated through organization, con-

[2]From the Greek, *νόμος* "law."

sciousness is the product of the order-producing cosmic laws that are intrinsically necessary and eternal.

But should we not admit the hypothesis of a God-consciousness, by conceiving the universe as a great organized unity, as an ego, endowed with the quality of self-apprehension, as a huge being in which the planets play a part analogous to the blood-corpuscles of the human brain? We reject this view of the universe as pantheistic, for it will be difficult for us to believe that the planetary motions are accompanied by consciousness; nor do we see any need of this assumption, as our God-idea is complete without it. God must be super-personal; in order to be God he cannot be merely personal.

I have come to the conclusion that Maine de Biran's comparison is in a certain sense both forcible and true: God and the ego are indeed like unto the north and the south poles of our starry heavens. They are the direction of astronomical lines, but if we were to go out in search of them among the stars, we should not be able to discover them. They are useful for certain practical purposes of astronomy from a terrestrial standpoint, and represent,

as such, real and indeed very important relations of the earth to the surrounding universe; but they are not entities, not things-in-themselves, not tangible or concrete objects, not individual things.

I am not a pantheist. I do not identify God and the universe, for God and nature are different. God is the omnipresent law, and not the sum total of all existences. Nor is the term God (as I use it) an empty abstraction, but a word of intensest significance, for indeed God is that which gives significance to the world.

I do not say that God is impersonal, for God is not a vague generality but possesses a distinct suchness. He is not indefinite, but exceedingly definite in character. We can as positively say what God is and what God is not, as we can distinguish between truth and untruth, between right and wrong, between good and evil. If you understand by personality definiteness of character, God is personal; but God's is not a human personality, his is a divine personality. His personality is not confined to the limits of individual concreteness; that is, His will is not a particular aspiration, but the eternal rightness that constitutes the condition

of the cosmic order, the physical aspect of which can be stated in a body of formulas,[3] called laws of nature.

While in one sense God is personal, being possessed of a definite character, we must insist on the truth that in another sense God is not personal. God is not personal in the sense that an individual being is called personal. God is not an individual being; he is not a particular existence; he is not a concrete ego-self; in a word, he is not a creature; but if he is God, he is truly God, *i. e.*, He is that which is omnipresent, absolute, intrinsically necessary, universal, eternal, the reality of all truth, and the norm of all righteousness. Being the condition of everything conditioned, he determines the suchness of all creatures and is especially also the condition of all personality in rational beings. For what is personality but individuality developed into the domain of rationality and endowed with moral aspiration? Being the condition of personality, God is superpersonal.

Since I understand that God is superper-

[3]The unity of a system of truths is frequently compared to an organized body, and it is in this sense that Buddhists speak of the three bodies or Kayas of Buddha, the Nirmana Kaya or body of transformation, Sambhoga Kaya, the body of bliss and eternal rest, and Dharma Kaya, the body of the law or the revelation of the truth as developing in the evolution of the Buddhist religion.

sonal, I cannot help looking upon the belief in a God who is a concrete and individual being endowed with an ego-consciousness, as a pagan notion. It is a belief that takes an allegory literally. Paganism, in my opinion, is nothing but a literal acceptance of a symbol or a myth, where we ought to seek for the truth that is conveyed to us in the form of a parable.

The superpersonal God as I conceive him is neither vague nor illusory, but definite and actual. As Newton's formula of gravitation is not an unmeaning phrase but a description of actualities, so the word God (in the sense in which I use the term) defines an omnipresent effectiveness, which is not material but incorporeal; not bodily but spiritual, not individual or concrete, but universal, yet at the same time definite.

When God is here defined as "spiritual," the word must not be interpreted in the sense in which spiritualists represent ghosts. The expression is here used in the sense of the Platonic term "causal,"[1] viz., that which is the determinative in causation. The Greek word is frequently translated by "formal" because form is the feature that gives character to a

[1] *αἰτιώδης.*

thing, and is the decisive element in the processes of transformation.

This conception of the superpersonal God, far from being atheistical, obviates the objections of atheism and shows the old truths of religion in a new light; it is in harmony with the most stringent critique, and is not only tenable on scientific grounds, but will be recognized as the sole philosophical basis of science formulated as a religious term.

The God of science, it is true, is not an individual being, but he is after all a reality as much as the law of gravitation; he is not an ego-entity with a limited range of consciousness, but is for that reason not a nondescript generality; he is definite in character and his qualifications are unmistakable. When we take the attributes of God—eternality, omnipresence—seriously, we shall understand that God cannot be personal, but for all that He is superpersonal. He is the condition of all personality, the prototype of man's reason, the norm of all moral purpose, the inspiration of ideals. He is the determinedness of the universe and the intrinsic necessity of the cosmic order itself. God cannot be an individual. He is not a man, he is God. He is not *a* God, but God.

God's thoughts are not acts of thinking,

they are verities such as mathematical laws. God does not think in syllogisms as we do; his ideas are not a chain of arguments; he does not deliberate, arriving finally at a conclusion and coming to a decision. In him the problem and its solution are one. His thoughts are not representations of the conditions of being, but the laws of pure being themselves.

Man's thoughts are representations. God's thoughts are eternal verities.

When we find a proposition that is intrinsically necessary and universal, a law that is uncreated and uncreatable, we must know that it is a thought of God. While thinking it, our thoughts are on holy ground, they are face to face with the Eternal.

It seems that glimpses of this higher God-conception are not foreign to the Gospel-writers. According to St. John, Christ did not say God is a spirit; he said "πνεῦμα ὁ θεός" (God is spirit). And again he did not say God is a loving personality, but "God is love." And when he was asked, "Where is thy father?" he replied, "I and the Father are one." The two poles of science which you seek, viz., God and man, are not special spots in the universe. They are ideals,—they are aspirations which are laid down in a line of "definite direction,"

in the God man, Christ, the Logos incarnate; here, if anywhere in our aspiring hearts, must we seek for God.

Here I agree with you that the Logos doctrine contains a great truth. The Logos, or World-Reason, takes shape in him who is perfect, in the God-man, the realized ideal of manhood, the paragon of mankind.

The Logos is incarnated not only in Christ, but in every rational being. The perfection of the Logos is not mere rationality, but moral endeavor, purity, holiness, charity, love; and the incarnate Logos in its perfection is as divine as the eternal world order, God the Father. Nor is it less divine in the various ideals of mankind as they appear to-day in the advance of civilization, in science, art, invention, and social progress, all of which in a word may be comprised under the name of the spirit manifesting itself—the Holy Spirit of the New Testament.

Allow me to add here that the trinity doctrine of the Church and the conception of the Logos or World-reason as an aspect of God Himself is quite tenable upon philosophical grounds, provided we do not believe in the letter of the dogma but comprehend its sense. There are not three God-individuals who are

one, but there is a superpersonal God who has three aspects which are allegorized in three personalities. As soon as the personality of God is construed to mean an individual God-being, the trinity doctrine becomes absurd. Hence the various rationalistic[5] reactions against this most fundamental dogma of traditional Christianity, and hence probably your own deep felt sympathy with the deistic teachings of Islam.

Our reason, our life, and our moral ideas are not human inventions; they are intrinsically necessary and cannot in their fundamental nature be other than they are according to the unalterable conditions of existence. The cosmic prototype of our existence, that something through the agency of which we have become intelligent and morally aspiring beings, is what I call God, and, thus, I recognize God as the ultimate norm of reason, the all-quickening wellspring of life and the obedience-enforcing authority of moral conduct, acting with the never-failing certainty of natural law.

The immortality of the soul remains a mystery so long as we still believe in an ego-entity,

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[5] "Rationalistic," not "rational." By "rationalistic" I understand the theories of the rationalistic school. Such rationalists are Arius, Pelagius, Mohammed, the Deists, the Unitarians, etc.

for we fail to understand the possibility of a continuance of our ego-personality, but when we learn that our thoughts and aspirations are our soul, that *they* constitute our personality, we see at once that we shall continue beyond the grave. Our thoughts will be thought again. The examples we set will be imitated, and our life will remain a factor in the evolution of mankind, not otherwise than every act of ours remains during our entire life with us as a living presence shaping our fate for good or evil. When we are gathered to our fathers, we shall remain active realities in the spirit-life of our race; we are and remain citizens of the Kingdom of God which is not beyond the clouds but in the hearts of men.

Although the whole combination of a man, his bodily frame, and the energy that manifested itself in the discharges of his nervous activity breaks utterly down in death, all the personal features of his soul remain according to the actions which he performed during life. Man's life is transient, but his deeds are immortal, and deeds are soul-activity; deeds constitute the soul, indeed, they are the most characteristic features of personality. Our deeds are not extraneous or foreign to us, they are ourselves; and our deeds continue according to

the law of causation, for the same reason that every event which takes place continues in its effects and that every thought of ours lingers with us as a memory. Effects may be modified and offset by other effects, but they can never be annihilated; they remain for ever and aye modifying the universe in exact proportion to the range and nature of their causes.

Here again we must understand that the soul is spiritual, not material nor kinematic. The soul does not consist of substance, nor is it an energy or a force; the soul is the significance residing in forms of life, and thus it constitutes the essential and determinative feature of a being.

Here is an illustration: A poet writes a verse to a friend, and it so happens that in the course of time the ink fades and the paper crumbles into dust. Is the verse itself thereby destroyed? No, not at all. The verse (that is to say, that peculiar sentiment expressed in definite words) cannot be destroyed, for it is not of the earth earthy; it is spiritual. Previous to the destruction of the writing the verse was received and read; it was copied and printed; and its sentiments are now repeated by hundreds and thousands of people. The copy which the poet wrote is transient, but the

life of the verse is not limited to the single copy. By being read it impresses itself upon other minds and thus acquires the faculty of resurrection. It will reappear, according to the power of its intrinsic worth in combination with external conditions that may favor or obliterate its reappearance. But be it ever so neglected, it will remain forever and aye an indelible modification of the constitution of the universe.

The immortality of the soul is of the same kind. It is spiritual, not corporeal. But it is real, and among all the realities of the world, it is the most important, the most essential, the most vital reality; and the recognition of this reality is the most paramount religious truth. Thus it appears that the pantheistic notion of the soul as being dissolved in death into the All is from this standpoint a gross error. First, because the soul is not a fluid that could be absorbed by or resolved into a large reservoir of a kindred fluid, as a river loses its identity in the ocean; and, secondly, because the deeds of a man, that is to say, his spiritual existence, or his soul, retain all their peculiar and characteristic features, just as the verses of the poet preserve their identity throughout

all the time to come even after the destruction of the original copy.

We may compare man's life to the writing and type-setting of a book. Life is labor, and death is the consummation of our labor. While the bookmaker toils there is life in his efforts. After the distribution of the type his labors cease, but his book does not cease to exist; it enters a higher career of existence. Thus, if a man of science passes out of this life, the truth he has found is not lost; when a mother sinks into the grave, the fruits of her maternal care and of the example she gave to her children are not buried with her; when a hero dies for a great cause, his ideal remains with us. The body dies, but the soul lives; and the soul is purely spiritual, not an essence, not a sense-function, not a force. It is the significance of man's life-work in all its definiteness and in all its personal identity.

Thus death is not a curse, nor is it an annihilation, but merely a going to rest. It is the consummation of life's labor, but not an end of its usefulness and its significance. The dead are blessed, for "they rest from their labors," but their works do not cease; they continue to be a living influence in the world.

To sum up: Traditional religion is based

upon belief, and I do not deny that a belief in what children are told to believe, a trust in their spiritual fathers, is, within certain limits, beneficial, but let me add, belief is not as essential to religion as is commonly thought. Belief characterizes a stage of religious immaturity. The highest religion is a trust in truth. The facts of life, of our own experience in addition to that of the human race, are, if they are carefully weighed and rightly interpreted, the safest basis to build upon. They are a divine revelation which teaches us the solidarity of all existence, demanding of us to suppress passions and to seek comfort for affliction in charity and good will. Such a religion (a religion based on facts) is possible, and as it is purified in the furnace of scientific criticism it may be called "the religion of science."

Science and religion will both gain by their alliance. Science is not profane (as many think); science and its sternness in searching for the truth is holy. And religion is neither irrational nor anti-scientific; religion is nothing but obedience to the truth; it is man's enthusiasm to be one with truth and to lead a life of truth.

Try to understand the position which I have

laid down before you and show me its errors. Years ago I thought as you do but have been compelled to surrender my position. Can you persuade me to return to yours? The question does not concern you and me alone, but mankind; for there are thousands who share your views but are beset with doubts, and I venture to say that there are not a few (unchurched people as well as members of various denominations and religions) who have progressed on the same road with me. If the new path of the religion of science is the narrow path of life, as I trust that it is, this conception of religion will become in time the religion of mankind.

If we would understand that growth is the plan of life, we would see that intellectual, moral, and religious growth is as necessary as the progress of science and invention; we would comprehend that God's revelation is not as yet a closed book, and that we are here to decipher its writings. And the duty of the hour is to make scientifically definite what has come down to us in the shape of prophetic symbols.

Père Hyacinthe's Rejoinder.

My Dear Sir:—I have read with deep attention the remarkable letter which you have been so kind as to

write to me on the doctrinal points wherein we two differ. Nevertheless, it has not convinced me.

At the present moment I have absolutely no time at my disposal for discussing your arguments with the thoroughness which they deserve, but I hope to be able to do so later.

For the present, therefore, I shall restrict myself to saying that your reasoning simply proves, so far as I can see, the profound and infinite difference there is between the personality of God and that of man or of any creature whatsoever. With this understanding I am quite willing to say with you, that God is not personal but superpersonal

I admit also that in the future life, or at least in the definitive state of the future life, the only one which we can call eternal, our personality, without ever being of the same nature with that of God, will yet be so stripped of its present infirmities that it will exhibit a character far superior to that which it possesses now. Nothing will be destroyed. All will be transformed. "Man shall end where God commences."

What I affirm is that the immortality of the personal ego of the intelligent, moral and religious agent is not a purely ideal and abstract thing but a living and real one. "Because I live, ye shall live also," saith the God of Christians.

As to your statement that the laws of mathematics and ethics are not dependent on the *free will* of God, I have never believed that they were. But it does not follow from this that they are a power superior to him and of the nature of an impersonal God set above any dominating over the personal God. These laws depend on the very constitution of the eternal and necessard being of God, and as that being is conscious and intelligent he sees them eternally and necessarily in his own proper bosom. It is what the Christian theologian, who perfected the doctrine which he inherited from Plato, admirably says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God. . . . and the Word was the Light."

I must beg your pardon for these hurriedly written

lines, but if you believe them of any value you may publish them in your magazine with my preceding letter and the answer which you made to it.

With sympathetic regards, I remain,

Very truly yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

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Father Hyacinthe Loyson, in a letter of September, 1907, writes with reference to conversations we had at Paris on various philosophical subjects and especially on the problem of God, as follows:

"My God is superpersonal like yours, like the En-Sof of the Cabbala which I have been studying a little lately; but this God is at the same time the Heavenly Father of the Gospel, the inmost ear which hears the inarticulate language of the soul, the inmost mouth which speaks to it in an inarticulate language—inarticulate also but the more profound and the more efficacious because it is inarticulate."

In comment on Father Hyacinthe's remark I would say that I gladly grant that his further description of God does not contradict my conception of Him, and I have insisted at various times that God is not only the world-order such as we formulate it in great outlines as natural laws, but also and mainly what in Biblical language we would call "The Still Small Voice." It is He that speaks to us in the most intimate sentiments of religious feelings, inarticulate though these feelings may be. I still hold the idea that God can be understood from

the standpoint of a scientific investigation, but I also grant that to the unscientific man a scientific formula is unmeaning, and he would naturally be more satisfied with the hazy picture of his inarticulate sentiment because that to him is the reality, and the scientific formula, as it has been boiled down in the alembic of a logical analysis, is to him a foreign and meaningless jumble of words. I would at the same time insist that the still small voice is powerful not only in the heart of a devotee; it is not purely a subjective sentiment, but there is something real corresponding to it in the objective universe. There is a feature in the destiny of the evolution of life that tenderly preserves the finer and nobler aspirations, which naturally gives the impression that a fatherly care guides and protects mankind

The scientific way of looking at things is after all one method only of treating our experiences. We claim that there is nothing that cannot be subjected to it, and it is the only way of reaching the standpoint of a higher conception which will enable us to rise above the standpoint of sentimentality. Culture based upon science affords a foundation for a man that will enable him to rise above a mere sentimental morality of goodness, as high as primitive man-

kind rises above the brute creation. Yet for all that, in spite of the unparalleled importance of science, the sentimental method of contemplating the world which utilizes the short cut of mystic imagery is also quite justifiable, and will be a very serviceable surrogate of a real philosophical insight into the nature of the divinity of the cosmos. It will enable the man who is incapable of scientific thought to enter at least with his sentiments into the inmost heart of the nature of being which thereby he will understand according to the measure not merely of his own intellect, but also of the culture of his heart. What the philosopher thinks in clear definitions, which appear cold and dry to an outsider, the mystic theologian tries to comprehend in sentiments by the assistance of allegories, symbols and parables, sometimes in poetic visions and ecstatic yearnings.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The author has given various lectures at different times on the theme which forms the subject of this book, and they have always elicited more or less discussion—perhaps especially those delivered before the philosophical clubs of the Universities of Chicago and Michigan. Some of the more important questions

that have arisen from these lectures throw additional sidelights upon the solution of the God problem, and may appropriately be incorporated here at the close of this volume.

Question 1. "Your formulation of the God-problem contains two sides; one part of it is strictly scientific, the other religious. How do you unite both?

I have endeavored to present a plain statement of facts and have then given a religious appreciation of those factors which shape the world at large and determine our lives, "roughhew them as we may." These factors are eternal necessities: that is to say, we can understand that they must be such as they are and cannot be otherwise. They are not a plurality of factors, but are one throughout. They are uncreated and uncreatable, and therefore not the ordinance of a deity. They form an inevitable omnipresence in which all things live and move and have their being. On the one hand they are not an individual being of concrete existence; they are not here nor there; but they are truly everywhere at once. They are not this nor that particular existence which says "I am," excluding any other "thou"; they are not anything particular; they are the universal in the particular. Yet, on the other hand, neither are they nonentities. Although they are not concrete entities, they are none the

less real. Indeed, they are the most important feature of everything real. They would remain the same, even though all material reality were annihilated. In this sense they are superreal. If nature did not exist, they would remain true; in this sense they are supernatural. They constitute the possibility of mentality and of moral aspirations and thus they build a higher realm of spiritual life upon the purely physical domain of existence. In this sense they are hyperphysical. Being the purely formal features of existence, they are the prototype of reason and the foundation of everything intellectual, mental, spiritual.

Although universal, they are not indefinite; on the contrary, they are the determination of every definite suchness in the world.

Although not particular and not individual, they are not lacking in that which constitutes personality; they possess a specific character which is sufficiently pronounced to lay down for all its creatures certain ascertainable rules of conduct and a standard of moral goodness.

These are facts concerning which there can be no disagreement; and they possess a direct bearing on our lives. They are the realities in the experience of mankind which were formulated under the name of God, and on our atti-

tude toward them our entire life depends—our world-conception, our ultimate motives of actions, our moral ideals, our consolation in the vicissitudes of fate, our destiny in general.

Should this realm of the most important realities remain neglected? Should the hyperreal, the supernatural, the hyperphysical be left unheeded because its truth is more subtle than the grossly real, the crudely natural, the merely physical, the material? Certainly not. The historian can watch the growth of an appreciation of these higher factors of life in the development of religion which instinctively discovers the most salient moral truths and expresses them in allegories and parables. Are the parables untrue because they must not be taken literally? No, and a thousand times no! Religion is not the product of priestcraft but is the natural outcome of a groping after the truth. Mythology is the dawn of religion, as alchemy and astrology are the beginning of chemistry and astronomy. There is a close analogy between the religious and scientific evolution of man; and let us bear in mind that evolution has its phases; it passes through several stages; and if we have succeeded in attaining to the solution of a great problem, it will prove to be only a starting-point for new

problems. Evolution is never closed. Life is constant growth; completion or consummation would mean death. The religious life of mankind is no exception. There are still higher vistas of a deeper religious revelation in store for us, and they will justify the religious aspirations of former periods. They will come to fulfil, not to destroy. They will teach us the reality of the still, small voice in the human heart and afford us a key to the significance of the mythology of the savage and of the parable as it was crystallized in mediæval dogmatism.

Question 2. "Is not your God-idea a mere abstraction and therefore lacking in the vitality which is indispensable for a religious conception?"

This question rests upon the assumption, which is quite common among many people, that abstract ideas are empty, unmeaning, and unreal. This is an error. Abstract ideas are, if they are but true, as significant as their poetical personifications; there is only this difference between the two, that while abstract ideas are more definite, the people who are not trained in exact thinking are more impressed by poetical descriptions than by concise formulas.

To attempt giving a philosophical definition of God in a missionary sermon addressed to the Zulus, or in our midst, to a Salvationist meeting, would be as much out of place as trying to

teach mathematics or explain the falling of stones by the Newtonian formula to a child of three or four years. But because abstractions are empty and unmeaning to the unschooled, they are not redundant; on the contrary they are of the greatest importance and full of significance to those who have acquired the habits of exact thought. He who speaks of abstractions as being empty, only proves that he is still in the period of mental infancy for which the milk of mythology is alone the proper food. He can not yet digest the meat of scientific accuracy.

Question 3. "Is not a certain anthropomorphism allowable in speaking of God?"

Anthropomorphism in speaking of God is not only allowable, but, according to circumstances, even indispensable, for it is the means and the sole means by which the untutored masses, the half-civilized races, and all the many adult children that we find everywhere, can be approached.

Anthropomorphism was a necessary phase in the religious evolution of mankind and will remain indispensable even to the scientific thinker for the purpose of artistic and emotional expressions. Only we must remain conscious of our anthropomorphism and must avoid

drawing conclusions from terms which are purely allegorical.

For instance, God is not a father in the literal sense. Take the allegory in the literal sense, and the highpriest, Ananias, was justified in denouncing the very thought of it as blasphemy. On this ground Mohammed rejects the Christian doctrine of the sonship of Christ. But understand that it is an allegory, symbolizing God's intimate relation to every one of us, and it will be difficult to find a more beautiful and more impressive simile.

Question 4. "Do you regard this view of God as compatible with the Christian conception of God?"

It is not only compatible with the Christian conception, it is the Christian conception itself, in its matured and purified form. Any one who holds the traditional conception of God will be confronted with problems as to the nature of God as soon as his mind becomes scientifically trained. In the face of the truth that the world order is not made but is intrinsically necessary and eternal, he can no longer look upon God as an individual being who makes worlds as the watchmaker makes watches. If it is impossible that God ordained those uniformities which are commonly called natural laws, the question rises, "Is God sub-

ject to certain universal necessities, or if not, what is his relation to them?" The solution here offered which regards every law of the cosmos, everything eternal in nature, everything universal in our experiences, as a part and parcel of God himself, will appeal only to those who have been confronted with the problem. Those who know of science and philosophy from hearsay only will not be in need of any reconciliation between religion and science, and we must excuse them for regarding the very attempt at comprehending the significance of God as a waste of time and idle talk.

Question 5. "Your conception of God is quite simple and apparently acceptable to the theist and the atheist. But it takes away all mystery."

Well! The purpose of every scientific and philosophical investigation is to do away with a mystery of some kind. An unsolved problem mystifies us, but when it is solved the facts are clear, and we might repeat with Schopenhauer, "*Simplex veri sigillum.*"

Question 6. "Is not mystery God's very nature?"

Many people love the mysterious and are afraid of clear thought; but if God really represented the mysterious, *i. e.*, the inexplicable, and atheism represented clear thought or the solution of problems, the duty of science would be to reduce the domain of God to the utmost

and if possible to let him entirely disappear. But God, if he is God at all and not merely the prop of superstition, is the light of the world, not its darkness; he appears in the order of the world and not in the supposed reversions of the world-order, commonly called miracles; he is the principle that pervades science, that conditions reason, and enhances progress, not a personification of obscurantism, ignorance, and reaction.

Question 7. "Do you not explain too much? Do you not explain God away and leave intangible relations, pure form, and natural laws in his place?"

Is it possible to explain too much? Does a phenomenon which is understood disappear? The reality of God remains the same whether or not his nature be understood. But we have the advantage of avoiding the errors connected with a literal belief in the allegories under which God is comprehended by the uneducated masses of mankind.

Do you think that music ceases to be music when we understand that the objective reality outside of us consists of air-vibrations, the intervals of which possess definite mathematical proportions? The beauty of music remains the same whether or not we understand its nature. It is the same with fire, electricity, life, and all other processes of nature. Fire was formerly

supposed to be a peculiar stuff; it was regarded as one of the imponderable substances and was called *phlogiston*. Since we understand that fire is a mode of motion and not an imponderable stuff, we know that the existence of phlogiston is a pure invention of the misguided imagination of former scientists, but fire is as real now as it ever was. Thus that ultimate *why* of existence which by one word we call God, remains as real to-day as it ever was of yore, only we know to-day better what it is.

Question 8. "Is not the term superpersonal a mere euphemism for impersonal? If God is not an individual, he cannot be a person, for every person is an individual."

Allow me the counter-question, What constitutes personality? I grant that every person is an individual which is possessed of particularity, being bodily always at a given moment in a special place. A person in this sense is here, not there, and in this sense God is not a person. But the personality of man consists in his being possessed of reason and pursuing rational purposes. What is reason but the recognition of the universal? If the universal takes abode in an individual, the individual changes into a person, or in other words, it acquires personality. God is the principle of personality

itself; he is the condition that renders personality possible. In his image man is made.

Question 9. "Is not a person an individual, endowed with reason, or intelligence, sentiency, and will?"

Yes! But sentiency is not a quality which is typical of personality; it is not a feature that belongs exclusively to man; it belongs in the same degree to the animal. That which constitutes the characteristic feature of personality is the intelligence of the universal in experience which is rendered possible through language. Every man is, in this sense, more or less an incarnation of the Logos. In him the notion has originated of that which remains the same in all changes. He sees things (as Spinoza has it) *sub specie aeterni,* under the aspect of the eternal.

Allow me here to call your attention to the close connection between sentiency and matter. All sentiency is particular; it is always in a special place and time; it is always awareness of material objects, involving material existence. Sentiency originates through a contact of matter with matter. Matter has been defined as the sense-perceived, and sentiency is the matter-perceiving. As to God, taking God now as the absolute Deity which in the Christian dogmatology is called God the Father, viz., the

formative factor of the world, or God the Creator, we should say that He is unmaterial and is not a sentient being. God is called "holy," which means, separated from everything sensual and sensory. Yet God possesses a definite character, and his character determines the nature of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong, of goodness and badness.

While God is not an individual, he is not devoid of personality. A system of truths, or rather of such norms determining the actual world as can be formulated in statements of fact, in laws or truths, may be called a spiritual body, an organism, or a personality; for it is that which constitutes the personality of a person. In this sense God is not a person but a personality. Further, God manifesting himself in evolution and culminating in the God-man, God as the divinity of this actual world of ours, the second person of the Christian trinity, is endowed with personality even as a cosmic principle. He has a will, or to avoid even the semblance of anthropomorphic expressions, he is the determinedness of the process of evolution. The universe has a definite character which is that which makes for progress, the onward motion of mankind, the power that makes for righteousness; the bliss of goodness,

the curse of sin; in a word, the verdict of consequence which inevitably follows every deed according to the law of causation. God has a will, and he pursues a definite design. Only his will is not like the will of a man; his will is the eternal determinedness of events. His design is not the plan of a Prometheus (*i. e.*, a fore-thinker), a meditating plodder, a deliberate worker and constructor. God's design is the immanent, eternal order of things and the unalterable, immutable necessity that naturally produces the obviously noticeable fitness of things.

After these comments the remark will not be misunderstood, that God is not an individual being but after all he possesses personality; yet his personality is different from the personality of man, which is the personality of an individual, and therefore I prefer to call God superpersonal.

Question 10. "Is God conscious of himself?"

The question should be, How does God become conscious of himself? Consciousness is a representation of oneself for the purpose of adapting one's conduct to the requirement of circumstances. God as the absolute unity of the formative factors of the world, the ultimate norm of all existence in its superreal eternality,

is not in need of consciousness and could not, without gross anthropomorphism, be said to be conscious of himself. But God in his practical attitude as the manifestation of the Divine in the process of evolution necessarily becomes conscious in the ideal aspirations of mankind which are pursued with purposive efforts of a morally determined will. God awakens to consciousness in man, and here we are confronted with the deepest truth of Christianity. The self-consciousness of God is realized in the God-man, in Christ, in the man of good will, in him whom Buddhists call the Perfectly Enlightened One, and Taoists the Superior Sage, or Holy Man. Mohammedanism saw in the trinity doctrine a tritheism; it returned therefore to a rigid unitarianism which conceived God in his absolute aspect alone. To the strict unitarian the word of St. John, "I and the father are one," is blasphemy as much as the idea that God is love itself, appears to be a veiled atheism. Mohammed declares that God is unbegotten and he does not beget. Accordingly he abhors the idea of Christ's sonship. From our standpoint the Christian trinity doctrine is a decided progress upon the prior unitarianism as it deepens the God-idea and dwells on the

importance of the divine immanence in the evolution of moral ideas.

Question 11. "Do you believe that mere relations are real?"

I do not believe, I know. Belief of any kind is excluded from this scientific formulation of the God-idea. There is nothing hypothetical about it; it is a systematized formulation of facts. These so-called mere relations, or these purely formal uniformities, are not substances, are not energies, are not metaphysical essences of any kind; yet they are the determinants of the world.

Real means that which produces effects. The German *wirklich* shows the significance of the term in its etymology. *Wirklich* is that which *works,* or produces effects, that which determines the suchness of causation. Now, the purely formal uniformities are the determinative element of the forms of reality. If anything is real, they are real. Their reality is different from the reality of a stone or any other concrete object; but it is rather more real than less. The reality of a definite piece of matter is in one place, but the reality of the law of gravitation is ubiquitous; and this is not a matter of belief, it is a scientific truth, demonstrable in experience and verifiable by experiments.

Question 12. "Is not belief an essential element in religion?"

No! Belief is not essential, but faith is. Belief is imperfect knowledge. Should not the perfect be better than the imperfect? Belief is only essential to religion if the word is used in the sense of faith.

We must distinguish between faith and belief. The Greek word *pistis* means faith, confidence, trust; and the Hebrew *amunah* means firmness, reliability, trustworthiness. Belief in the sense of accepting unverified and unverifiable statements without investigation is not only not essential in religion, but downright irreligious. It is a sacred duty to inquire and gain as much light as possible on the main problems of life. To take for granted certain doctrines which are handed down to us by tradition, is immoral and must lead to the sanctification of superstition. What we need in life is not belief but faith. Belief is a matter of intelligence, or rather of neglect of intelligence; faith is a moral attitude. We need faith, *i. e.,* faithfulness, firmness, stability, moral earnestness in life. We need the inspiration of good will toward all, above all we need a trust in truth. Indeed, we might condense the definition of the religious attitude to

these three little words: religion is "trust in truth."

Question 13. "Do you think it possible that a clergyman could hold your views and remain in his church?"

Certainly I do think so. In fact, I have received letters from various clergymen—personally unknown to me—who thanked me for the light they had received from writings of mine on the religious question. Two of them wrote that, having been affected by the contradictions between the letter of the dogma and the results of science, they had thought of leaving the Church, but now they saw their religious traditions in a new light and had thereby been enabled to find a conciliation between religion and science. They could now stay in the Church. They felt no longer the bitter self-reproach of hypocrisy, but could attend to their duties with a clear conscience and in gladness, as they had done in younger years before the scruples of doubt had attacked their souls. One clergyman told me that he had formerly seen no other way out of the difficulty than by turning to agnosticism for comfort, but now he saw that the religious evolution tended toward a scientific religion which would no longer be in need of mysticism.

How compatible with the active duties of a

clergyman a philosophical conception of religion is or can be, may be learned from the fact that Bishop Berkeley, Herder, and Schleiermacher were bold and radical thinkers. I may also mention Pope Sylvester II. and other men of scientific distinction among the clergy. If my philosophy be incompatible with the position of a clergyman, the philosophies of these men, too, ought to be condemned as heretical.

I propose a philosophical interpretation of certain facts which have produced religion, the Churches, and dogmas; or rather I formulate the facts and show them under a certain aspect, that is all. I do not deny the facts; I deny only some unscientific explanations of these facts and replace them by a simpler explanation which abandons the antiquated metaphysical views and reconstructs the experiences of our religious life upon the basis of a rigid positivism.

Question 14. "But are not clergymen pledged to accept a belief in the letter of their dogmas?"

The pledges of clergymen when they are ordained are different in different churches. In some denominations they are very loose and allow much liberty; in others they are more direct; but, so far as I know, a belief in the letter is nowhere exacted. On the contrary, the

most dogmatic churches give their members the greatest freedom of interpretation.

The faith of the Church is laid down in the symbolical books from the Apostolic Creed down to the most recent confessions of faith and platforms, but the very name "symbolical" implies that they contain truths which are not stated with scientific precision but in terms of symbols. The very first sentence of the Apostolic Creed, "I believe in God the Father," is an obvious allegory, and the allegorical nature of the term has never been denied. These formulations of doctrine are first of all historical documents; they must be treated with reverence and respect. We accept them as we accept the testaments of our parents and grandparents. They have been made to assist us, not to enslave us. It is our duty to think the same problems over again and revise the old statements in the fuller light of modern science.

Question 15. "How do you define the various conceptions of God, and would you look upon your own view as monotheistic?"

Bear in mind that by God I understand the ultimate authority of conduct, our norm of truth and of finality. Here are my definitions of the various theories concerning the nature of God.

Theism is the belief in God without any qualification.

Atheism rejects any conception of God. True atheism denies that there is any moral obligation.

Polytheism is the belief in many gods.

Monotheism declares that there is but one God.

Anthropotheism looks upon God as a personal being like man.

Pantheism identifies the All with God.

Deism is the view adopted by the Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, who rejected miracles but held that God is a personal and supernatural being, the Creator and Legislator of the universe.

Entheism regards God as inseparable from the world. He is the eternal in nature.

Cosmotheism traces God in the cosmic order.

Nomotheism (from the Greek word *nomos*, i. e., "law") recognizes God in the uniformities of nature.

Monotheism as it is commonly held is the belief in a single God. In this sense monotheism is actually a polytheism that has reduced its gods to one in number. But I would prefer

to call this conception "henotheism" (derived from the Greek *heis*, gen. *henos*, i. e., one).

Monotheism ought to mean not that God is one single God but that He is unique. God is neither one individual God nor a plurality of many Gods. Number does not apply to him. God is one in the sense that there is one kind of Godhood. There is not one God-being; but there is divinity. God is one in the same sense that there is but one reason and but one truth.

The God-conception which I deem true might be called nomotheism or cosmotheism, or also monotheism, according to definition; but I object to deism, pantheism, and atheism.

APPENDIX.

GODWARD.

Nearer, my God, to thee,
  Nearer alway;
E'en though thou other be
  Than prophets say.
Other thou art but higher,
Bidding our souls aspire
  Godward alway.

Doubt comes from God, in sooth,
  Though conquering creeds;
Doubt prompts our search for truth
  And higher leads.
Who on doubt's path ne'er trod,
Ne'er saw the face of God:
  Doubt truthward speeds.

Science the burning bush
  Where God doth dwell!
Truth and its onward rush
  Nothing can quell.
God is the truth that guides,
Heaven where love abides:
  Sin's curse is Hell.

God the eternal cause
  Of truth and right;
Oneness of cosmic laws,
  Reason's true light.
God, though nowhere confined,
Yet in the human mind
  Showeth His might.

God is man's truthward call,
  Noblest desire.
He's in life cosmical,
  Love's holy fire.
Thou who art All in All
God superpersonal,
  Lead Thou us higher.

THE GOD OF STRENGTH.

The God who made the iron grow
  He wanteth men of iron,
Who in all things their manhood show;
  He scorneth slave and tyran.
He wanteth men of iron will,
  Men genuine and real,
Whose glowing hearts yet throb and thrill
  With love of the ideal.

The God who made the iron grow
  Shaped nature's constitution,
And iron laws did he bestow,
  The God of evolution.
Making his creatures keenly vie,
  Compete, fight, and aspire,
He loveth those who dare to die
  For aims that lead man higher.

The God who made the iron grow
  Enjoyeth strife, not quarrel.
Brute force he ever layeth low,
  Yet deems the faint immoral!
The Father who o'er nature reigns
  Eschews the sentimental.
And mawkish sweetness he disdains:
  Stern is his love parental.

The God who made the iron grow
He granteth no protection.
He bids us struggle with our foe,
His law, it is selection.
He sifteth nations in a sieve,
The strongest find their rival;
He chooseth from the things that live,
Things worthy of survival.

Who's lacking iron, he's no man,
Be he in rags or ermine,
For each one 'tis but iron can
His real worth determine.
The God of love He careth naught
For love with no strength in it.
The crown he giveth those who've fought,
The prize to those who win it.

THE ETERNAL.

Eternity, thou wondrous word,
With hallowed awe my soul has stirred,
Deep thought, and yet so simple.
Thou, the abiding and sublime,
Art never moved in change of time,
A rock for church and temple.
Filling
And stilling
All the yearning
Of souls, burning
For resplendent
Glories of the realms transcendent.

Thou reason's norm inviolate,
Type universal, uncreate,
Direction of all motion.
To thinkers thou art nature's law,
The prophet thou inspir'st with awe,
Life's comprehensive ocean.
Mankind
There can find
In thy canons
All the tenons
Which join duty
To their lives in noble beauty.

Causation's dire necessity,
Dread of the blind, is yet the key
To all life's doubt and query.
Eternal truths when understood
Change curse to bliss, the bad to good,
And give new strength the weary.
Brighten,
Enlighten,
Cleanse from error,
Free from terror;
Newly quicken
Those who are with darkness stricken!

Eternity is not a place,
'Tis All-hood's omnipresent trace,
Identity in changes.
It shapes the reason of our minds
Where the etern expression finds
In thought's unmeasured ranges.
Beaming
And streaming;
Soul-life starting.

Sense-imparting,
Truth's true basis
Which all things in love embraces.

* * * * *

O use life's moments while they flee,
In aspect of eternity:
In acts abides the actor.
Eternity is immanent,
And life remains, such as 'tis spent,
For aye a living factor;
Sowing,
Seeds growing,
Never waning
But attaining
To resplendent
Glories of the realms transcendent.

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